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ABSTRACT
REAL AND NOMINAL EFFECTS OF EXCHANGE RATE
REGIMES
DECEMBER 2016
Emiliano Libman
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF BUENOS AIRES
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF BUENOS AIRES
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Arslan Razmi
This dissertation explores some of the macroeconomic effects of exchange rate regimes
and the role of real exchange rate on capital accumulation and growth. The first essay ana-
lyzes the factors that promotes episodes of accelerated capital accumulation that last seven
years or longer. After identifying 189 such episodes, I rely on econometric analysis to explore:
(i) the conditions that increase the likelihood of an episode taking place, (ii) the presence of
structural change during episodes, and (iii) the characteristics that distinguish episodes that
are sustained beyond the final year from those that are not. Turning points in investment
tend to be preceded by fast growth, stable and undervalued currencies, low inflation, and low
capital inflows, especially on the portfolio account. During the episodes, economies experi-
ence a shift in their economic structure, from agriculture toward the manufacturing sector.
Sustained episodes seems to be related to trade openness, low incidence of macroeconomic
vii
crises, a relatively closed capital account, and low dependence of natural resources, but these
results are not very robust. The second essay explores the relation between exchange rate
regimes and real exchange rate misalignments in an unbalanced panel of 100 countries, span-
ning the period 1979-2010. The propensities to adopt a particular exchange rate regime are
estimated using different exchange rate regime determinants, and the results are used to
create a control group to compare with the countries that adopt a peg. The comparison of
countries that use pegs with countries that have similar characteristics, but use more flexible
arrangements, suggest that pegs are associated with more overvaluation. The results are
robust to different exchange rate regime classifications, misalignment indexes, and matching
estimators. The third and final essay discusses the effects of Inflation Targeting in Latin-
American countries during the period 2000-2015. Some authors have argued that there is
a flaw in the way in which the system has been conducted in the region. In good times,
the Central Banks are reluctant to cut interest rates, but in bad times they are willing to
raise interest rates very aggressively, adding a procyclical bias to monetary and exchange
rate policies. Using different econometric techniques, I find that these Central Banks, with
the exception of Chile, suffer from “fear of floating” (i.e., the Central Bank combat depreci-
ations more aggressively than appreciations), and that this is more pronounced for the case
of Brazil and Mexico, as the literature have argued.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. INVESTMENT SURGES: AN EXPLORATION OF THEIR
DETERMINANTS, STRUCTURE AND SUSTAINABILITY
ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
1.1 Introduction and Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Episode Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.1 Episode Determinants. Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Robustness and Other Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.1 Large Changes in the Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.2 Lags and Leads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4.3 Determinants by Country Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5 Episode Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.6 Sustainability of Capital Accumulation After Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
ix
2. THE EFFECTS OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ON REAL
EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.2.1 Measuring the ERRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.2.1.1 Mixed De Facto Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.2.1.2 Pure De Facto Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.2.2 Choosing the ERR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
2.2.3 The Impact of the ERR on performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.2.4 The literature on exchange rate “misalignment” and growth . . . . . . . . . . 116
2.2.5 Taking Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
2.3 Econometric Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2.3.1 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
2.3.2 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
2.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3. ASYMMETRIC MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES
IN LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES USING INFLATION
TARGETING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
3.3 Exchange rate trends and empirical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
3.3.1 LSTAR-2 and Markov-Switching Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
3.3.2 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
3.3.3 GMM Reaction Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
3.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
APPENDICES
A. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR INVESTMENT
EPISODES DETERMINANTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
B. GMM ESTIMATIONS USING THE INFLATION GAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
x
BIBLIOGRAPHY . ................................................................................................... 231
                xi
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1.1 Investment and saving across regions as a percent of GDP, 1960-2014 . . . . . . . . . 47
1.2 List of Episodes (Asia) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.3 List of Episodes (Africa & the Middle East) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.4 List of Episodes (Africa & the Middle East, continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.5 List of Episodes (Latin America & the Caribbean) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.6 List of Episodes (Europe & North America) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.7 Unconditional Probabilities by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.8 Unconditional Probabilities by Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.9 Variable Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.10 Summary Statistics and Expected Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.11 Baseline Probits - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.12 Probits with the Smallest Sample - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.13 Robustness OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.14 Robustness Logits - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.15 Stricter Filter Probits - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.16 Very Strict Filter Probits - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.17 1st Year Probits - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
xii
1.18 5 Year Windows Probits - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.19 9 Year Windows Probits - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.20 K Probits - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1.21 PPP Probits - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1.22 Large Changes Probits - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1.23 Probits with Lag 1 - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1.24 Probits with Lag 3 - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
1.25 Probits with Lag 5 - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
1.26 Probits with Lead 1 - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1.27 Probits with Lead 3 - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
1.28 Probits with Lead 5 - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
1.29 Probits with full set of lags and leads - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
1.30 Probits for Manufacturing Countries Only - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . 75
1.31 Probits for Non-Manufacturing Countries Only - Average Marginal
Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1.32 Probits for Manufacturing Countries Only - Average Marginal Effects
(Smallest Sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
1.33 Probits for Non-Manufacturing Countries Only - Average Marginal Effects
(Smallest Sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
1.34 Probits for Africa, Asia and LA - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1.35 Probits for Non-Developed I - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
1.36 Probits for Non-Developed II - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1.37 Probits for Non-Developed III - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
xiii
1.38 Long Lasting Probits - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1.39 Sustained Episodes by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
1.40 Sustained Episodes by Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
1.41 Sustained Probits - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
1.42 Non-Sustained Probits - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
1.43 Growth Sustained After - Average Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
1.44 Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
1.45 Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
1.46 Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 1 (Smallest Sample) . . . . . . . 90
1.47 Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 2 (Smallest Sample) . . . . . . . 91
2.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
2.2 Variable Descriptions and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
2.3 Estimated Marginal Effects on ERR choices, RR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
2.4 Estimated Marginal Effects on ERR choices, RR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
2.5 OLS and ATE of RR ERR on Underval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
2.6 Estimation of Different Undervaluation Indexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
2.7 OLS and ATT effects using different undervaluation indexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
2.8 Estimated Marginal Effects on ERR choices, LYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
2.9 Estimated Marginal Effects on ERR choices, IMF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
2.10 OLS and ATE of LYS ERR on Underval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
2.11 OLS and ATT of IMF ERR on Underval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
xiv
2.12 Rosembaum Bounds (RR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
2.13 Rosembaum Bounds (LYS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
2.14 Rosembaum Bounds (IMF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.1 Lagrange Multiplier “LM” Non-Linearity Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
3.2 LSTAR-2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
3.3 Markov-Switching Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
3.4 LSTAR-2 Model Linear Part (Full List of Coefficients) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
3.5 LSTAR-2 Model Non-Linear Part (Full List of Coefficients) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
3.6 Markov-Switching Model Lower Regime (Full List of Coefficients) . . . . . . . . . . . 205
3.7 Markov-Switching Model Upper Regime (Full List of Coefficients) . . . . . . . . . . . 206
3.8 GMM Estimation of Interest Rate Reaction Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
3.9 GMM Estimation of Reserve Accumulation Reaction Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
3.10 GMM Estimation of Interest Rate Reaction Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
3.11 GMM Estimation of Reserve Accumulation Reaction Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
A.1 Robustness Logits II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
A.2 Robustness Logits III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
A.3 Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 1# . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
A.4 Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 2# . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
A.5 GLLAMM Models 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
A.6 GLLAMM Models 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
B.1 GMM Estimation of Interest Rate Reaction Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
xv
B.2 GMM Estimation of Reserve Accumulation Reaction Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
B.3 GMM Estimation of Interest Rate Reaction Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
B.4 GMM Estimation of Reserve Accumulation Reaction Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
xvi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1.1 Capital stock growth in the (a) Solow framework and the (b) AK
framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
1.2 Episodes in South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
1.3 Agricultural Share of Value Added During Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
1.4 Agricultural Share of Employment During Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
1.5 Manufacturing Share of Value Added During Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
1.6 Manufacturing Share of Employment During Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
1.7 Tradable Share of Value Added During Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
1.8 Tradable Share of Employment During Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
1.9 Trade Balance Share of GDP During Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
1.10 Export Share of GDP During Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
1.11 Import Share of GDP During Episodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.1 Distribution of ERRs, full sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
2.2 Distribution of ERRs, regimes that last more than 5 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
2.3 Distribution of Propensity Scores, before and after matching (RR) . . . . . . . . . . 161
2.4 Histogram of Propensity Scores, On and Off Support Observations (RR) . . . . . 162
2.5 Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (I), RR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
xvii
2.6 Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (II), RR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
2.7 Distribution of Propensity Scores, before and after matching (LYS) . . . . . . . . . . 165
2.8 Distribution of Propensity Scores, before and after matching (IMF) . . . . . . . . . 166
2.9 Histogram of Propensity Scores, On and Off Support Observations
(LYS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
2.10 Histogram of Propensity Scores, On and Off Support Observations
(IMF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
2.11 Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (I), LYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
2.12 Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (II), LYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
2.13 Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (I), IMF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
2.14 Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (II), IMF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
2.15 Placebo Testing (RR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
2.16 Placebo Testing (LYS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
2.17 Placebo Testing (IMF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
3.1 EMP and Natural Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
3.2 EMP and Natural Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
3.3 EMP and Natural Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
3.4 EMP and Natural Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
3.5 EMP and Natural Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
xviii
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation presents three papers on exchange rate policies and real exchange rates.
The unifying theme is that policies, in particular the choice of the exchange rate regime,
have considerable space to influence the behavior of the real exchange rate. Why focusing
on real exchange rates? It is arguably the single most important macro price for a small
open, non-developed economy. It is known that the real exchange rate affects output and
employment, inflation, the balance of payments, and as a recent literature have argued, it
can have growth enhancing effects as well.
For a long time, the literature on exchange rates and growth identified real exchange rate
misalignment as an explanation only for slow growth. It is easy to see how overvaluation can
be associated with shortages of foreign exchange reserves, poor incentives to invest in tradable
activities (which are usually the locus of technical progress and capital accumulation), and
economic stagnation.The history of Latin-America and Africa is plagued with examples of
how real exchange rate overvaluation leads to balance of payments crises of different kinds.
For that literature, undervaluation was also seen as a bad policy. The reason is that
undervaluation was associated with high inflation and debt overhangs, for example as in
Latin America during the so called “Lost Decade” in the 1980s. Thanks to the growth
miracle of the South East Asian countries, China and India, but also to some respectable
macroeconomic performance of countries like Chile and Colombia during the 1980s, some
authors consider that undervaluation may favor growth (Rodrik, 2008; Razmi, Rapetti, and
Skott, 2012a). The chapter on “Investment Surges” take a look at episodes of sustained
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capital accumulation, and it includes an analysis of the role of different policies related to
exchange rates in promoting growth.
Inspired by Hausmann et. al. (2005), and after identifying 189 such episodes, I rely
on econometric analysis to explore the conditions that increase the likelihood of an episode
taking place, the presence of structural change during episodes, and the characteristics that
distinguish episodes that are sustained beyond the final year from those that are not. The
results suggest that turning points in investment tend to be preceded by fast growth, stable
and undervalued currencies, low inflation, and net capital outflows, especially on the port-
folio account. During a typical episode, economies experience structural change, shifting
resources from agriculture to manufactures. Finally, sustained episodes seems to be related
to trade openness, low incidence of macroeconomic crises, a closed capital account, and
low dependence of natural resources, but these results are not as robust as the previously
described results.
The exchange rate regime is the main policy tool to affect the moments of the distribution
of the nominal exchange rate, and I would argue this also applies to the real exchange rate
as well under certain circumstances. It is not hard to see how extremely rigid exchange
rate arrangements, like a currency board or dollarization, can create scenarios in which the
domestic currency becomes badly overvalued, and yet there is no way to correct relative
prices because non-tradable prices are rigid in the downward direction.
But for a large part of the profession, the exchange rate regime does not really matter,
except for a short-period of time. This point of view argues that choice of the exchange
rate arrangement determines nominal magnitudes such as the nominal exchange rate, or the
price level, but that real variables like the real exchange rate, are determined somewhere
else. This is of course a corollary of the well-known proposition that money is neutral for an
open economy set-up.
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Despite how popular is the assumption that money and exchange rate regimes are neutral,
there are tons of examples of “hard pegs” that are abandoned due to their inability to correct
relative prices, and of the most striking empirical facts is how closely the real exchange rate
tracks the nominal exchange rate when inflation is moderate. In a nutshell, non-neutrality
does not seems to hold.
There are several reasons why this is the case, including the existence of multiple equilib-
rium, hysteresis, or real rigidities that prevent full price adjustment. When neutrality fails,
monetary and exchange rate policies can have important real effects. The chapter on “The
Effects of the Exchange Rate Regime on Real Exchange Rate Misalignments” explores these
issues using matching models.
More precisely, the second essay analyses the relation between exchange rate regimes
and real exchange rate misalignments. As far as I know, this is one the few papers that
analyzes the influence of the exchange rate policy on misalignment. For sure this is the first
paper to use matching models to compare countries that use pegs with countries that have
similar characteristic, but use more flexible arrangements. The results suggest that pegs
are associated with more overvaluation, and are robust to different exchange rate regime
classifications, misalignment indexes, and matching estimators. Hence, the exchange rate
regime is not neutral.
Even if one is willing to accept that the exchange rate regime is neutral, there are very
good reasons to analyze the impacts of the different exchange rate regimes. Policy can affects
other moments of the distribution, such as the variance or the skewness, and the adjustment
path after a disturbance may depend on whether the exchange rate is held fix or it is allowed
to float (hence it can take jumps). Finally, the exchange rate regime may not affect the
long-run level of the real exchange rate, but it can react different to similar shocks with
opposite signs, so the actual real exchange rate spent more time on the overvaluation than
on the undervaluation side.
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The chapter on “Asymmetric Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies in Latin-American
Countries using Inflation Targeting” tackles that problem. I analyze how the implementation
of Inflation Targeting in small open and non-developed economies have affected the behavior
of the exchange rate. Although it is usually recommended that countries on Inflation Tar-
geting should let the exchange rate float freely, in practice Central Bank intervention was
widespread in Latin-America and East Asia.
Authors such as Barbosa-Filho (2015) and Ros (2015) have argued that there is an flaw
in the way in which Inflation Targeting has been conducted in the Latin-American region, in
particular in Brazil and Mexico. In good times, the Central Bank is reluctant to cut interest
rates, but in bad times is willing to raise interest rates very aggressively, adding a procyclical
bias to monetary and exchange rate policies. Interestingly, the exact opposite pattern seems
to be present in East Asia (see Pontines and Siregar, 2012)
A quick preview of my results is as follows. Using different econometric techniques, I
find that these Central Banks, with the exception of Chile, suffer from “fear of floating”,
and that this is more pronounced for the case of Brazil and Mexico, as the literature have
argued. Furthermore, the policy response was implemented mainly via changes in foreign
exchange reserves, and not in interest rate (or capital controls), as the intuition and the
casual observation suggest.
To summarize, this dissertation presents three papers on the relation between exchange
rate regimes and real exchange rate determination, as well as some novel results on the
relation between real exchange rate and capital accumulation and growth.
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CHAPTER 1
INVESTMENT SURGES: AN EXPLORATION OF THEIR
DETERMINANTS, STRUCTURE AND SUSTAINABILITY
ISSUES
1.1 Introduction and Related Literature
Economists have recognized the central role of capital accumulation in determining
growth since the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century at least. Indeed, any
discussion of growth or development-related issues is incomplete without some words on
investment. The country-level determinants of investment, however, remain controversial.
While earlier studies tended to focus on variables such as the cost of capital and aggregate
demand, the literature since the eighties has been dominated by models based on intertempo-
ral optimization, in a frictionless world, or in the presence of capital market imperfections,
irreversibility, convex adjustment costs, and financial constraints.1 More recent literature
has explored the role of economic and political institutions broadly defined.
This paper takes a different approach to the question. Instead of focusing on the effect of
correlates on the level of investment, I direct my attention to the identification of national-
level episodes of sustained per capita capital stock growth. After some informal analysis, I
use Probit and Logit regressions to identify variables that significantly affect the probability
1Strictly speaking convex adjustment cost are a friction, but they are necessary to avoid abrupt jumps
in the level of the capital stock in models that use continuous time, so they are a standard component of an
otherwise frictionless model. Other approaches, such as Nickell (1978) and Skott (1989, chapter 4) rely on
firm heterogeneity, and have non-convex adjustment cost at the firm level, but a smooth investment function
at the aggregate level.
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of an investment episode taking place. I then explore the sectorial employment and value
added dynamics of the identified episodes. Lastly, I classify the episodes in “sustained” and
“non-sustained” and I analyze the determinants of sustainability.
The existing theoretical and empirical literature identifies several determinants of invest-
ment. One could alternatively locate these determinants in financial markets, in the markets
for goods and services, or in the broader landscape of institutions and macroeconomic poli-
cies. The classical approach emphasizes the profit rate. In the simple Keynesian approach
to business cycles, expectations of future aggregate demand conditions play a central role
along with uncertainty and the cost of capital. Neoclassical models, as elaborated by Jor-
genson (1963) and later work, are based typically on firms that choose capital and labor
inputs to maximize the net present value of future net cash flows, and assign a central role
to relative factor prices in determining the long-run value of capital labor ratio. Diminishing
returns to capital ensure that the rate of capital stock growth is similar across long-run
steady states, although a new literature explores the role of constant and increasing returns
to scale (Romer, 1986).
In more recent micro-founded models with rational agents that optimize over an infinite
horizon, the path of investment over time is determined by the consumption-smoothing
behavior and convex capital stock adjustment costs, but shocks to permanent income can
influence the trajectory of saving and investment. Other complications incorporated in the
recent literature include the irreversible nature of investment in capital goods, uninsurable
idiosyncratic risks, financial market imperfections, and the lumpiness of investments, among
others.2
2Empirical studies such as Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) have also incorporated the level of financial and
institutional development as a determinant of investment.
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Open economy considerations add further complexities. A positive terms of trade shock,
for example, could boost investment not simply by increasing wealth (and hence saving),
but also by increasing the value of the marginal product of capital, attracting foreign capital
flows as a result. Empirical studies since Horioka and Feldstein (1980), however, have found
robust support for a continued strong correlation between investment and domestic saving.
The so-called Balance of Payments Constrained Growth model (Thirlwall, 1979) asumes
trade is balanced in the long run, so it also predicts a strong correlation of domestic savings
and domestic investment.
As valuable as existing theoretical and empirical studies are, most of these do not ap-
pear to give adequate weight to the unstable nature of investment, even though the role
of investment fluctuations over the business cycle tends to be widely recognized. Indeed,
extended upturns and downturns in investment appear to be a fact of life, while periods of
high investment sustained over decades tend to be relatively rare.
These upturns and downturns tend to be geographically dispersed and differences in in-
vestment rates among seemingly similar countries tend to be persistent. Table 1.1 highlights
some of these facts. For example, while East Asia experienced investment-GDP ratios of 31.7
percent over the period 1960-2014, accumulation in Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries stagnated at 20.9 percent, while South Asia experienced an even lower average rate.
Moreover, countries appear to experience phases of high and low investment, and similar
saving rates across countries tend to give rise to different investment rates.
Considering the empirical evidence, identifying the nature of the turning points could,
therefore, yield interesting insights into the growth process. Let us think, for example, in
terms of the Solow growth model with exogenous technological change. In the steady state,
the capital to output ratio (in terms of the effective labor force) is constant, as is the capital
to labor ratio. Factors that affect savings could affect the steady state level of output per
capita but only through the transitional dynamics. This is illustrated by Figure 1.1 where a
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change, such as a policy-induced increase in the saving rate at time 0, leads to level effects
but no growth effects in the long-run.
These inter-steady state dynamics, however, could last for significant periods of time.
For example, employing the Cobb-Douglas version of a general form production function,
assuming a one-third income share of capital, and assuming the rates of capital depreciation,
labor force growth, and technological progress to be 4, 1, and 2 per cent, respectively, yields
a half-life of approximately 15 years. Thus, deviations from the equilibrium level of per
capita output seem to persist for sustained periods of time.3 Incorporating human capital to
increase the capital share to 0.66 changes the number to approximately 29 years. Given the
rather long time horizons involved, identifying the determinants of trend changes therefore
becomes an interesting exercise.
In models with endogenous growth,4 such as the AK family of models, policy changes
that affect investment behavior lead to permanent changes in steady state rates of capital
and output growth even in the absence of exogenous technological progress. Figure 1.1b,
where a policy shock increases the growth rate at time 0, illustrates our discussion. Rodrik
(2008) argues for instance, that the tradable sector in developing countries is more affected by
market imperfections and externalities. In Rodrik’s story, a policy of sustained real exchange
rate undervaluation, in this second-best world, can act to counter these externalities by
boosting tradable sector profitability, accelerating growth.
Other models feature multiple equilibria, where the relationship between policy variables
and investment is not linear since small movements across thresholds can cause switching
from a low investment state to a high investment one and vice-versa. Thus, identical initial
economic conditions could give rise to different growth rates of capital stock, and a country
3Specifically, − ln(0.5)/((1− 0.33)(0.04 + 0.01 + 0.02)) ≈ 14.8.
4In the sense that policy can affect steady state growth rates permanently.
8
could be stuck in low or high capital accumulation equilibria for extended periods of time.
The factors that push economies on to high accumulation trajectories, therefore, attain
particular salience. Benhabib and Gali (1995) provides a survey of these kinds of models.5
On a broader note, models which incorporate deviations from full employment over ex-
tended periods of time naturally generate endogenous growth, even in the presence of con-
stant returns to scale and even when technological progress is absent. The famous Harrod-
Domar model, and in the context of a developing economy with underemployment and dual
labor markets, the Lewis model, are well-known examples. The endogenous nature of the
steady state rate of capital accumulation in these models provides another reason to focus
on sharp historical break points in investment rates.
To summarize, in most models of long-run growth there is considerable room for policy,
structural and institutional factors to affect the trajectory and/or the steady state level of
the capital to population ratio. The focus of this paper is on turning points that lead to
a sustained upsurges in investment. In order to explore the nature of these turning points,
I zoom in on long-term trends rather than on short-run fluctuations. I investigate the
conditions before, during, and after episodes using econometrics. I rely on several criteria for
identifying an investment surge as discussed in the next section. This approach minimizes the
role of volatility, irreversibility, and lumpiness and other factors that are likely to render open
to question empirical specifications based on smooth distributions of underlying variables.
It also aims to separate temporary/cyclical investment booms from sustained surges. The
goal is to focus on such surges at the national level and, unlike most empirical studies, we
include data for both advanced and developing economies. For this purpose, I use capital
5 The idea of growth traps appears in variants of the traditional big push model such as Rosenstein-Rodan
(1943), Murphy et. al. (1989), and Skott and Ros (1997), where it is the level of capital stock that varies
between multiple steady states.
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stock data from the Penn World Tables 8.1, which is comparable across countries and has
the largest possible coverage.
A body of analysis has appeared in recent years that identifies turning points in macroe-
conomic aggregates. Hausmann et. al. (2005) identify episodes of acceleration in output
growth. Freund and Pierola (2012) carry out a similar exercise for export surges, while
Montiel (2000) and Rodrik (2000) analyze consumption booms and saving transitions, re-
spectively. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to identify determinants of
sustained investment surges using a similar technique.
Why bothering with capital accumulation, rather than output growth? Is it not output
growth a more important variable, for example in terms of welfare? Also, should not we
expect that capital and output will grow at the same rate in the long-run? I believe there
are good reasons to focusing on capital, rather than just sticking with output. First, it may
worth to explore the dynamics of capital accumulation, as a complementary and robustness
checks of previous estimation that use output only. Second, although it may seem that fast
capital accumulation cannot be sustained without fast output growth, the timing and the
composition may matter. For instance, fast output growth in sectors with very low capital
intensity are possible, or the growth process may involve a period of capital deepening; in
both cases total capital may growth at a different pace than total output for significant
periods of time.
An example may clarify this. Suppose that output grows very fast in a non-tradable
sector, such as a services. A filter based on output growth may detect an episode here, but
a filter that relies on the capital stock may not. Contrast this with an example in which
both output and capital growth very fast, for example if the manufacturing sector led the
expansion. Now both filters should detect an episode.
This is truly important because service led growth may not be as sustainable as manufac-
turing led growth, due to bottlenecks in the external sector or low productivity growth. In
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a nutshell, we need to know what happens to capital accumulation, and not only to output
growth, to understand the nature of the growth process. Thus, my exercise is a complement
of papers such as Hausmann et. al. (2005).
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction, section 1.2 describes
the episode identification methodology and describes the empirical approach. Section 1.3
analyzes the factors that precede investment accelerations, while section 1.4 presents some
robustness checks and additional results. Section 1.5 then illustrates the changes that typi-
cally occur in economic structures during episodes. Section 1.6 examines the characteristics
of episodes that are sustained beyond the episode years. Finally, section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Episode Identification
In this section I describe the filter that I use to identify episodes of investment surges.6
To be identified as the starting point of an investment surge, a candidate observation must
satisfy the following criteria: a) annual per capita capital stock growth over a 7-year period
must be over 3.5 percent; b) annual per capita capital stock growth must have accelerated
by at least 2 percentage points during the 7-year period; and c) the level of capital per capita
seven years after the end of the acceleration episode must exceed its historical peak.
Criteria (a) ensures that the capital stock per capita grows at a rapid rate. Criteria (b)
ensures that the growth rate deviates significantly from the pre-episode average. Criteria
(c) avoids picking investment surges that are pure recoveries from periods of capital stock
destruction due to events such as war, major political upheavals, and natural disasters. These
criteria are similar to the ones used in Hausmann et. al. (2005).
6The data comes from Penn World Table 8.1; this is a large panel of 167 countries spanning the period
1950-2011.
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A few comments are in order. Using the criteria “the level of capital per worker seven
years after the beginning of the acceleration episode must exceed its pre-episode level” yields
a very similar result (almost the same list of episodes is selected). The reason is that there
is a very high correlation (0.9795) between population and employment in the data from
Penn World Tables 8.1 used in this paper. It is also worth to notice that criteria c) is rarely
binding.
In light of (a), (b) and (c), the first step is to obtain the fitted growth rate of capital per
worker over each 7-year window. Specifically, I estimate the following rolling regression for
every country individually (notice I am not using a panel):
ln(kwit) = α
w
it + g
w
it ∗ t+ uit (1.1)
Where kwit is the capital to population ratio, t is a time-trend, and w denotes the 7-year
rolling estimation window.7 The parameters αw and u are the intercept and the error term
respectively.8 The coefficient estimate gˆw is therefore the fitted 6-year growth rate of capital
per capita, and as such, is a projection of the growth rate in the 7 year period considered.
This is better than simple averages, because it minimizes the impact of outliers, and it is
better than using the median growth rate, because I can capture non-linearities, for instance
if level of the per capital stock evolves exponentially (as we should expect during an episode).
I define an investment acceleration episode as one where both the fitted growth rate gˆw
and the acceleration of the capital stock growth (∆gˆw) exceed certain thresholds. For our
baseline filter, as already noted, I consider the case where capital per capita must grow
7Let us assume that a 7 year period starts in 1960. Then 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966 are part
of the window. The year 1967 is excluded.
8Strictly speaking, I have no interest in the term αwit, but estimating an equation without intercepts
creates unnecessary complications.
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more than 3.5 percent a year on average over a 7-year window and accelerate by at least 2
percentage points during the same period, compared to the previous 7-year window.
Having calculated the fitted growth rates and after applying the filtering criteria, it is
still necessary to identify the beginning year of each episode. This is because in most cases a
number of contiguous years will satisfy the growth and acceleration thresholds. For example,
a country’s capital per capita may grow on average more than 3.5 percent and accelerate
more than 2 percent over the 7-year windows beginning in 1973, 1974, and 1975. It is
therefore important to rule out two of these three candidate years. This is accomplished
using Chow tests for each candidate year separately, and then compare the goodness of fit
for each one. Formally, I estimate:
ln(kit) = αi + t[β1i(t < τ) + β2i(t > τ)] + uit (1.2)
Where (t > τ) is an indicator function that is equal to one for the candidate year τ and
the years afterwards, and zero otherwise, and (t < τ) is an indicator function that is equal
to one for the years before the candidate start year τ and zero otherwise. Equation (1.2) is
a spline regression with a common intercept.
My routine runs (1.2) setting τ equal to each year on my sample, and for every country. I
then obtains the regression F-statistic.9 I then choose the candidate year for τ that yields the
maximum F-statistic as the starting year of the investment acceleration episode. Notice that
I am not testing for structural break. Rather I am assuming that the break exist. Finding
structural break is the job of the filter.10 Here I am picking what it seems to be the year
that makes such break more likely. Furthermore, I allow for overlapping episodes, provided
9Thus, I set τ = 1960, τ = 1961, τ = 1962, and so on, for each country on the sample.
10Thus, it is possible that either β1i or β2i, or both, are not significant, but this is hardly the case if the
filter does a god job detecting episodes.
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that the starting dates are at least 5 year apart. For example, if the starting date chosen
by (2) is 1970, and 1975 satisfies the criteria a), b), and c), I consider it as another separate
episode.11
In order to ensure the robustness of the empirical results presented in the next sections I
also apply the episode filter using increasingly “stricter” growth and acceleration thresholds.
The “strict” filter considers the case where the average annual growth rate of capital per
worker exceeds 5 percent and accelerates by at least 3 percentage points. The “very strict”
filter then raises the thresholds to 7 and 4 per cent respectively. While the first filter picks
up 189 episodes, the second picks 100, and the third a total of 38.
Figure 1.2 shows a typical episode detected by the first filter. I choose the case of South
Korea because it is well know for it recent history of fast growth. The dashed red lines are
placed on the episode starting years. They clearly look like structural breaks in the series
of per capita capital stock. It is a well know fact that capital accumulation accelerated
very fast after a devaluation in 1964, and that South Korea sustained growth at a rapid
pace afterwards for at least three more decades. Our filter does a good job and detects an
episode right after that devaluation. Growth also gained momentum during the mid 1970s
and 1980s, as it is reflected on the figure. Notice that for a fast growing country like South
Korea, successive episodes require an increasing growth rate of capital per capita. Indeed,
growth increased from 7.91 in the first episode, to about 10.2 and 10.7 in the second and
third, and comparing the 7 year period before each episode, growth accelerated by 7, 2.81
and 3.12 percentage points.12
11I follow Hausmann et. al. (2005). They suggest this, but surprisingly, their list of episodes does not
feature any overlap.
12Notice these are “OLS” growth rates, not simple averages. They were estimated using (1.1).
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Tables 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 , 1.5, and 1.6 include the full list of episodes (using the first filter).
Episodes seems to be a relatively common phenomena. Even countries that are not associ-
ated with fast growth (i.e., Sub-Saharan African countries) seem to have experienced several
of them. However, our filter does not pick an abnormally large number of episodes. Ex-
cluding all the years during which an episode cannot take place, Hausmann et. al. find an
unconditional probability for the occurrence of an episode of about 2.68%. Using a similar
approach, I find that the unconditional probability of the occurrence of an episode is 2.25%,
slightly below the figure reported by Hausmann et. al. for GDP growth.13 This number
looks reasonable, considering that I am using a different data sample and our variable of
interest is capital accumulation and not per capita output.14
Table 1.7 displays the unconditional probabilities by decade and region (using the first
version of the filter). These probabilities were calculated by taking the ratio of the number
of episodes in each region during a particular decade divided by the total number of years
an episode could take place. Overall, Europe and North America have the lowest probability
(a little bit more than 1 per cent) of an episode taking place while East Asia has the highest
(3.95 per cent). The former is what one would expect if there are diminishing returns to
capital accumulation in the Solow sense; richer economies endowed with larger per capita
capital stock tend to growth slower. Among middle and low-income countries, Sub-Saharan
Africa has the lowest probability (2.06 per cent). In terms of decades, the 1970s and the
13The unconditional probability is defined as the ratio of episodes over the number of years where an
episode can potentially take place. I exclude the second, third, fourth, and fifth year from an episode,
because an episode cannot take place then. The years before 1956 and after 2005 are also excluded because
due to the nature of the filter, an episode can only be identified between 1956 and 2005 (there is not enough
data before and after).
14Using data from Penn World Tables 8.1, I find a probability of around 3% using GDP per capita instead
of capital stock per capita.
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2000s have the highest probability of an investment surge for any region, with a probability
of 2.99 and 4.5 per cent respectively.
I also estimate the probability of an episode taking place for each quintiles of per capita
income, where the first quintile denote the 20 % observations with the lowest income per
capita, and the fifth quintile the 20 % observations with the highest income, in both cases on a
given year.15 As reported in table 1.8, countries in the middle quintile of global income are the
most likely to experience an investment surge. This result appears to contradict the literature
that suggest that there is a “middle income trap”, but it is consistent with the recent findings
of Ye and Robertson (2016), who find that only a small fraction of countries identified as
“trapped” are actually in a trap. Moreover, this is to be expected if the investment surge is
associated with accumulation in the modern sector and the depletion of the pool of hidden
unemployment in the backward sector (see section 1.5 for a discussion). And not surprisingly,
the upper-most income quintile has the lowest probability of the occurrence of an episode.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
What factors can trigger episodes? To answer, I analyze what variables can explain the
turning points in the series of per capita capital stock. Because there is some uncertainty
regarding the precise starting date, I create a dummy variable that takes the value of one the
first year of an episode, one year before and one year after, and zero otherwise. That dummy
variable is included as the dependent variable in a series of limited dependent variable models.
The years where an episode cannot take place (before 1956, after 2005, the third, fourth,
15This procedure avoids the obvious problem of comparing the income of country in 1950 with the income
of the same country in 2000, because the distribution is computed for each year separately. Thus, even if
Congo doubled its per capita income from 1950 to 2000, what matters is the per capita GDP compared to
the per capita GDP of the rest of the sample in each year.
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and fifth year after the starting of an episode) are excluded, as suggested by Hausmann et.
al. (2005).
As control variables I use covariates that reflect external and internal factors, policy and
institutional aspects that may trigger a structural change in the rate of capital accumulation.
All these variables were selected to control for all the potential factors highlighted by the
literature on the determinants on investment. The timing of the control variables is the
same as the starting date of each episodes, but some covariates are defined as averages of
the previous 3-5 years. I describe these main control variables in some detail, and the next
sub-section presents the Probit analysis to explain factors that trigger episodes. The table
1.9 contains a short description of the variables, as well as their precise definition:
1. To control for macroeconomic conditions and economic policy, I include Rodrik’s (2008)
undervaluation index (Underval81 ), the degree of fiscal procyclicality (Fiscal), the one
year lagged rate of per capita GDP growth (Lag Growth), the one year lagged per capita
capital stock (Lag KL), the rate of inflation (Inflation), and an index of exchange rate
stability (XR Stability).16 The expected sign of the undervaluation index is positive,
as a recent literature suggest that real exchange rate undervaluation may favor growth
(Rodrik 2008, Razmi, Rapetti and Skott, 2012). The lagged growth rate is included
to capture the accelerator effect, so fast past growth will increase the likelihood of
an episode. The lagged per capita capital stock accounts either for convergence or
for the presence of sluggish adjustment of the capital stock, so a larger per capita
16To compute the undervaluation index, I follow Rodrik’s three step procedure: i) I construct a real
exchange rate index using relative prices from Penn World Table 8.1; ii) I regress our real exchange rate
index on per capita GDP and a set of time fixed effects; iii) I estimate the residuals from the previous
regressions to construct the undervaluation index. The residuals constitute the undervaluation index. A
positive residual denotes “undervaluation”, while a negative residual denotes “overvaluation”.
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capital stock will decrease the likelihood of an episode.17 Regarding fiscal procyclicality
(measured as the correlation of the de-trended government consumption to de-trended
GDP), I expected a negative sign, as more pro-cyclical policies increase the volatility
of the economy, and higher volatility may increase the required rate of profit to justify
investment decisions (holding everything else constant, this reduces investment). The
relation between inflation and growth is non-linear, so the expected effect of inflation
is positive when inflation accelerates from very low levels, but negative once inflation
hits a threshold that the literature places somewhere between 20-40 percent (Bruno
and Easterly, 1998). Finally, exchange rate stability can favor investment, but a stable
exchange rate may reflect the adoption of a hard peg which are notorious for exhibiting
a tendency towards real exchange rate overvaluation and crisis. However, I also control
for crisis and real exchange rate undervaluation, so more exchange rate stability should
have a positive effect on capital accumulation and growth, once these effects are taken
into account by our other control variables.
2. To control for external factors, I include a variable that captures net capital flows to
GDP (NET Inflows), the FED reserve Federal Funds interest rate (FFend), an index
of the US stock market volatility (Global uncertainty), an index of terms of trade
(TOT ), the “de facto” degree of trade openness (Trade), and the degree of capital
account openness (KA open).18 The expected sign of capital inflows is ambiguous, as
17Thus, if capital per capita changes as a function of the difference of the “target” and the “actual” level
of per capita capital stock, an increase in capital stock may lower the rate of capital accumulation. As an
example, consider the following specification k˙ = α(k∗−k), where k˙ is the change in per capita capital stock,
α is the adjustment speed, k∗ is the target per capita capital stock and k is the actual per capita capital
stock. It follows that ∂k˙∂k < 0.
18The original data on capital flows comes from Broner et. al. (2013), and it is presented as a ratio of the
trend of nominal GDP, to reduce the influence of short-run fluctuations and presumably the effects of price
and exchange rate changes. Because the balance of payments data is current dollars, GDP at current prices
should be used. There seems to be a problem with Broner et. al. data: the figures on total NET inflows
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they could increase total investment, or they could crowd-out productive investment
if flows are mainly portfolio flows (i.e., they can appreciate the real exchange rate
and reduce manufacturing investment). For the same reasons, the sign of the degree
of capital account openness is also ambiguous. To gain further insights, I eventually
replace capital inflows by the variables (Port Inflows), (FDI Inflows), and (Reserves)
that represent portfolio and FDI net inflows, and the change in gross foreign exchange
reserves.19 Increases in Federal Funds interest rate and in the volatility of the stock
market may increase financial constraints and reduce credit, thus I expect them to have
a negative effect on capital accumulation. Higher terms of trade can boost investment in
favored sectors, but they can also have negative repercussions due to “Dutch-Disease”
effects. Finally, countries that are more open to trade can exploit the economies of
scale of the world market, so an episode is more likely in more open countries. But in
the past some inward oriented strategies also featured a very fast growth thanks to a
protected manufacturing sector (i.e., Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s), so the expected
sign of the trade variable is also ambiguous.
3. To control for other internal factors, I include a variable that reflects the presence of
crises (banking, currency, debt, etc.) in the 5 years before an episode (Crisis 5y), the
share of natural resource rents on GDP (Rents), and per capita GDP (Capita GDP).
The expected sign of the crisis variable is negative, as the presence of crises may severely
disrupt long-term prospects, depressing investment. The variable (Rents) proxies for
natural resource availability or for natural resource dependence, and as such it can have
seems to be 100 times larger than the figures of each component individually considered. Thus, I choose to
multiply the original data by 1/100. This produce a set of consistent estimations.
19The variables Port Inflows, FDI Inflows, and Reserves are constructed using a similar logic than
NET Inflows, and they contain the 3 year average of net portfolio and net FDI inflows, and the change
in the foreign exchange reserves, divided by the trend of nominal GDP. The same procedure was used to
construct the variable NET Inflows.
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opposite effects on capital accumulation; an increase in the stock of natural resources
that can be profitable exploited may enhance investment in natural-resource intensive
sectors, but it may also generate “Dutch-Disease” effects, reducing investment in the
manufacturing sector. Finally, the expected sign of per capita GDP is ambiguous, as
the relation between income and the likelihood of an episode is non-linear (the results
depends on whether convergence holds or not).
4. To control for institutional characteristics, I include a human capital index (Hu-
man Capital),20 and the durability of the political regime (Durable).21 I expect an
ambiguous effect of the human capital index on the likelihood of an episode; the rea-
son is that the effect of income and education and growth and capital accumulation is
notably non-linear; positive if we start from a low level of development, but possibly
negative after some middle-income threshold. Regarding the durability of the political
regime, the expect sign is also ambiguous, as political and institutional stability can
favor economic stability, but they can also lock in policies that are not conducive to
economic growth.
The table 1.10 defines the control variables and presents their summary statistics, as
well as their expected effect (+/-) on the likelihood of an episode taking place. In the next
section I present the baseline specifications, robustness tests and additional results.
20The Human Capital Index from Penn World Tables 8.1 is based on years of schooling (Barro and Lee,
2013) and the returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994).
21I tried other variables related to the quality of the institutions (prevalence of civil wars, indexes of the
quality of democracy), but they often result in non-significant coefficients, their signs change depending on
the specification, and so on.
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1.3.1 Episode Determinants. Main Results
To analyze the determinants of sustained investment surges, I introduce our episode
dummy as the dependent variable on a series of Probit regression that features the set of
control variables described in the previous sections. The table 1.11 show the baseline results.
My findings suggest that some variables consistently stand out as statistically significant
at standard levels.22 More precisely:
1. The degree of real exchange rate undervaluation (Underval81 ) correlates positively
with the likelihood of an investment surge episode taking place. A one percent increase
in the undervaluation index raises the probability of an episode by between 2.9 to 7.7
percent, depending on the specification. These results are statistically significant at 1
or 5 per cent.23
2. The lagged per capita growth rate (Lag Growth) correlates positively with the likeli-
hood of an episode. A one percent increase in the previous year growth rate raises
the probability of an episode by between 57.6 and 80.3 percent, depending on the
specification. This is a very large number, and these results are always statistically
22Through this paper I stick with Probit as the baseline model, and I choose to report the average
marginal effect. Reporting the marginal effects holding the other variables at their sample means is another
common option, but some of our results (in particular when our sample becomes small due to the inclusion
of covariates with limited coverage) feature very low coefficients. This is specially true for the estimations
that use the second and the third version of the filter. There is not specific reason why marginal effects
evaluating everything else at the sample mean is representative, and thus the average marginal effect may be
preferable. However, this creates an additional complication, as some of the programs for the models from
the Logit family presented in tables 1.1 and 1.2 on the Appendix A, the Re-logit and the Firth Logit (see
columns 2 and 3), do not permit to estimate the average marginal effects. In that case I report the log of the
odd ratios (I explain their interpretation soon). The only purpose of that set of tables is to check parameter
consistency, so that is enough.
23Notice these results suggest that the level of the real exchange rate affects the rate of growth. See section
1.4.1 for a discussion that involves changes in the real exchange rate and their effects on the likelihood of an
episode taking place.
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significant at 1 per cent, which suggest that the accelerator effect is an important driver
of sustained capital accumulation.
3. The lagged per capita capital stock (Lag KL) correlates negatively with the probability
of an episode taking place. A one percent increase in the previous year per capita
capital stock lowers the probability of an episode by between 2 and 14.4 percent. These
results are always statistically significant at 1 per cent confidence. This may suggest
the presence of convergence or adjustment cost and lags in the dynamics of the capital
stock. However, per capita GDP and human capital are positively correlated with the
likelihood of an episode; a 1 per cent increase make an episode between 8.2 and 8.3
per cent more likely for GDP, and between 12.5 and 13.2 per cent for human capital.
This suggest that unconditional convergence does not fit the facts. Adjustment cost
or conditional convergence are a better story.
4. The ratio of net capital flows to the nominal trend of GDP (NET Inflows) in the
previous 3 years significantly decreases the likelihood of an investment surge. The
average marginal effect varies between -0.003 to -0.004, so a 1 per cent increase in
the ratio of capital flows to GDP seems to reduce the likelihood of an episode taking
place between 0.3 and 0.4 percent points. Notice that when I include portfolio flows
(Port Inflows), FDI flows (FDI Inflows), and the change in Reserve assets (Reserves)
separately (columns 5 and 7), only the portfolio flows are statistically significant. This
suggest that “speculative” portfolio flows, and not “productive” FDI flows seems to
produce the observed result.24
24However, the definition of portfolio flows and FDI flows is based on conventions. Not all the FDI flows
are productive. A purchase of less than 10 per cent of the existing assets is classified as “portfolio”, but
more for larger purchases the flows are classified as “FDI”. Moreover, FDI flows include both the purchase
of existing assets and new plants.
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5. Increases in the Federal Funds rate (FFend) or in the US stock market volatility
(Global Uncertainty) lowers the likelihood of an episode taking place. This suggest
that changes in the international context matter. Either because the financial condi-
tion explain downturns and upturns in the US business cycles, or because they influence
global liquidity. A 1 percentage point increase in the Federal Funds rate reduces the
likelihood of an episode taking place by about 1.1-1.6 percentage points. Interestingly,
during the period of the late 1970s, when the Federal Funds rate increase dramati-
cally, the number of total episodes falls considerably. During the 1982, when the Latin
American Debt Crisis started and financial markets were in a state of turmoil, no new
episodes started. These results are statistically significant at 1 or 5 percent.
6. Higher inflation, captured by (Inflation), seems to reduce the probability of an episode
taking place. The effect ranges from -0.031 to -0.088, although not all the coefficients
are significant at standard levels, and only the last two are significant at 10 per cent.
In words, a 1 percentage increase in the rate of inflation makes an episode about 3.1
or 8.8 percentage point less likely. This result is consistent with the findings that show
that high inflation is bad for growth (Bruno and Easterly, 1998); however, the relation
is probably non-linear, so our specification may not capture the entire story.
7. Human capital and per capita GDP are positively associated with the probability of
an episode taking place, and the results are significant. More precisely, a 10 per cent
increase in the human capital index increases the likelihood of an episode by around 1.2
- 1.3 per cent, while a 10 per cent increase in per capita GDP seems to raise it by about
0.8 percentage point. These results are statistically significant at 1 and 5 percent. This
is consistent with out previous results, and suggest that absolute convergence does not
hold. Poorer countries are less likely to experience an episode than richer countries.
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8. The durability of the political regime seems to reduce the probability of an episode
taking place, but by a very small amount. A 1 per cent increase in the duration
lowers the probability by 0.1 percent. That is a very small number, and the results are
significant at 10 percent in one specification, and at 5 percent in the other. In table
1.10 we can verify that the variable Durable ranges from zero to 202 years, with an
average of about 22 years. Thus, an increase in 1 years lowers the probability of an
episode taking place by about 0.5 percent.
To my surprise, factors such as the terms of trade or the natural resource rents are not
statistically significant (at least not consistently). The results say that natural resources and
terms of trade do not explain why episodes take place, but they also say that these factors
do not explain why episodes do not take place either. In other words, natural resources and
terms of trade are neither good or bad for capital accumulation: according to our estimation
they are irrelevant.25
Could reverse causation be an issue, however? I should note that the structure of the
exercise minimizes this possibility. I am looking for correlates from data that include the
years that precede the investment episodes (at least for some covariates). Strictly along the
time dimension reverse causality is probably not an issue. Next, let’s take a look at some of
the significant variables, starting with the undervaluation index. An investment boom that
increases domestic spending in the non-tradable sector should appreciate the real exchange
rate through the spending channel, for instance in a simple Mundell-Fleming framework. The
baseline monetarist framework that incorporates purchasing power parity and some version
of the quantity theory should also predict a similar effect through the real balances channel.
Moreover, analysis in a portfolio framework with imperfect substitution between money and
25A word of caution. As in any regression, this could reflect the fact that in some episodes natural resources
and terms of trade are extremely important, while in some others they are not, or it could reflect the fact
that they do not matter.
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other assets should lead to qualitatively similar expectations. In all these cases, reverse
causality works in a direction that leads us to believe that the effect of undervaluation is, if
anything, biased downwards (i.e., capital accumulation is associated with real appreciation
and possibly with currency overvaluation if the real exchange rate appreciates too much).
One could construct a scenario where an unanticipated and permanent productivity shock
in the non-tradable sector leads to both a real depreciation and a boost to investment. It
is also possible that future changes in productivity may trigger growth today, so reverse
causation is, in principle, possible for growth rate. I plan to examine this possibility in the
subsection that explores the role of leads and lags.
Consider now the lagged capital stock. The negative sign indicates that, if there is reverse
causation, then an investment episode leads to a fall in the per capita capital stock, a very
unlikely scenario. A similar reasoning applies to capital flows, the Federal Funds interest
rate and the rate of inflation. If reverse causation is a problem, then an episode should
trigger a capital outflow, a reduction in the Federal Funds rate, and a reduction in the rate
of inflation. All of these scenarios seems very unlikely. If anything, an episode should lead
to capital inflows and an increase in the rate of inflation, and presumably no effect on the
Federal Funds rate. Summing up, causality is probably not a important concern.
1.4 Robustness and Other Results
To tackle the question on how robust are the results, I present a set of alternative specifi-
cations. Perhaps the main source of concern is the sensitivity to sample changes. As I include
additional covariates, some of the previous results may fail to hold. A way to mitigate this
problem is to stick with the smallest sample possible. Thus, I eliminate all the observations
that do not have the entire set of covariates. The results are displayed in table 1.12. It is
very good news to see that the results hold using the smallest sample possible.
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On the next set of tables I replicate the results displayed 1.11 using OLS and Logit
(tables 1.13 and 1.14) instead of Probit.26 As a general rule, the results hold, except that
Underval81 is not significant in the last two columns for the Logit models. The Appendix
A presents other models from the limited dependent variable family, for robustness control.
As another check, I implement the baseline specifications, but using the second and third
versions of the filter, which are more strict. The second filter considers the case where the
average annual growth rate of capital per capita exceeds 5 percent and accelerates by at
least 3 percentage points. The third filter raises the thresholds to 7 and 4 respectively.27
The main plot holds, but with a few exceptions. Using the second filter (see table 1.15),
crises in the past now account for a reduced likelihood of an episode taking place, while
per capita GDP is not significant in one specification, and significant at 10% in the other
one. Moreover, the capital flow variables no longer explain episodes, except for reserves
(which increase the likelihood of an episode taking place). Finally, natural resources seems
to affect the likelihood of an episode taking place using the third filter (see table 1.16), but
the sign is not stable and the coefficient is very small (between -0.002 and 0.001). Notice that
comparing the third filter with the first, undervaluation becomes more important (at least
in the last specifications), while lagged growth and lagged per capita capital stock diminish
their impact on the probability that a typical episode takes place.
26The interpretation of the OLS models is a little bit tricky. Take for example the coefficient associated
with the degree of undervaluation in column number 1 of table 1.13, equal to 0.031. In words, an increase of
1 per cent in undervaluation increases the Episode Dummy by 3 per cent, and the result is significant at 1 per
cent. However, if I predict the underlying probabilities, they may not be bounded by 0 and 1. Nevertheless,
the coefficients are unbiased if the usual assumption are satisfied. Roughly speaking if the error term is
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, there are no measurement errors in the independent variables,
and so on.
27Keep in mind that this reduces the number of episodes from 189, to 100 and 38, so an episode becomes
are very rare events as we add covariates. Luckily, the Re-Logit and Firth-Logit models (designed to deal
with rare events) suggest that this is not an issue. See the Appendix A for the results using these models.
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For additional robustness checks, I modify the basic filter in different ways. It may be
argued that the best criteria for choosing a starting date is simply to pick the first year
that meets the three criteria of the original filter. One set of specifications exclude the
Chow test, so I choose the starting date based on a “first come first serve basis” (the first
year that is selected by our filter is automatically selected as the starting date). The other
sets of specifications change the size of the window from 7 year to 5 and 9, and I consider
total capital accumulation rather than per capita capital accumulation. These alternative
specifications are necessary because the size of the window on the original filter is arbitrary,
and because total capital accumulation is also be a very meaningful variable on its own.
The table 1.17 display the results excluding the Chow test, and they suggest that there
are no fundamental differences when compared with the baseline results. The tables 1.18
and 1.19 shows what happens when I use a 5 and a 9 year window. Shortening the window
seems to “kill” the significance of some coefficients (see columns 3, 4 and 5 for undervaluation
and inflation), but other variables are still significant (i.e., human capital). Using a 9 year
window suggest that the previous result still hold, but now the terms of trade and natural
resource rents seems to decrease the likelihood of an episode taking. This may suggest that
the factors that explain longer episodes may differ from the factors that explain shorter
episodes. I explore the issue of sustainability in more detail in the section 1.6. The results
in table 1.20 suggest that using total capital stock rather than per capita capital stock does
not affect the main results except for human capital and per capita GDP (depending on the
specification), but other variables like de facto trade openness, capital account openness and
inflation become highly significant.
Finally, I consider an alternative undervaluation index. This is one of the most interesting
variables due to a new literature that analyzes the relation between growth and real exchange
rates (as the aforementioned study by Rodrik, 2008). Because there are multiple ways
to define real exchange rate misalignment, it makes sense to try alternative definitions.
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Consequently, I replace Underval81 with PPP, an index constructed using IMF multilateral
real exchange rate, taking the deviation from the sample mean (for each country).28 This
new variable captures deviations from Purchasing Power Parity (and hence the name PPP),
provided that we believe that the real exchange rate reverts to its mean during the span of
our sample, which includes up to around 35 years between the 1970s and the 2000s. Although
it may seems strange to omit the Balasa-Samuelson effect, it is by no mean clear that PPP
is a bad theory of exchange rate determination in a very long-run sense, and some studies
were able to find supporting evidence for it using non-linear econometric techniques (Taylor
et. al. 2001). Notice that there is an extra difficulty when comparing the results, as PPP
includes only one third of the observations than the most basic results (column 1).
The table 1.21 displays the results using this new real exchange rate misalignment index.29
While in some specifications the effects of PPP on the likelihood of an episode taking place
are no longer significant, the size of the effects is very similar to our original specification,
except for the first estimation, which suggest a rather weak average marginal effect of around
0.009. However, we should keep in mind that these results suggest that exchange rate does
not matter, or that PPP is not the best theory to define the implicit notion of equilibrium
real exchange rate.
1.4.1 Large Changes in the Covariates
In this subsection I adopt a different approach to analyze the determinants of sustained
investment episodes. Instead of the levels of the covariates, I introduce “covariate-booms”,
28Notice that unlike Underval81, each level of this real exchange rate index is meaningless when considered
alone, and it cannot be compared across countries. An effective real exchange rate of 100 for Brazil is not
necessarily lower than 120 for Belgium, but we can compare it with a 90 for Brazil during a different time
period.
29A positive PPP index denotes “undervaluation”, while a negative value denotes “overvaluation”.
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that capture abnormally large changes in the independent variables (i.e., extremely high
terms of trade, large changes in the degree of capital account openness).
To capture these large changes, I create the new variables Underval change, Growth boom,
Rents boom, TOT boom, Trade boom, KAopen boom and NET boom30. These are dummies
variable that are equal to one when the average change over a 3 year period is on the upper
5th quintile of the original variables (Undervaluation, per capita GDP Growth, Natural
Resource Rents, Terms of Trade, Trade Openness, Capital Account Openness and NET
capital inflows). I also add the variables Regime change and Fiveregime, defined as the
average change over 3 years of the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) exchange rate regime index,
and a dummy that takes the value of one if there is a change of more than three points (up
or down) in the polity index.31
Almost all the expected signs are ambiguous (except for growth) because all the variables
may reflect very favorable conditions, but they can also have important side effects (as the
“Dutch Disease”) or reflect crises (i.e., large changes in the undervaluation index, changes in
the Reinhart and Rogoff index, or changes in the Polity IV index of democracy). The table
1.22 displays the results. Four variables stand out:
1. A change in the exchange rate regime (Regime change) correlates negatively with the
likelihood of an investment surge episode taking place. As the index classifies countries
into hard pegs (1), soft pegs (2), intermediate (3), freely floating (4), “freely falling”
(5), moving up means adopting a more flexible regime.32 Thus, a jump from one
30I also include a “boom” variable for FDI and Portfolio flows, as well as the change in reserves.
31The “Coarse” classification from Reinhart and Rogoff includes 5 categories, from the less flexible (1) to
the more flexible (5). Hence, higher values means more flexibility. The source for the political index is the
Polity IV database; the index provides scores from -10 (less democratic) to 10 (more democratic).
32Number (5) represents currency crises, and it is associated with observations with more than 40 percent
of inflation.
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category to the next one reduces the likelihood of an episode by around 1-2 percentage
points.
2. Very high growth rates (Growth Boom) significantly increase the likelihood of an in-
vestment surge taking place. The average marginal effect varies between 0.050 to 0.067,
an important effect. A “growth boom” increases the likelihood of an episode taking
place by 5 or 6.7 percentage points.
3. Large natural resource discoveries, captured by (Rents boom) increase the likelihood
of an episode taking place. The average marginal effect varies between 0.031 to 0.043
depending on the specification, which translates into an increase in the probability
between 3.1 and 4.3 percentage points.
4. Large increases in the degree of trade openness, captured by (Trade boom) increase the
likelihood of an episode taking place, provided that I include capital flows and political
variables (as in columns 4 and 5). The magnitude of the coefficients varies between
0.029 to 0.037 on the significant specifications.
Overall, these results also suggest that accelerator effects, exchange rate stability, natural
resources and trade openness seems to be very important determinants of investment surges.
While the first two results are consistent with the baseline findings, the last two are not.
This may suggest that natural resources and trade openness are non-linearly related with
the likelihood of an episode taking place.
1.4.2 Lags and Leads
The previous specifications do not directly address the issue of non-contemporaneous
effects of the different covariates on investment. By construction, my regressions analyze
the impact of the control variables on the contemporaneous probability of an episode taking
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place. The definition of our dependent variable already captured some of the uncertainty
regarding the starting point of an episode, and some variables (like those related to capital
flows, the crisis variable, and the degree of fiscal procyclicality) are defined as averages over
a three or five year period before an episode.
But what if an increasing in one of these variables three years ago (even if it is already an
average of past values) makes an episode more likely today? In this section I introduce lags
and leads up to five years for some control variables that may have a non-contemporaneous
effect on capital accumulation, such as the undervaluation index, the growth rate, the per
capita capital stock, the terms of trade, the share of natural resource rents, and the net capital
flows variables.33 To avoid any multicolinearity issues, I exclude all the other covariates and
include the lags and leads one by one. I report the results including only 1, 3 and 5 lags or
leads.
The results using lags are reported in the tables 1.23, 1.24, and 1.25, while the results for
leads are presented in the tables 1.26, 1.27, and 1.28. Let us take a look at the estimation
that use lags first. The variables become less significant, but the sign are consistent with the
previous results. Including only the lags shows that the effect of undervaluation is signifi-
cant and positive, while the effects of capital flows are negative, but usually not significant
(results not reported here). Lagged per capita capital stock is statistically significant in
all the specification with any lag combination, but the size of the effect is very small (for
practical purposes, is almost zero). Interestingly, terms of trade become significant in several
specifications and the sign is still negative.
33While lags are useful to capture non contemporaneous effects of the covariates on the probability of
an episode taking place, leads can help to uncover reserve causality and endogeneity issues. Consider for
example the effect of undervaluation. If future undervaluation is positively correlated with the likelihood of
an episode taking place, this may suggest that reserve causation could be an issue, or that expectations of
future level of the real exchange rate matter.
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Regarding the estimations that use leads instead of lags, the capital stock per capita and
the growth rate stand out as the most significant variables, with the same sign as in the
original estimations. This is good news because it suggest that the result are robust, but
it increases our concerns regarding endogeneity issues. The result may suggest that future
growth is responsible for turning points in investment, or alternatively, it could be the case
that there is reserve causality between capital accumulation and growth.
Table 1.29 displays an estimation using a full battery of lags and leads (as well as con-
temporaneous effects) of growth and capital stock per capita on the probability of an episode
taking place. We can see that including lags, leads and contemporaneous effects does not
destroy the statistical significance of the coefficients associated with the growth rate, before,
after and during the beginning of an episode. This suggest that fast growth precedes a typi-
cal episode. Thus, it seems more likely that future growth matters because of the effects on
investment during the last phase of an episode, rather than because agents anticipate the
future rates of growth. Alternatively, capital accumulation also matters for growth (there is
reverse causation). I cannot choose among any of these possibilities with the evidence that
I have at hand, and more work may be need to asses the importance of expectations or the
endogeneity of growth in my estimations.
1.4.3 Determinants by Country Type
This section explores the determinants of episodes by country characteristics. I separate
the sample into Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing countries. To create the classifica-
tion, I combine information on the share of value added of the manufacturing sector on total
value added and the share of manufacturing exports on total exports. The data comes from
World Development Indicators rather than from the Groningen Growth and Development
Centre (which will be used in the next section), because the former has a broader coverage.
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When both the value added and the export shares are larger than the year world average
in most of the sample (at least in half of the years), I consider that country as manufacturer
producer for the entire sample (1950-2011). When very little data is available (some countries
have less than 10 or even 5 observations for one of the series), I only consider the longer series.
When no data exist that country is excluded, except a well known example: there is no data
for Taiwan, but I included into the group of manufacturing countries. Countries like French
Polynesia, Haiti, Kosovo, Puerto Rico and New Caledonia are classified as manufactures
according to World Development Indicators data, but there is no PWT 8.1 capital stock
data for them, so at the end of the day they are out of the sample and I do no bother to
classify them. The rest of the countries are de facto considered non manufacturer producers,
even if there is no World Development Indicators data for them.34
Table 1.30 contains the results for manufacturing countries only, while the table 1.31
show the same results for the group of non-manufacturing countries only. It worth to notice
several features of the results. The degree of real exchange rate undervaluation matters for
the first baseline specification only for manufacturing countries, while it only matters for
the last specification for non-manufacturing countries. The reverse seems to be true for the
lagged growth rate and the lagged capital stock.
Rather than a true difference due to the variables included, this could be a side-effect of
using different samples. There seems to be no clear picture. To control for this, the tables
1.32 and 1.33 use the smaller sample possible. This exercise suggest that undervaluation
34The final list of manufacturing countries is: Armenia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Be-
larus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macao, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands,
Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam.
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seems to be more important for the non-manufacturing group, and that lagged growth is
more important for the manufacturing group.
Human capital and GDP per capita seems to be very important for manufacturing coun-
tries, a result consistent with the new literature on economic growth that emphasizes diver-
gence due to increasing returns (a feature that seems to be more prevalent for manufactures).
FDI flows are significant and positive for non-manufacturing countries; moreover, the capital
flows variable display a similar pattern than in our original results, but the effects seems to
be larger for manufacturing countries (thus, the size of the coefficient seems to be more than
twice as a large in manufacturing countries, -0.009 vs. -0.004 for non-manufacturing). As
in the baseline results, global factors seems to decrease the likelihood of an episode in both
types of countries.
As a second exercise, I consider whether non-developed countries are “different”.35 My
first set of specifications includes countries for Africa, Asia and Latin-America only. Other
classifications are possible. For example, Rapetti, Razmi and Skott (2012b) consider three
alternative definitions of developed countries: 1) Rodrik’s criteria (GDP per capita larger
than 6.000 US$ using a PPP measure), “‘Developed I”; 2) A per capita GDP larger than
50 per cent of the US per capita GDP, “Developed II”; and 3) the standard classification of
international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, “Developed III”.
Tables 1.34, 1.35, 1.36, 1.37 include the results, for Asian, African and Latin-American
countries only, and countries that do not satisfy the criteria (1), (2), and (3), respectively. It is
possible to verify that some variables are still significant and very important. More precisely,
lagged growth and lagged capital stock have the same sign as in the baseline specifications,
and they are significant at standard levels. The variables associated with the international
35The literature on the effects of real exchange rates on growth suggest that non-developed countries
are indeed different. The real exchange rate is a more important macroeconomic price than for developed
countries (Razmi, Rapetti, and Skott, 2012b; Rodrik, 2008).
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context, capital flows and crises are almost always significant and have the correct sign,
and the coefficients are a little bit larger (which make sense for the case of non-developed
economies). The variable undervaluation has the correct sign in all the specifications, but it
becomes non-significant most of the time; although the number of observations is not that
larger in several equations, in several cases its significance drops after including covariates
that eliminate very few observations. This is what happens in tables 1.36, 1.37, when
comparing column (3) and (4). The number of observation falls by about 5 % (not a big
deal), but the effect of undervaluation becomes smaller and non-significant, suggesting that
after controlling for everything else, that variable no longer matters.
To conclude this subsection, countries do differ in terms of level of development and the
shares of manufactures on total GDP. But from our regressions it seems difficult to highlight
a clear difference attributable to country group specific characteristics. However, it seems
to be the case that while undervaluation matters for non-manufacturing countries, lagged
growth is important for manufacturing producers. On the other hand, capital flow variables
negatively affect almost all the types of countries, except for FDI flows that seems to make
episodes more likely in non-manufacturing countries.
1.5 Episode Structure
The task for this section is to analyze the “structure” of a typical episode. By “structure”
I mean the composition of output and employment. Are there any signs or evidence of
structural change somewhere close to the starting date for an average episode? A priori,
there are reasons to expect a “yes” for an answer. If capital accumulation is driven by
growth in the modern sector, it is plausible to observe some shift of resources from other
sectors, like agriculture, to manufactures.
I will also explore the evolution of exports and imports during an episode. It seems
plausible that during a typical episode the tradable sector will expand by more than the
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non-tradable sector. This process will probably involve an increase in exports, but also more
imports of capital goods and intermediate inputs. The trade balance will worsen as imports
will increase faster than exports, although this may depend on the evolution of the real
exchange rate.
To address the issue of structural change, I show the evolution of the shares of value added
and employment of manufactures, agriculture and the tradable sector over time, including
years before, during, and after an episode. I plot the mean and the 95 per cent confidence
interval (the upper and the lower bound). I consider 3 years before an episode, the 7 year
window, and 3 years after. Thus, an episode starts at t=4 and ends at t=10.
To construct the data, I create a new database with episodes as identifiers. This implies
that there could be some degree of overlapping for some countries that experience consecutive
episodes. For instance, if a country has an episode starting at 1960, and another starting at
1965, then there are two options: 1) to use the same info twice (i.e., the year 1964 is t=8 in
one episode, and t=3 in another); 2) to discard one of the episodes (the second one).
I opt for option 2), so the next results that I show do not include the second episode.
This seems to be the best option. This avoids the problem of counting some observations
twice, but what is more important, these observations are part, by definition, of episodes of
very fast capital accumulation; otherwise there will be no consecutive episodes and hence no
overlap. Because these episodes of very fast growth are well-known examples of resource shifts
that involve industrialization, our results are, if anything, biased against finding evidence of
structural change.
The first six graphs (1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8) show the evolution of the share of
value added for agriculture, manufactures, and the overall tradable sector, which includes
the previous two plus the mining sector. The data comes from the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre. The data from World Development Indicators is also available, and it
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has a broader coverage, but it does not include the level of disaggregation that I need, and
it does not includes employment.36
The data shows a clear pattern that involves a falling share of agriculture and an in-
creasing share of manufactures, both in terms of employment and value added. The share
of the tradable sector seems to decline during an episode, both in terms of employment and
value added. My decisions to include agriculture in the tradable sector drives these results.37
This evidence is consistent with a “Lewisian” story of economy development (Lewis, 1954),
where backward economies growth very fast by shifting resources from the agricultural sec-
tor, which has a lower level of productivity and lower productivity growth, to the modern
sector. Given the productivity differentials, this shift is consistent with capital accumulation
and economic growth.
If there is “hidden unemployment” in the backward sector, during this process of struc-
tural change the re-allocation of resources can take place with little wage pressures, so the
profit rate in the modern sector can remain more or less constant despite fast capital ac-
cumulation. Thus, the evidence from value added and employment data is connected with
the results from sections 3 and 4. For example, in an open economy set-up, real exchange
rate undervaluation is associated with a high profit rate in the modern sector. The variables
associated directly or indirectly with the level of real exchange rates, like capital flows, terms
of trade and capital account openness, can affect the profitability in the tradable sector. 38.
36The full list of countries includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan,
Venezuela. The period spans from 1950 to 2005.
37Had I choose to exclude agriculture, we will probably observe exactly the opposite. There are good
reasons to include agriculture in the tradable sector, but also in the non-tradable sector. In Latin-American
and developed countries agriculture is usually part of the modern sector, while in some parts of Africa and
Asia agriculture is (or it was not so long ago) mainly part of the backward sector.
38Razmi, Rapetti and Skott (2012) provide an open economy model with a “Lewisian” flavor.
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The data suggest that the process of structural change seems to be preexisting. The
trends in value added and employment indicates so. The share of agriculture was declining
and the share of manufactures increasing before a typical episode starts (see what happens
during years 1, 2, and 3). An episode does not necessarily trigger the process of structural
change, but it rather seems to be a consequence of the re-allocation of resources from the
backward to the modern sector of the economy. Alternatively, an episode may be responsible
for an acceleration of the process of structural change.
After the end of an episode the behavior of agriculture and manufacturing seems to
differ. While the agricultural sector seems to stop shrinking, manufacturing continues to
grow afterwards. This may suggest that the end of an episode coincides with a slow down
in the process of absorbing the surplus of labor from agriculture. It is reasonable to expect
some reduction in the rate of growth if the surplus is absorbed, but it could also be the case
that growth stops for other reasons.39
The size of the shifts from agriculture to manufacturing suggest that the process of
structural change was extremely important during the episodes. In terms of magnitudes, the
fall in agriculture seems to be more dramatic than the increase in manufactures, suggesting
that other sectors like services also increase their share. For example, comparing the first
and the last year of a typical episode, the agricultural share of value added and employment
fall from about 18 and 43 percentage points to 15 and 38, while the manufacturing share of
value added and employment increase from around 17 and 14 percentage points to 19 and 15
percentage points. Of course these are well-known patters in the literature on development.
39For this particular finding, removing overlapping observations implies that this is a somehow more robust
result, the reason being that some of the episodes will continue in the future, and in fact will lead to another
episode, but because the next data is not there, the years t = 8, t = 9, and t = 10 will presumably display
an ongoing process of structural change.
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It is also interesting to analyze what happens to exports and imports during a typical
episode. The figures 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11 show a clear pattern: both imports and exports as a
share of GDP increase, but imports by more than exports, so the trade balance worsens. The
numbers suggest that the trade balance worsens from an average of -4 percentage points of
GDP to about -7 percentage points. This is driven mostly by an abrupt increase in imports,
from about 40 to about 46 percentage points of GDP, while exports increase from 36 to
about 39 percentage points of GDP. Interesting, imports seems to stabilize at a higher level
after the end of an episode, while exports seem to keep growing faster than GDP.
Notice that this behavior of the tradable sector is consistent with the behavior of manu-
facturing and agriculture. I expect that the fast growth of the manufacturing sector requires
large imports of capital goods and intermediate inputs that are usually not produced do-
mestically in non-developed economies at early stages of development. I also expect a strong
positive effect on exports that probably last longer than the positive effects on imports, for
at least two reasons. Once the capital goods are installed, imports may not need to keep
growing as fast as before for a while, and there could be some import substitution in the
manufacturing sector.
To summarize, a typical episode of sustained capital accumulation in our sample features
a certain dose of structural change. Output and employment shifts from agriculture to
manufactures. Imports and exports increase, but imports growth faster, so the trade balance
worsens over time. This is fully consistent with the “old” theory of development. Whether
future episodes will feature the same type of structural change is a matter of debate.40
40Some recent papers have focused on the increasing importance of services. See for example Eichengreen
and Gupta (2011).
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1.6 Sustainability of Capital Accumulation After Episodes
The final task is to analyze why capital accumulation is sustained after some episodes and
not sustained after others. This section extend the original filter to account for the behavior
of capital accumulation during the years after the end of an episode. The problem is how
to define sustainability. Several definitions are possible. An easy way out is to expand the
window to include up to 12 years, instead of the original number of 7. The findings using
the baseline Probit models and extending the window are reported in table 1.38.
Interestingly, most of the main results hold, but the statistical significance of growth
disappears once we include additional controls. This could suggest that lagged growth is
not as important as in the original results. Fast growth may trigger a process of capital
accumulation, but it may not be an important factor sustaining the process of long-term
growth itself. Although this is surprising, because it is hard to believe that the capital stock
can growth very fast without fast output growth, this could very well reflect the fact that
spurts of growth are not enough to sustain capital accumulation. Another possibility is that
an average episode may involve some form of capital deepening, so capital grows faster than
output at least for a while.
Three new variables are now significant at standard levels. Namely, exchange rate sta-
bility, trade openness and natural resource rents as a proportion of GDP. An increase in one
percent in the index of exchange rate stability makes an episode about 1.5 and 5.3 percentage
points less likely. More open economies are also associated with long lasting episodes; an
increase in trade openness of one percent raises the likelihood by about 4 per cent. Finally,
an increase in one percent in the share of natural resources over GDP decrease the likelihood
of an episode taking place by 0.2 per cent. The number may seem small, but the differences
across countries and years can be very large. Specifically, in table 1.10 we can verify that the
variable Rents ranges from 0 to about 90 per cent. Thus, a country with the largest share of
40
natural resource rents to GDP is about 20 per cent less likely to experience an episode than
a country with no natural resource rents.
A second method to analyze the issue of sustainability combines a 12 year window with
the original criteria that uses 7 year. I use the 12 window to detect long lasting episodes,
and then I go back to the original filter to classify as “sustained” those episodes that are
selected both by the filter with 7 and 12 year windows. Because the starting dates imply
some overlapping and some disagreement between the filters, I allow for a 3 year difference
between them. For example, an episode may be identified for China starting in 1990 using
a 7 year window, but the filter with a 12 year window may select 1993 as the starting date.
In that case the original episode is classified as sustained, while if the window picks another
date, let’s say 1994, then the episode that starts in 1990 is not consider sustained.41
The main reason to resort to this procedure, rather than just sticking with a 12 year
window is that now I can compare the results. The table 1.39 display the fraction of sustained
of episodes by region. The fraction of sustained episodes is very large, suggesting that most
episodes picked-up by the original filter are sustained. The table also shows that in Asian
and European countries, the fraction of sustained episodes is larger than in Africa and Latin-
America and the Caribbean. As expected, Sub-Saharan Africa displays the lower fraction
of sustained episodes, but interestingly, about half of them are very long-lasting. The table
1.40 replicates the previous exercise using income quintiles instead of regions. Perhaps
surprisingly, I could not find substantial differences by income levels.
The tables 1.41 and 1.42 show the econometric results using Probit models. There are not
very large differences between sustained and non-sustained episodes, except for some changes
in the size of the coefficients, and some changes in the statistical significance (although once
again we should keep in mind that the number of observations often becomes very low). It
41Luckily, this overlap never happens for the episodes that also have value added and employment data.
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is worth to notice that the coefficient associated with undervaluation becomes very large for
sustained episodes, from 0.056 to up to 0.312. This implies that now a 1 percent increase in
undervaluation makes an episode 30 percent more likely. However, non-sustained episodes
are also associated with undervaluation, so we can only distinguish episodes by the degree,
and not by the sign or the statistical significance of the coefficients. Per capita GDP now
makes non-sustained episodes more likely.
Lagged growth is not significant in both cases, considering columns (3), (4), and (5). The
sign becomes negative in table 1.41, and it is still positive in table 1.42. This is consistent
with the findings displayed in table 1.38: growth seems to be more relevant for non-sustained
episodes of capital accumulation.
Another method to consider sustainability issues consist in defining a new dummy variable
that is equal to one when the criteria for an episode are met, and when capital per capita
growth is at least as fast as 3.5 per cent in the following 7-year window. The new results using
only episodes that met this new criteria are shown in table 1.43. As in other estimations, the
coefficients associated with undervaluation and lagged growth become less significant in the
last two estimations, but unlike in some of the previous results, now both variables have a
positive sign. We should keep in mind that changes in the sample may explain these results.
However, the number of observations only fall by about 40, suggesting that this is not the
main issue. Against my own priors, higher terms of trade are associated with episodes where
growth afterwards is as fast as during the episode. Human capital and per capita GDP are
positively associated with this types of episodes, suggesting that growth is more stable after
an episode in more developed economies.
As a fourth and final method, I run a Multinomial Probit defining three outcomes, no
episode (=0), non-sustained episode (=1) and sustained episode (=2) (using the filter with
a 12 year window to define sustainability). The results are shown in tables 1.44 and 1.45.
There seems to be noticeable differences. For instance, undervaluation is no longer significant
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once we account for factors such as crises in the previous five years, natural resource booms,
trade and capital account openness, and the like. All these factors are not significant for the
non-sustained episodes. More precisely, natural resource rents, capital account openness and
crises make a sustained episode less likely, while trade openness make them more likely. As
before, Human Capital, and lagged growth are important drivers of sustained episodes, but
they don’t always matter for non-sustained episodes. Interestingly, this new set of results do
not suggest that lagged growth is negatively correlated with sustained episodes, but rather
the opposite seems to be true (lagged growth is associated with sustained episodes, and not
with unsustainable ones).
Because the sample drops dramatically from equation 2 to equation 3 (see columns 2 and
3), the tables 1.46 and 1.47 use the smallest sample possible. These tables confirm that for
non-sustained episodes, undervaluation matters, for sustained the picture is less clear: when
the sample is restricted, undervaluation no longer makes sustained episodes more likely. This
exercise confirms that lagged growth does not make a non-sustained episode more likely after
including additional covariates, but past growth seems to predict sustained episodes, even if
a stick with the smallest sample possible.
To conclude, the picture that emerges from this section is not very clear, but some factors
can be highlighted. Specifically, growth is less significant and even negatively correlated with
the likelihood of sustained episodes taking place on some specifications. Variables such as
trade openness, exchange rate stability and natural resource rent seems matter, although
this depends on how I define “sustainable” episodes. Finally, it is worth to remember that,
as expected, Asian countries display the higher share of sustained episodes of capital accu-
mulation. The reasons why Asian countries succeed remains an area for future research, as
regression analysis was not able to present a clear-cut case.
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1.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has attempted to uncover the characteristics of sustained episodes of invest-
ment acceleration at the country level. I find that episodes are very common, with each
country experiencing at least one in a 50 year period on average. The likelihood of an
episode taking place varies non-linearly with per capita GDP. Advanced economies have
a lower probability of experiencing an episode while low- to middle-income countries have
higher probabilities. Usual suspects (a.k.a, East Asian countries, China and India) are more
likely to experience an episode than slow growing countries (a.k.a., African countries).
My preliminary econometric exercises ask three main questions: What are the determi-
nants of an episode? What happens during an episode? Why some episode last longer than
others? Regarding the first question, the results indicate that sustained surges in investment
tend to be preceded by stable and undervalued real exchange rates, low inflation, net capital
outflows, fast growth in the past, high per capita income and human capital, and favorable
external conditions. I do not find strong evidence that shows that natural resources or terms
of trade are detrimental (nor particularly beneficial) for episodes of capital accumulation.
These preliminary results were subject of a battery of robustness tests and checks. I
showed that the results hold using Probit, Logit and OLS models, and that controlling for
rare events or for a nested choice structure do not lead to dramatic changes in the results.
Using different specifications and alternative definitions of the filter also leads to similar
outcomes. More precisely, extending or contracting the window, adding lags, changing the
criteria, introducing alternative covariates or using different samples (manufacturing vs.
non-manufacturing countries, developed vs. non-developed) do not make a big difference.
Regarding the second question, I find evidence of structural change. During an episode,
or more precisely a few years before (the trends seems to be pre-existing), employment and
value added shift from agriculture to manufactures, and imports and exports increase, but
the overall trade balance worsens. These results are consistent with structural change as a
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source of growth, as suggested by the development literature which emphasized increasing
returns, surplus labor, endogenous productivity gains, and so on. However, my sample was
limited and, as a recent literature has suggested, growth and capital accumulation may be
service-lead in the future.
Regarding the third and final question, I was not able to find very clear patterns that
allows us to distinguish sustained from non-sustained episodes. Fast growth seems to be
less significant for long-lasting episodes, more trade openness, more exchange rate stability,
a closed capital account, and less dependence on natural resource rents seems to matter.
However, all these findings depends on how I define sustainability. Alternatively, unobserved
variables or changes in the sample may explain the aforementioned difference, but in any
case the results are not very robust.
What do our results tell, when I contrast them with the findings of the literature? Al-
though it is very difficult to compare my own numbers with the results of, for example,
Hausmann et. al. (2005), due to sample and database differences, several of my findings
suggest that output growth and capital accumulation seems to go hand-in-hand. The compo-
sition of episodes by income levels and regions do suggest that the lion share of both episodes
based on output growth and episodes based on capital growth seems to be located in East
Asian countries, but other typical low and middle income regions such as Latin-America,
Africa, or post World War II Europe as well.
Thus, my findings are not in strong disagreement with those that are derived from a filter
based on output, and I also find that past output growth is good for capital accumulation
in the next 7-year window. It seems likely that the episodes of fast output growth also
feature fast capital accumulation. A story based on the fast growth of a low capital intensive
sector (which implies fast output growth with slower capital accumulation), or based on
capital deepening (which implies fast capital growth with slower output growth) requires a
different set of findings. The discussion and results presented on section 1.5 illustrate that
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the manufacturing sector typically led the expansion, reinforcing the conviction that it is
generally the case that output and capital move together.42
Furthermore, I was able to find some evidence that variables associated with the external
sector, such as real exchange rate undervaluation, and low capital inflows, make an episode
a more likely event. These results are in line with Freund and Pierola’s (2008) analysis that
shows how large real depreciations accelerate manufacturing export growth.
42A constant capital-output ratio is consistent with “Harrod-neutral” technical progress (also known as
labor saving), and with Kaldor “stylized facts” (Kaldor, 1961).
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Table 1.1: Investment and saving across regions as a percent of GDP, 1960-
2014
Gross domestic savings Gross fixed capital formation
East Asia & Pacific 31.7 28.4
Latin America & Caribbean 20.9 19.7
High income: OECD 23.6 23.7
Middle East & North Africa 29.0 22.1
South Asia 18.7 19.8
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators
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Table 1.2: List of Episodes (Asia)
Country Year K/L Growth Acceleration
Bangladesh 1993 3.79 2.56
Bangladesh 1998 5.49 2.2
Bhutan 1981 5.24 2.26
Bhutan 1989 7.52 3.11
Cambodia 2001 6.84 4.54
China 1957 5.55 2.5
China 1972 5.56 2.46
China 1990 8.26 2.9
Hong Kong 1962 6.37 2.76
Hong Kong 1978 6.78 2.49
India 2000 6.1 2.02
India 2005 8.4 3.16
Indonesia 1971 4.08 4.56
Indonesia 1976 6.25 2.79
Indonesia 1989 7.26 2.1
Indonesia 2004 5.06 2.1
Japan 1960 9.75 2.95
Korea, Republic of 1964 7.91 7
Korea, Republic of 1973 10.2 2.81
Korea, Republic of 1985 10.7 3.12
Laos 1988 4.48 4.52
Laos 2001 7.1 3.4
Macao 1973 6.98 2.07
Macao 1991 6.92 2.61
Macao 2001 5.94 4.51
Malaysia 1967 4.73 3.62
Malaysia 1972 7.16 3.76
Malaysia 1988 7.37 3.66
Maldives 1976 9.65 8.53
Maldives 1981 10.4 4.01
Maldives 2003 11.2 4.91
Nepal 1970 4.03 3.42
Nepal 1975 5.81 2.67
Pakistan 1960 4.04 5.72
Philippines 1972 4.29 3.1
Philippines 1977 6 2.65
Singapore 1970 10.5 4.48
Singapore 1992 6 2.13
Sri Lanka 1975 4.53 2.1
Sri Lanka 2003 5.28 2.2
Taiwan 1960 3.97 3.82
Taiwan 1965 9.03 5.63
Taiwan 1970 11.4 3.1
Taiwan 1988 9.11 2.21
Thailand 1959 3.93 4.5
Thailand 1964 7.34 4.09
Thailand 1990 9.77 3.73
Vietnam 1990 8.45 6.11
Vietnam 1995 10.2 2.86
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Table 1.3: List of Episodes (Africa & the Middle East)
Country Year K/L Growth Acceleration
Angola 1990 3.51 4.66
Bahrain 1980 4.78 2.14
Botswana 1970 11.4 6.63
Botswana 1985 7.14 2.88
Burkina Faso 1967 3.63 3.54
Burkina Faso 1978 5.52 2.3
Cape Verde 1968 6.68 3.17
Cape Verde 2005 7.41 3.89
Comoros 1963 4.14 2.1
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1980 3.79 2.09
Congo, Republic of 1980 8.63 6.84
Congo, Republic of 2005 5.82 8.14
Cote d‘Ivoire 1975 4.68 2.92
Egypt 1971 4.04 3.84
Egypt 1976 10.9 8.44
Egypt 1994 5.65 2.04
Egypt 2004 7.19 2.09
Equatorial Guinea 1971 7.47 3.11
Equatorial Guinea 1991 27.6 24.2
Equatorial Guinea 1996 29.7 11.3
Gabon 1974 8.22 3.93
Gambia, The 1988 3.76 5.36
Gambia, The 1998 4.19 2.46
Guinea 2001 6.4 4.34
Iran 1956 4.92 2.3
Iran 1965 7.83 2.03
Iran 1973 9.97 3.16
Iraq 1978 6.75 4.01
Israel 1956 3.68 2.38
Israel 1970 7.06 2.68
Jordan 1977 9.07 2.47
Kuwait 1989 8.96 10.1
Kuwait 2000 4.35 2.32
Kuwait 2005 6.7 3.64
Lebanon 1983 4.5 4.63
Lebanon 2005 4.57 4.26
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Table 1.4: List of Episodes (Africa & the Middle East, continued)
Country Year K/L Growth Acceleration
Lesotho 1969 3.72 3.35
Lesotho 1974 10.1 7.44
Lesotho 1990 6.41 2
Malawi 1969 6.13 2.5
Malta 1956 3.58 2.43
Malta 1965 6.3 2.48
Mauritania 1971 7.01 2.47
Mauritania 2005 4.97 2.11
Mauritius 1973 3.59 4.01
Mauritius 1984 3.57 2.45
Morocco 1971 4.6 3.82
Morocco 1999 3.54 2.21
Morocco 2004 6.03 2.9
Mozambique 1997 3.61 3.77
Namibia 1967 3.91 2.09
Namibia 2005 5.05 2.47
Nigeria 1972 6.91 2.04
Oman 1974 5.7 2.95
Oman 2005 8.53 4.93
Rwanda 1981 4.5 3.83
Rwanda 1988 6.13 2.2
Rwanda 2005 6.94 5.4
Sao Tome and Principe 1989 3.77 4.36
Saudi Arabia 1976 3.91 3.78
Saudi Arabia 2005 3.77 3.49
South Africa 2003 3.92 3.16
Sudan 1994 12.2 11.6
Sudan 1999 13.9 3.05
Swaziland 1971 7.3 2.08
Syria 1976 4.89 2.24
Tanzania 1968 4.06 2.28
Tanzania 2005 5.01 3.74
Togo 1976 4.93 2.1
Tunisia 1973 5.32 2.05
Uganda 1994 4.25 3.37
Uganda 2003 5.64 2.17
Yemen 1993 4.84 6.16
Yemen 2003 4.82 2.15
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Table 1.5: List of Episodes (Latin America & the Caribbean)
Country Year K/L Growth Acceleration
Antigua and Barbuda 1980 6.46 2.3
Antigua and Barbuda 1985 8.77 2.02
Antigua and Barbuda 2002 4.24 2.55
Bahamas 1979 3.76 4.96
Bahamas 1993 3.89 2.14
Barbados 1967 4.64 2.29
Belize 1988 3.59 4.57
Bermuda 2004 3.52 2.89
Brazil 1972 6.86 3.08
Chile 1964 5.66 2.21
Chile 1994 6 2.72
Colombia 1990 4.05 2.62
Colombia 2003 3.72 3.44
Costa Rica 1967 3.63 2.11
Costa Rica 2005 4.69 2.21
Dominica 1980 5.44 2.4
Dominica 2005 3.82 2.04
Dominican Republic 1968 5.17 5.78
Dominican Republic 1993 5.22 2.6
Ecuador 1975 4 2.25
El Salvador 1971 3.66 4.25
El Salvador 1991 3.57 2.8
Grenada 1979 9.8 3.73
Jamaica 1967 3.57 2.14
Panama 1964 3.61 2.87
Panama 1969 6.96 4.29
Panama 1994 4.54 3.61
Panama 2005 7.3 5.84
Paraguay 1969 3.53 2.19
Paraguay 1974 8.06 5.26
Peru 2005 5.2 4.08
St. Kitts & Nevis 1987 7.88 3.2
Suriname 1972 7.24 2.84
Suriname 1998 4.1 2.73
Trinidad & Tobago 1956 3.89 2.53
Trinidad & Tobago 1976 8.92 2.82
Uruguay 1972 3.77 2.25
Uruguay 1977 4.99 2.27
Uruguay 2005 3.52 2.17
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Table 1.6: List of Episodes (Europe & North America)
Country Year K/L Growth Acceleration
Armenia 2003 8.69 6.34
Azerbaijan 2000 9.85 8.36
Belarus 2004 7.11 5.23
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 12.5 3.71
Bulgaria 1990 7.98 3.4
Bulgaria 1999 4.31 3.83
Bulgaria 2004 7.56 4.09
Cyprus 1972 6.59 2.02
Denmark 1960 5.48 2.1
Estonia 1999 6.35 2.34
Greece 1968 8.37 2.09
Greece 1999 3.55 2.17
Ireland 1997 7.44 4.71
Italy 1969 6.51 2.14
Kazakhstan 2005 3.76 3.02
Latvia 1999 4.33 2.96
Lithuania 2001 5.58 2.02
Montenegro 2004 5.73 4.5
Poland 1996 3.64 2.74
Portugal 1961 6.03 2.37
Romania 1974 10.5 2.43
Romania 2002 4.57 2.65
Spain 1963 7.39 2.45
Turkey 1970 6 2.42
Turkey 1985 4.58 3.63
Turkey 2003 4.54 2.46
Turkmenistan 2005 6.67 5.5
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Table 1.7: Unconditional Probabilities by Region
Decade 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total
East Asia and Pacific 0.0286 0.0362 0.0574 0.0311 0.0403 0.0430 0.0395
Latin-American & Caribbean 0.0089 0.0259 0.0357 0.0160 0.0287 0.0432 0.0269
Middle East and North Africa 0.0508 0.0131 0.0833 0.0216 0.0196 0.0690 0.0380
South Asia 0.0000 0.0156 0.0556 0.0385 0.0172 0.107 0.0352
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0000 0.0164 0.0280 0.0201 0.0180 0.0380 0.0206
Europe & North America 0.0000 0.0102 0.0062 0.0020 0.0162 0.0394 0.0111
Total 0.0092 0.0174 0.0299 0.0152 0.0211 0.0450 0.0223
Table 1.8: Unconditional Probabilities by Income
Decade 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total
1st Quintile 0.0351 0.0230 0.0271 0.0180 0.0240 0.0373 0.0250
2nd Quintile 0.0141 0.0229 0.0420 0.0217 0.0233 0.0382 0.0280
3rd Quintile 0.0500 0.0563 0.0647 0.0221 0.0244 0.0536 0.0407
4th Quintile 0.0000 0.0299 0.0432 0.0298 0.0234 0.0785 0.0357
5th Quintile 0.0000 0.0000 0.0122 0.0061 0.0133 0.0206 0.0119
Total 0.0092 0.0174 0.0299 0.0152 0.0211 0.0450 0.0223
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Table 1.9: Variable Descriptions
Description Source
POLICY VARIABLES
Underval81 Undervaluation index PWT 8.1
Lag Growth Lagged Per Capita Growth Rate PWT 8.1
Lag KL Lagged Per Capita Capital Stock PWT 8.1
Fiscal 5 year corr. of GDP and Gov. Cons (dev. from trends) WDI
Inflation Rate of Inflation WDI
XR Stability Exchange Rate Stability Index [*]
INTERNAL VARIABLES
Crisis 5y Dummy for a crisis episode (previous 5 years) [**]
Rents Share or natural resource rent on GDP WDI
Capita GDP Per Capita GDP PWT 8.1
EXTERNAL VARIABLES
NET Inflows Net capital Inflows / Trend GDP (3 year avg.) [***]
FFend Federal Funds Rate (end of period) FRED
Global uncertainty Volatility of World Stock Market Index FRED
TOT Log of Terms of Trade [****]
Trade De Facto Trade Openness PWT 8.1
KA open Capital Account Openness Index [*]
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Human Capital Years of education adjusted by the return of schooling PWT 8.1
Durable Political Regime Durability (years) Polity IV
[*] Aizenman et. al. (2013)
[**] Laeven and Valencia (2012)
[***] Broner et. al. (2013)
[****] Spatafor and Tytell (2009)
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Table 1.10: Summary Statistics and Expected Signs
Observations Mean SD Max / Min Exp. Sign
POLICY VARIABLES
Underval81 8275 0.0000 0.4086 2.1638 / -2.2791 +
Lag Growth 8101 0.0198 .06401 -1.1106 / 0.6553 +
Lag KL 8268 9.2650 1.3677 5.3269 / 12.7864 -
Fiscal 4609 0.3498 0.5085 1 / -1 -
Inflation 5852 0.3192 3.9813 237.73 / -0.1764 +/-
XR Stability 7333 0.6939 0.3282 1 / 0.0013 +/-
INTERNAL VARIABLES
Crisis 5y 3963 0.0664 0.2489 1 / 0 -
Rents 6591 10.0348 14.3107 89.3287 / 0 +/-
Capita GDP 8275 8.4326 1.2324 5.2112 / 11.9692 +/-
EXTERNAL VARIABLES
NET Inflows 2769 0.0080 0.0759 0.8167 / -0.5092 +/-
FFend 9686 5.2991 3.3649 16.38 / 0.1 -
Global uncertainty 5678 20.2568 6.4431 40.82 / 9.8 -
TOT 3493 4.6615 0.2871 5.8793 / 3.0576 +/-
Trade 6767 0.7675 0.5010 5.6206 / 0.0531 +/-
KA open 5595 0.0000 1.5244 0.24390 / -1.8640 +/-
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Human Capital 6927 0.6913 0.3115 0.0180 / 1.2861 +/-
Durable 7499 22.1756 28.9124 202 / 0 +/-
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Table 1.11: Baseline Probits - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.029*** 0.051*** 0.077*** 0.065** 0.068**
(0.008) (0.015) (0.026) (0.031) (0.031)
Lag Growth 0.576*** 0.803*** 0.792*** 0.653*** 0.640***
(0.078) (0.113) (0.233) (0.239) (0.244)
Lag KL -0.020*** -0.035*** -0.065*** -0.142*** -0.144***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.026) (0.025)
Fiscal 0.030*** -0.001 0.030* 0.023
(0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Inflation -0.031 -0.065 -0.083* -0.088*
(0.028) (0.045) (0.049) (0.050)
XR Stability -0.001 -0.035 -0.046 -0.052
(0.015) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Crisis 5y -0.050*** -0.058*** -0.056***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Rents 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.003 -0.022 -0.029
(0.021) (0.024) (0.026)
KA open -0.001 -0.004 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NET Inflows -0.003* -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.004
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.006***
(0.001)
Reserves 0.007*
(0.004)
TOT -0.080* -0.042 -0.058
(0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
FFend -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.005** -0.005** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.125** 0.132**
(0.055) (0.055)
Capita GDP 0.083*** 0.082***
(0.028) (0.027)
Durable -0.001* -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.045 0.107 0.184 0.202 0.205
Observations 6,230 3,298 1,084 1,041 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.12: Probits with the Smallest Sample - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.062** 0.064** 0.071*** 0.063** 0.068**
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031)
Lag Growth 0.976*** 0.863*** 0.742*** 0.681*** 0.640***
(0.230) (0.228) (0.236) (0.242) (0.244)
Lag KL -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.063*** -0.148*** -0.144***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.026) (0.025)
Fiscal 0.006 0.023 0.029 0.023
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Inflation -0.178** -0.061 -0.081* -0.088*
(0.071) (0.042) (0.049) (0.050)
XR Stability -0.038 -0.052 -0.046 -0.052
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Crisis 5y -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.056***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Rents -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.002 -0.019 -0.029
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026)
KA open 0.002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
NET Inflows -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.004
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.006***
(0.001)
Reserves 0.007*
(0.004)
TOT -0.022 -0.058 -0.058
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
FFend -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.133** 0.132**
(0.055) (0.055)
Capita GDP 0.087*** 0.082***
(0.027) (0.027)
Durable -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.090 0.106 0.180 0.204 0.205
Observations 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.13: Robustness OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Underval81 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.079** 0.068** 0.066*
(0.008) (0.015) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Lag Growth 0.515*** 0.835*** 0.673*** 0.526** 0.513**
(0.061) (0.107) (0.216) (0.213) (0.219)
Lag KL -0.020*** -0.034*** -0.063*** -0.125*** -0.126***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.027) (0.026)
Fiscal 0.023** -0.006 0.017 0.017
(0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Inflation -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
XR Stability 0.005 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015
(0.015) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Crisis 5y -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.062***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Rents 0.002* -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.005 -0.015 -0.016
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
KA open 0.001 -0.003 -0.005
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
NET Inflows -0.002 -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.005
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.005***
(0.002)
Reserves 0.006
(0.004)
TOT -0.059 -0.005 -0.008
(0.039) (0.031) (0.031)
FFend -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.103* 0.104*
(0.062) (0.063)
Capita GDP 0.072** 0.073**
(0.029) (0.030)
Durable -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.258*** 0.387*** 1.181*** 0.828*** 0.837***
(0.024) (0.042) (0.217) (0.174) (0.173)
R-squared 0.026 0.057 0.103 0.101 0.102
Observations 6,230 3,298 1,084 1,041 1,029
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.14: Robustness Logits - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
Underval81 0.028*** 0.050*** 0.076** 0.070 0.071
(0.008) (0.016) (0.032) (0.052) (0.051)
Lag Growth 0.567*** 0.777*** 0.775*** 0.619** 0.615**
(0.076) (0.121) (0.242) (0.259) (0.260)
Lag KL -0.020*** -0.034*** -0.063*** -0.148*** -0.150***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.027) (0.027)
Fiscal 0.031*** -0.004 0.031 0.023
(0.011) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Inflation -0.040 -0.078 -0.099 -0.100
(0.036) (0.056) (0.060) (0.061)
XR Stability -0.001 -0.035 -0.043 -0.050
(0.015) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Crisis 5y -0.050*** -0.057*** -0.055***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Rents 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.003 -0.020 -0.026
(0.022) (0.025) (0.026)
KA open -0.001 -0.004 -0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
NET Inflows -0.003 -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.004
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.006***
(0.001)
Reserves 0.006*
(0.004)
TOT -0.075* -0.029 -0.044
(0.045) (0.052) (0.051)
FFend -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Uncertainty -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.119** 0.131**
(0.060) (0.060)
Capita GDP 0.094*** 0.092***
(0.036) (0.034)
Durable -0.001* -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
R-squared 0.049 0.103 0.178 0.199 0.203
Observations 6,230 3,298 1,084 1,041 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.15: Stricter Filter Probits - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy II Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.024*** 0.037*** 0.057*** 0.064*** 0.065***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Lag Growth 0.328*** 0.469*** 0.722*** 0.651*** 0.569***
(0.049) (0.086) (0.192) (0.178) (0.181)
Lag KL -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.028*** -0.060*** -0.069***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.016) (0.017)
Fiscal 0.003 -0.005 0.018 0.014
(0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Inflation -0.003 -0.249* -0.291** -0.350**
(0.006) (0.129) (0.132) (0.157)
XR Stability 0.016 -0.008 -0.031 -0.024
(0.010) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Crisis 5y -0.034** -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Rents 0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Trade 0.028** 0.010 0.003
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
KA open 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
NET Inflows 0.001 -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI Inflows -0.001
(0.002)
Port Inflows -0.001
(0.001)
Reserves 0.007***
(0.002)
TOT -0.038 0.025 0.020
(0.033) (0.028) (0.027)
FFend -0.004** -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Global Uncertainty -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Human Capital 0.106*** 0.106***
(0.030) (0.031)
Capita GDP 0.022 0.029*
(0.017) (0.017)
Durable -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6,445 3,420 1,123 1,080 1,068
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.16: Very Strict Filter Probits - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy III Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.010** 0.007 0.062*** 0.101*** 0.116***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.027) (0.033)
Lag Growth 0.111*** 0.137*** 0.388*** 0.288*** 0.189**
(0.026) (0.049) (0.131) (0.083) (0.094)
Lag KL -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.031** -0.031**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013)
Fiscal 0.000 -0.016* 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Inflation -0.010 -0.215** -0.199** -0.341***
(0.015) (0.104) (0.083) (0.132)
XR Stability 0.003 0.010 -0.010 0.001
(0.006) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Crisis 5y -0.003 -0.001 -0.003
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
Rents 0.001*** -0.001* -0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.021*** 0.016** 0.007
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
KA open 0.004 0.008** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
NET Inflows 0.001 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI Inflows 0.002
(0.001)
Port Inflows -0.000
(0.001)
Reserves 0.005***
(0.001)
TOT -0.059** 0.016 0.021
(0.030) (0.024) (0.027)
FFend -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Global Uncertainty 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Human Capital -0.020 -0.068**
(0.018) (0.027)
Capita GDP 0.037** 0.048**
(0.016) (0.019)
Durable -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6,607 3,512 1,146 1,103 1,091
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.17: 1st Year Probits - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.040*** 0.072*** 0.098*** 0.078** 0.080**
(0.009) (0.016) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033)
Lag Growth 0.346*** 0.397*** 0.788*** 0.578** 0.542**
(0.075) (0.130) (0.253) (0.251) (0.261)
Lag KL -0.024*** -0.038*** -0.065*** -0.151*** -0.156***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.028) (0.028)
Fiscal 0.038*** 0.004 0.031 0.026
(0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Inflation -0.081** -0.022 -0.152** -0.159**
(0.036) (0.034) (0.071) (0.073)
XR Stability 0.002 -0.007 -0.014 -0.016
(0.016) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Crisis 5y -0.025 -0.030 -0.028
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Rents 0.000 -0.001 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.006 -0.030 -0.033
(0.023) (0.025) (0.027)
KA open 0.009 0.003 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
NET Inflows -0.005*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.005
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.007***
(0.002)
Reserves 0.007*
(0.004)
TOT -0.086* -0.059 -0.078
(0.046) (0.052) (0.052)
FFend -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.004 -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.141** 0.148**
(0.058) (0.059)
Capita GDP 0.091*** 0.094***
(0.031) (0.030)
Durable -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.036 0.094 0.160 0.178 0.182
Observations 6,129 3,260 1,068 1,035 1,023
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
62
Table 1.18: 5 Year Windows Probits - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.028*** 0.057*** 0.024 0.027 0.028
(0.009) (0.016) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
Lag Growth 0.637*** 0.888*** 1.121*** 0.937*** 0.784***
(0.082) (0.125) (0.256) (0.267) (0.272)
Lag KL -0.017*** -0.032*** -0.048*** -0.164*** -0.168***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.025) (0.024)
Fiscal 0.043*** 0.030* 0.055*** 0.046**
(0.010) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Inflation -0.026 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007
(0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
XR Stability -0.002 -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.095***
(0.015) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Crisis 5y -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.084***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
Rents 0.001** -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.046** 0.030 0.010
(0.020) (0.023) (0.025)
KA open -0.005 -0.009 -0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
NET Inflows -0.002 -0.006***
(0.001) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.000
(0.003)
Port Inflows -0.005***
(0.001)
Reserves 0.011***
(0.003)
TOT -0.096** -0.057 -0.076
(0.046) (0.050) (0.048)
FFend -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.192*** 0.201***
(0.052) (0.051)
Capita GDP 0.112*** 0.111***
(0.028) (0.026)
Durable -0.001** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.045 0.103 0.204 0.267 0.281
Observations 6,192 3,278 1,082 1,040 1,028
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.19: 9 Year Windows Probits - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.053*** 0.060*** 0.077*** 0.097*** 0.112***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
Lag Growth 0.141 0.032 -0.007 -0.071 -0.080
(0.130) (0.131) (0.135) (0.139) (0.136)
Lag KL -0.010 -0.009 -0.020*** -0.086*** -0.077***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019)
Fiscal 0.011 0.002 0.016 0.009
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Inflation -0.086* -0.011 -0.028 -0.038
(0.044) (0.019) (0.027) (0.029)
XR Stability 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.004
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Crisis 5y -0.011 -0.012 -0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Rents 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Trade -0.052*** -0.063*** -0.075***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
KA open 0.010* 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
NET Inflows -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI Inflows 0.001
(0.002)
Port Inflows -0.004***
(0.001)
Reserves -0.000
(0.003)
TOT 0.003 -0.023 -0.019
(0.038) (0.039) (0.040)
FFend -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.003 -0.002 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.045 0.033
(0.032) (0.032)
Capita GDP 0.088*** 0.081***
(0.024) (0.023)
Durable -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.043 0.096 0.163 0.222 0.223
Observations 6,266 3,319 1,079 1,038 1,026
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.20: K Probits - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.012** 0.019** 0.087*** 0.071*** 0.082***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
Lag Growth 0.149*** 0.213*** 0.512*** 0.368*** 0.310***
(0.037) (0.069) (0.143) (0.108) (0.104)
Lag K -0.009*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Fiscal 0.005 -0.009 0.010* 0.014**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Inflation -0.008 -0.404*** -0.290*** -0.350***
(0.012) (0.120) (0.099) (0.117)
XR Stability -0.001 0.030* -0.014 0.003
(0.010) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013)
Crisis 5y 0.000 -0.007 -0.005
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
Rents 0.001*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade 0.021** 0.048*** 0.054***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
KA open 0.005* 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NET Inflows 0.001 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI Inflows 0.001
(0.002)
Port Inflows 0.000
(0.001)
Reserves 0.004***
(0.001)
TOT -0.025 0.063*** 0.051*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.028)
FFend -0.002 -0.002 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Global Uncertainty 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Human Capital -0.021 -0.063**
(0.022) (0.027)
Capita GDP -0.012* -0.010
(0.007) (0.009)
Durable -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.043 0.109 0.416 0.512 0.545
Observations 6,479 3,444 1,137 1,094 1,082
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.21: PPP Probits - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
PPP 0.009 0.021 0.049 0.016 0.021
(0.014) (0.021) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074)
Lag Growth 0.486*** 0.432*** 0.641*** 0.576** 0.509*
(0.115) (0.130) (0.236) (0.246) (0.260)
Lag KL -0.023*** -0.032*** -0.059*** -0.098*** -0.085***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.033) (0.033)
Fiscal 0.013 -0.030 -0.025 -0.033
(0.011) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
Inflation -0.158*** -0.039 -0.035 -0.039
(0.058) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041)
XR Stability 0.003 -0.027 -0.024 -0.035
(0.018) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
Crisis 5y -0.047** -0.058** -0.051**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Rents 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.001 -0.010 -0.025
(0.024) (0.026) (0.031)
KA open -0.003 -0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
NET Inflows -0.003 -0.006**
(0.002) (0.003)
FDI Inflows -0.001
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.004**
(0.002)
Reserves 0.011*
(0.006)
TOT -0.102* -0.100 -0.140**
(0.055) (0.069) (0.063)
FFend -0.011** -0.010** -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Global Uncertainty 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.068 0.053
(0.059) (0.064)
Capita GDP 0.033 0.025
(0.035) (0.034)
Durable -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.050 0.136 0.224 0.193 0.204
Observations 2,175 1,611 620 597 585
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.22: Large Changes Probits - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval change 0.008 -0.007 -0.004 -0.014 -0.012
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Growth boom 0.067*** 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.061***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Rchange -0.011** -0.011** -0.016** -0.016**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
KA open boom 0.016* 0.017* -0.004 -0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Trade boom 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.019 0.016
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
TOT boom -0.009 -0.015 -0.009 -0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Rents boom 0.036*** 0.043** 0.031*
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
NET boom -0.015
(0.013)
FDI boom 0.011
(0.013)
Port boom -0.009
(0.013)
Reserve boom 0.028**
(0.013)
Fiveregime -0.011 -0.004 -0.011
(0.016) (0.025) (0.025)
Pseudo R-squared 0.027 0.037 0.045 0.052 0.058
Observations 6,125 2,920 2,761 1,620 1,587
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.23: Probits with Lag 1 - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 [t-1] 0.021** 0.037** 0.022 0.042 0.045*
(0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027)
Growth [t-1] 0.559*** 0.748*** 0.676*** 0.937*** 0.937***
(0.076) (0.132) (0.126) (0.211) (0.231)
KL [t-1] -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT [t-1] -0.110*** -0.095*** -0.111*** -0.108***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.034) (0.036)
Rents [t-1] 0.000 0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NET Inflows [t-1] -0.003**
(0.001)
FDI Inflows [t-1] -0.003
(0.002)
Port Inflows [t-1] -0.005***
(0.001)
Reserves [t-1] 0.003
(0.003)
Pseudo R-squared 0.053 0.071 0.050 0.107 0.115
Observations 6,230 2,089 2,179 1,174 1,160
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.24: Probits with Lag 3 - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 [t-3] 0.025*** 0.033* 0.021 0.053* 0.053*
(0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.028) (0.028)
Growth [t-3] 0.320*** 0.426*** 0.407*** 0.317 0.409*
(0.064) (0.133) (0.126) (0.216) (0.232)
KL [t-3] -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT [t-3] -0.111*** -0.096*** -0.106*** -0.106***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.035) (0.035)
Rents [t-3] 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NET Inflows [t-3] -0.003*
(0.002)
FDI Inflows [t-3] -0.003
(0.004)
Port Inflows [t-3] -0.004**
(0.002)
Reserves [t-3] -0.002
(0.003)
Pseudo R-squared 0.036 0.046 0.032 0.067 0.072
Observations 6,020 1,803 1,875 996 986
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.25: Probits with Lag 5 - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 [t-5] 0.028*** 0.017 0.021 0.023 0.023
(0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027)
Growth [t-5] 0.082 0.225* 0.202* 0.073 0.126
(0.053) (0.135) (0.121) (0.208) (0.236)
KL [t-5] -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT [t-5] -0.067*** -0.064*** -0.037 -0.030
(0.023) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037)
Rents [t-5] -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NET Inflows [t-5] -0.001
(0.002)
FDI Inflows [t-5] 0.000
(0.002)
Port Inflows [t-5] -0.003
(0.002)
Reserves [t-5] -0.004
(0.004)
Pseudo R-squared 0.029 0.024 0.018 0.037 0.041
Observations 5,811 1,517 1,573 816 812
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.26: Probits with Lead 1 - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 [t+1] 0.017** 0.029* 0.016 0.021 0.021
(0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021)
Growth [t+1] 0.676*** 0.964*** 1.066*** 1.335*** 1.254***
(0.086) (0.150) (0.146) (0.218) (0.224)
KL [t+1] -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT [t+1] -0.068*** -0.065*** -0.053 -0.052
(0.021) (0.022) (0.034) (0.032)
Rents [t+1] 0.001* 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
NET Inflows [t+1] -0.005***
(0.001)
FDI Inflows [t+1] -0.001
(0.003)
Port Inflows [t+1] -0.004***
(0.001)
Reserves [t+1] 0.010***
(0.003)
Pseudo R-squared 0.064 0.078 0.073 0.132 0.150
Observations 6,428 2,372 2,480 1,346 1,330
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.27: Probits with Lead 3 - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 [t+3] 0.016** 0.017 0.005 0.004 0.002
(0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
Growth [t+3] 0.586*** 0.979*** 1.064*** 1.312*** 1.134***
(0.082) (0.175) (0.170) (0.309) (0.319)
KL [t+3] -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT [t+3] -0.022 -0.018 0.012 0.027
(0.020) (0.020) (0.033) (0.031)
Rents [t+3] 0.001 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
NET Inflows [t+3] 0.000
(0.001)
FDI Inflows [t+3] 0.008***
(0.002)
Port Inflows [t+3] -0.001
(0.001)
Reserves [t+3] 0.007***
(0.003)
Pseudo R-squared 0.049 0.066 0.065 0.107 0.140
Observations 6,622 2,657 2,780 1,513 1,495
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.28: Probits with Lead 5 - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 [t+5] 0.014* 0.029** 0.016 -0.004 -0.002
(0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
Growth [t+5] 0.271*** 0.417** 0.484*** 0.841*** 0.686***
(0.071) (0.176) (0.156) (0.183) (0.188)
KL [t+5] -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT [t+5] 0.030 0.023 0.058* 0.075**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.031) (0.032)
Rents [t+5] 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
NET Inflows [t+5] 0.004***
(0.001)
FDI Inflows [t+5] 0.008***
(0.002)
Port Inflows [t+5] 0.002
(0.001)
Reserves [t+5] 0.002
(0.003)
Pseudo R-squared 0.019 0.023 0.023 0.089 0.096
Observations 6,812 2,941 3,077 1,534 1,516
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.29: Probits with full set of lags and leads - Marginal Effects
(1)
Episode Dummy Probit
Growth [t-1] 0.198***
(0.057)
Growth [t-2] 0.129**
(0.056)
Growth [t-3] 0.118**
(0.052)
Growth [t-4] -0.036
(0.047)
Growth [t-5] -0.051
(0.047)
Growth 0.168***
(0.060)
Growth [t+1] 0.243***
(0.064)
Growth [t+2] 0.179**
(0.072)
Growth [t+3] 0.174**
(0.070)
Growth [t+4] 0.132*
(0.078)
Growth [t+5] 0.091
(0.078)
KL [t-1] 0.000
(0.000)
KL [t-2] -0.000
(0.000)
KL [t-3] 0.000
(0.000)
KL [t-4] 0.000
(0.000)
KL [t–5] -0.000
(0.000)
KL -0.000***
(0.000)
KL [t+1] 0.000
(0.000)
KL [t+2] -0.000
(0.000)
KL [t+3] 0.000
(0.000)
KL [t+4] -0.000
(0.000)
KL [t+5] 0.000**
(0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.243
Observations 5,811
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.30: Probits for Manufacturing Countries Only - Average Marginal
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.028** 0.043** 0.052* 0.020 0.023
(0.013) (0.018) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026)
Lag Growth 1.017*** 0.977*** 1.110*** 0.907** 0.897**
(0.140) (0.188) (0.355) (0.354) (0.367)
Lag KL -0.044*** -0.053*** -0.074*** -0.314*** -0.298***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.055) (0.053)
Fiscal 0.023* 0.019 0.019 0.010
(0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Inflation -0.015 -0.012 -0.061 -0.070
(0.030) (0.013) (0.063) (0.062)
XR Stability -0.004 -0.084** -0.027 -0.036
(0.022) (0.041) (0.045) (0.044)
Crisis 5y -0.060** -0.068*** -0.063***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Rents -0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Trade 0.006 0.027 0.023
(0.024) (0.032) (0.037)
KA open -0.002 -0.005 -0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
NET Inflows -0.006** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003)
FDI Inflows -0.010
(0.006)
Port Inflows -0.009***
(0.003)
Reserves 0.011**
(0.006)
TOT -0.042 -0.104 -0.099
(0.063) (0.064) (0.061)
FFend -0.012*** -0.009** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Uncertainty -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Human Capital 0.200*** 0.200***
(0.069) (0.070)
Capita GDP 0.219*** 0.204***
(0.050) (0.049)
Durable -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo R-squared 0.116 0.185 0.293 0.364 0.366
Observations 2,600 1,745 666 648 642
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.31: Probits for Non-Manufacturing Countries Only - Average
Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.010 0.034 0.282*** 0.256*** 0.265***
(0.010) (0.022) (0.053) (0.049) (0.051)
Lag Growth 0.409*** 0.657*** 0.429 0.374 0.004
(0.081) (0.135) (0.266) (0.233) (0.251)
Lag KL -0.010*** -0.027*** -0.032** -0.027 -0.023
(0.003) (0.005) (0.014) (0.035) (0.032)
Fiscal 0.028* -0.046** -0.016 -0.024
(0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
Inflation -0.045 -0.625** -0.287* -0.263*
(0.035) (0.248) (0.161) (0.158)
XR Stability -0.008 0.033 0.026 0.025
(0.021) (0.058) (0.049) (0.046)
Crisis 5y -0.075*** -0.054** -0.043
(0.029) (0.026) (0.027)
Rents 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.006 0.025 -0.007
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033)
KA open -0.006 -0.003 -0.002
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
NET Inflows -0.001 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002)
FDI Inflows 0.012***
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.005***
(0.002)
Reserves 0.006*
(0.004)
TOT -0.216*** -0.087 -0.084
(0.071) (0.067) (0.072)
FFend -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Uncertainty -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Human Capital -0.133 -0.162**
(0.082) (0.077)
Capita GDP 0.044 0.058
(0.047) (0.044)
Durable 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.075 0.354 0.381 0.400
Observations 3,630 1,553 418 393 387
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.32: Probits for Manufacturing Countries Only - Average Marginal
Effects (Smallest Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.045* 0.035 0.045* 0.018 0.023
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Lag Growth 1.099*** 1.060*** 0.973*** 0.903** 0.897**
(0.350) (0.349) (0.349) (0.358) (0.367)
Lag KL -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.075*** -0.320*** -0.298***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.055) (0.053)
Fiscal 0.029 0.042* 0.019 0.010
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Inflation -0.092 -0.012 -0.063 -0.070
(0.062) (0.014) (0.064) (0.062)
XR Stability -0.070* -0.095** -0.022 -0.036
(0.039) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044)
Crisis 5y -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.063***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Rents -0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Trade 0.010 0.037 0.023
(0.029) (0.034) (0.037)
KA open 0.003 -0.006 -0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
NET Inflows -0.008** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003)
FDI Inflows -0.010
(0.006)
Port Inflows -0.009***
(0.003)
Reserves 0.011**
(0.006)
TOT -0.027 -0.101 -0.099
(0.063) (0.064) (0.061)
FFend -0.010** -0.009** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Uncertainty 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Human Capital 0.202*** 0.200***
(0.069) (0.070)
Capita GDP 0.225*** 0.204***
(0.050) (0.049)
Durable -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo R-squared 0.101 0.117 0.175 0.256 0.248
Observations 642 642 642 642 642
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.33: Probits for Non-Manufacturing Countries Only - Average
Marginal Effects (Smallest Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.160*** 0.239*** 0.240*** 0.248*** 0.265***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
Lag Growth 0.736*** 0.523** 0.346 0.381 0.004
(0.268) (0.254) (0.231) (0.235) (0.251)
Lag KL -0.019 -0.012 -0.014 -0.035 -0.023
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.036) (0.032)
Fiscal -0.030 -0.030 -0.017 -0.024
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021)
Inflation -0.590*** -0.359** -0.289* -0.263*
(0.221) (0.175) (0.164) (0.158)
XR Stability 0.018 0.037 0.023 0.025
(0.048) (0.052) (0.049) (0.046)
Crisis 5y -0.057** -0.054** -0.043
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Rents -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.004 0.022 -0.007
(0.033) (0.035) (0.033)
KA open -0.004 -0.005 -0.002
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
NET Inflows -0.005** -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows 0.012***
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.005***
(0.002)
Reserves 0.006*
(0.004)
TOT -0.084 -0.092 -0.084
(0.073) (0.069) (0.072)
FFend -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Uncertainty -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Human Capital -0.112 -0.162**
(0.084) (0.077)
Capita GDP 0.051 0.058
(0.049) (0.044)
Durable 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.199 0.356 0.369 0.400
Observations 387 387 387 387 387
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.34: Probits for Africa, Asia and LA - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.027** 0.028 0.052** 0.044* 0.043*
(0.011) (0.018) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Lag Growth 0.572*** 0.824*** 0.735*** 0.574** 0.673**
(0.089) (0.133) (0.259) (0.262) (0.274)
Lag KL -0.012*** -0.035*** -0.059*** -0.094*** -0.095***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.028) (0.028)
Fiscal 0.032** 0.001 0.029 0.025
(0.014) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Inflation -0.083* -0.324** -0.278** -0.274*
(0.044) (0.154) (0.140) (0.140)
XR Stability 0.003 -0.034 -0.041 -0.048
(0.019) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Crisis 5y -0.048** -0.061*** -0.058***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Rents 0.001 -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.014 -0.033 -0.019
(0.024) (0.027) (0.027)
KA open 0.003 0.005 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
NET Inflows -0.005** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.014***
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.009***
(0.002)
Reserves 0.007
(0.004)
TOT -0.101** -0.028 -0.042
(0.049) (0.054) (0.053)
FFend -0.013*** -0.008** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.006*** -0.006** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.067 0.084
(0.057) (0.056)
Capita GDP 0.035 0.034
(0.029) (0.029)
Durable 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.031 0.075 0.185 0.211 0.212
Observations 4,621 2,232 871 843 832
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
79
Table 1.35: Probits for Non-Developed I - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.014 0.028 0.039 0.019 0.018
(0.010) (0.018) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Lag Growth 0.625*** 0.824*** 1.188*** 0.818** 0.888**
(0.099) (0.133) (0.342) (0.365) (0.383)
Lag KL -0.021*** -0.035*** -0.081*** -0.089** -0.083**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.036) (0.037)
Fiscal 0.032** 0.007 0.041 0.034
(0.014) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027)
Inflation -0.083* -0.886*** -0.772*** -0.809***
(0.044) (0.266) (0.230) (0.235)
XR Stability 0.003 -0.151*** -0.166*** -0.166***
(0.019) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Crisis 5y -0.052** -0.062*** -0.062***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Rents 0.001 -0.002* -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.023 -0.025 -0.008
(0.039) (0.035) (0.038)
KA open -0.002 0.009 0.008
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
NET Inflows -0.005** -0.015***
(0.002) (0.003)
FDI Inflows -0.027***
(0.006)
Port Inflows -0.012***
(0.002)
Reserves 0.015***
(0.005)
TOT -0.102* 0.019 0.025
(0.057) (0.067) (0.062)
FFend -0.012*** -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Uncertainty -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Human Capital 0.086 0.113*
(0.064) (0.063)
Capita GDP 0.026 0.020
(0.037) (0.038)
Durable 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo R-squared 0.040 0.075 0.229 0.271 0.279
Observations 3,834 2,232 578 570 570
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.36: Probits for Non-Developed II - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.022** 0.041** 0.072** 0.051 0.053
(0.010) (0.019) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034)
Lag Growth 0.660*** 1.006*** 0.904*** 0.701*** 0.704***
(0.089) (0.140) (0.267) (0.270) (0.273)
Lag KL -0.013*** -0.031*** -0.060*** -0.149*** -0.152***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.030) (0.029)
Fiscal 0.030** -0.010 0.029 0.025
(0.013) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Inflation -0.040 -0.094* -0.111* -0.113*
(0.036) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058)
XR Stability -0.000 -0.037 -0.054 -0.060
(0.020) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Crisis 5y -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.066***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Rents 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.007 -0.037 -0.041
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
KA open -0.000 -0.003 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
NET Inflows -0.003* -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.006
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.008***
(0.002)
Reserves 0.007
(0.004)
TOT -0.106** -0.050 -0.066
(0.052) (0.055) (0.055)
FFend -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Uncertainty -0.006** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.144** 0.150**
(0.062) (0.062)
Capita GDP 0.100*** 0.100***
(0.032) (0.031)
Durable -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo R-squared 0.037 0.067 0.154 0.180 0.185
Observations 4,944 2,417 930 907 901
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.37: Probits for Non-Developed III - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.013 0.035* 0.074** 0.044 0.047
(0.010) (0.019) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033)
Lag Growth 0.564*** 0.879*** 0.899*** 0.762*** 0.754***
(0.082) (0.140) (0.269) (0.278) (0.284)
Lag KL -0.007* -0.029*** -0.059*** -0.134*** -0.138***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.030) (0.029)
Fiscal 0.029** -0.021 0.014 0.011
(0.014) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Inflation -0.038 -0.079 -0.104* -0.104**
(0.032) (0.049) (0.053) (0.053)
XR Stability -0.012 -0.038 -0.051 -0.057
(0.021) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Crisis 5y -0.053*** -0.061*** -0.060***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Rents 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.016 -0.047* -0.049*
(0.028) (0.027) (0.029)
KA open -0.000 -0.003 -0.005
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
NET Inflows -0.003* -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.006
(0.005)
Port Inflows -0.008***
(0.002)
Reserves 0.007*
(0.004)
TOT -0.125** -0.058 -0.076
(0.053) (0.056) (0.057)
FFend -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Uncertainty -0.006** -0.006** -0.005**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.116* 0.121*
(0.064) (0.063)
Capita GDP 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.032) (0.030)
Durable -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo R-squared 0.028 0.057 0.166 0.184 0.189
Observations 4,716 2,170 896 871 865
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.38: Long Lasting Probits - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.025*** 0.028** 0.028 0.035** 0.032*
(0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Lag Growth 0.191*** 0.223*** 0.245 0.170 0.208
(0.042) (0.070) (0.162) (0.160) (0.178)
Lag KL -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.040*** -0.057*** -0.053***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.018) (0.017)
Fiscal 0.014* 0.005 0.016 0.013
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Inflation -0.001 -0.003 -0.021 -0.024
(0.002) (0.003) (0.025) (0.026)
XR Stability -0.015 -0.044** -0.049** -0.053***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Crisis 5y -0.012 -0.015 -0.015
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Rents -0.000 -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.046*** 0.042** 0.044**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
KA open -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
NET Inflows -0.000 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI Inflows -0.001
(0.003)
Port Inflows -0.002**
(0.001)
Reserves -0.001
(0.002)
TOT -0.046* -0.012 -0.014
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
FFend 0.002 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Global Uncertainty 0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.066* 0.065*
(0.036) (0.036)
Capita GDP 0.007 0.005
(0.016) (0.015)
Durable -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.033 0.061 0.143 0.182 0.183
Observations 6,374 3,380 1,100 1,063 1,051
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.39: Sustained Episodes by Region
Region # of Episodes % Sustained
East Asia and Pacific 35 71.43
Latin-American & Caribbean 38 60.53
Middle East and North Africa 30 60
South Asia 14 71.43
Sub-Saharan Africa 44 50
Europe & North America 28 70.34
Table 1.40: Sustained Episodes by Income
Region # of Episodes % Sustained
1st Quintile 41 60.98
2nd Quintile 39 69.23
3rd Quintile 50 52
4th Quintile 41 65.85
5th Quntile 18 66.67
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Table 1.41: Sustained Probits - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.056 0.119* 0.169** 0.312*** 0.298***
(0.049) (0.066) (0.079) (0.105) (0.092)
Lag Growth 0.869** 0.955** -0.175 -0.462 -0.014
(0.340) (0.474) (0.912) (0.927) (1.062)
Lag KL -0.044*** -0.074*** -0.130** -0.172 -0.122
(0.016) (0.023) (0.064) (0.190) (0.192)
Fiscal 0.040 0.038 0.196* 0.155
(0.056) (0.099) (0.113) (0.117)
Inflation -0.250 -0.728* -0.529 -0.558
(0.163) (0.417) (0.366) (0.384)
XR Stability 0.024 -0.266 -0.246 -0.309
(0.097) (0.176) (0.178) (0.196)
Crisis 5y -0.028 -0.256** -0.255**
(0.121) (0.126) (0.126)
Rents 0.001 0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Trade 0.087 0.054 0.040
(0.146) (0.156) (0.195)
KA open -0.056* -0.064 -0.068
(0.033) (0.044) (0.044)
FDI Inflows -0.033
(0.026)
Port Inflows -0.029***
(0.009)
Reserves 0.020
(0.016)
TOT -0.088 -0.113 -0.108
(0.244) (0.300) (0.288)
FFend -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.070***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.012)
Global Uncertainty -0.014 -0.014 -0.017
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Human Capital 0.167 0.087
(0.324) (0.314)
Capita GDP -0.063 -0.094
(0.174) (0.176)
Durable -0.011** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.004)
NET Inflows -0.008 -0.037***
(0.006) (0.011)
Pseudo R-squared 0.016 0.033 0.186 0.284 0.278
Observations 628 336 126 109 109
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.42: Non-Sustained Probits - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.016*** 0.039*** 0.094*** 0.122*** 0.136***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029)
Lag Growth 0.212*** 0.309*** 0.096 0.024 0.016
(0.051) (0.072) (0.159) (0.160) (0.157)
Lag KL -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.100*** -0.095***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.022) (0.021)
Fiscal 0.016** -0.000 0.018 0.011
(0.007) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Inflation -0.011 -0.018 -0.036 -0.042
(0.015) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027)
XR Stability -0.005 0.007 0.009 0.001
(0.011) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
Crisis 5y -0.018 -0.018 -0.016
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Rents 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.059*** -0.067*** -0.080***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024)
KA open 0.010* 0.007 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
NET Inflows -0.004** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI Inflows 0.004
(0.003)
Port Inflows -0.004***
(0.001)
Reserves -0.000
(0.003)
TOT 0.014 -0.020 -0.024
(0.040) (0.041) (0.044)
FFend -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Uncertainty -0.003 -0.003* -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.045 0.031
(0.036) (0.035)
Capita GDP 0.103*** 0.100***
(0.028) (0.027)
Durable -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R-squared 0.029 0.085 0.259 0.300 0.315
Observations 5,602 2,962 958 932 920
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.43: Growth Sustained After - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Underval81 0.016*** 0.034*** 0.042** 0.025 0.028
(0.006) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Lag Growth 0.222*** 0.354*** 0.379** 0.126 0.111
(0.034) (0.070) (0.192) (0.181) (0.187)
Lag KL -0.008*** -0.020*** -0.058*** -0.120*** -0.117***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.022) (0.021)
Fiscal 0.014* -0.000 0.029* 0.020
(0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Inflation -0.086** -0.033 -0.051 -0.054
(0.036) (0.046) (0.052) (0.053)
XR Stability -0.034*** -0.021 -0.035 -0.049*
(0.011) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Crisis 5y -0.034** -0.045*** -0.044***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Rents 0.001* -0.001 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.008 -0.017 -0.029
(0.019) (0.020) (0.023)
KA open -0.002 -0.006 -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
FDI Inflows 0.000
(0.003)
Port Inflows -0.005***
(0.001)
Reserves 0.004
(0.003)
TOT 0.098*** 0.135*** 0.124***
(0.034) (0.041) (0.040)
FFend -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Global Uncertainty -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.173*** 0.172***
(0.048) (0.048)
Capita GDP 0.051** 0.045**
(0.021) (0.020)
Durable -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
NET Inflows -0.000 -0.005***
(0.001) (0.002)
Pseudo R-squared 0.034 0.100 0.252 0.292 0.302
Observations 6,230 3,298 1,084 1,041 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.44: Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit
Underval81 0.013*** 0.033*** 0.071*** 0.103*** 0.112***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
Lag Growth 0.170*** 0.225*** -0.002 -0.082 -0.080
(0.045) (0.058) (0.127) (0.139) (0.136)
Lag KL -0.005*** -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.084*** -0.077***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019)
Fiscal 0.013** 0.005 0.017 0.009
(0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Inflation -0.008 -0.008 -0.031 -0.038
(0.016) (0.018) (0.028) (0.029)
XR Stability -0.003 0.003 0.011 0.004
(0.010) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Crisis 5y -0.012 -0.012 -0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Rents 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Trade -0.051*** -0.064*** -0.075***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
KA open 0.009* 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
NET Inflows -0.004*** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI Inflows 0.001
(0.002)
Port Inflows -0.004***
(0.001)
Reserves -0.000
(0.003)
TOT 0.004 -0.016 -0.019
(0.035) (0.039) (0.040)
FFend -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.002 -0.002 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.038 0.033
(0.033) (0.032)
Capita GDP 0.089*** 0.081***
(0.024) (0.023)
Durable -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6,230 3,298 1,084 1,041 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
# 0 Denotes no episode, 1 Non-Sustained Episode, 2 Sustained Episode
88
Table 1.45: Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit
Underval81 0.016** 0.016** 0.024 0.021 0.019
(0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Lag Growth 0.403*** 0.403*** 0.737*** 0.620*** 0.610***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.200) (0.208) (0.212)
Lag KL -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.042*** -0.086*** -0.089***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.020) (0.020)
Fiscal -0.008 0.012 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Inflation -0.060 -0.060 -0.063
(0.062) (0.059) (0.063)
XR Stability -0.030 -0.043** -0.042**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Crisis 5y -0.042*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Rents 0.000 -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.041*** 0.039** 0.039**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
KA open -0.010* -0.012** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
NET Inflows 0.000 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI Inflows -0.003
(0.003)
Port Inflows -0.002*
(0.001)
Reserves 0.004*
(0.002)
TOT -0.055* -0.035 -0.036
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
FFend -0.004* -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Global Uncertainty -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.078** 0.077**
(0.036) (0.036)
Capita GDP 0.031* 0.035*
(0.018) (0.018)
Durable -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6,230 3,298 1,084 1,041 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
# 0 Denotes no episode, 1 Non-Sustained Episode, 2 Sustained Episode
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Table 1.46: Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 1 (Smallest
Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit
Underval81 0.013*** 0.033*** 0.071*** 0.103*** 0.112***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
Lag Growth 0.170*** 0.225*** -0.002 -0.082 -0.080
(0.045) (0.058) (0.127) (0.139) (0.136)
Lag KL -0.005*** -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.084*** -0.077***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019)
Fiscal 0.013** 0.005 0.017 0.009
(0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Inflation -0.008 -0.008 -0.031 -0.038
(0.016) (0.018) (0.028) (0.029)
XR Stability -0.003 0.003 0.011 0.004
(0.010) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Crisis 5y -0.012 -0.012 -0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Rents 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Trade -0.051*** -0.064*** -0.075***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
KA open 0.009* 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
NET Inflows -0.004*** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI Inflows 0.001
(0.002)
Port Inflows -0.004***
(0.001)
Reserves -0.000
(0.003)
TOT 0.004 -0.016 -0.019
(0.035) (0.039) (0.040)
FFend -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.002 -0.002 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.038 0.033
(0.033) (0.032)
Capita GDP 0.089*** 0.081***
(0.024) (0.023)
Durable -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
# 0 Denotes no episode, 1 Non-Sustained Episode, 2 Sustained Episode
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Table 1.47: Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 2 (Smallest
Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit
Underval81 0.019 0.018 0.021 0.022 0.019
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Lag Growth 0.822*** 0.809*** 0.641*** 0.626*** 0.610***
(0.198) (0.204) (0.206) (0.211) (0.212)
Lag KL -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.046*** -0.087*** -0.089***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.020) (0.020)
Fiscal -0.007 0.014 0.012 0.009
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Inflation -0.105 -0.037 -0.061 -0.063
(0.071) (0.054) (0.060) (0.063)
XR Stability -0.044** -0.048** -0.043** -0.042**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Crisis 5y -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.046***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Rents -0.004** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.051*** 0.040** 0.039**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
KA open -0.007 -0.012** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
NET Inflows -0.003** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.001)
FDI Inflows -0.003
(0.003)
Port Inflows -0.002*
(0.001)
Reserves 0.004*
(0.002)
TOT -0.004 -0.035 -0.036
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030)
FFend -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Global Uncertainty -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.078** 0.077**
(0.036) (0.036)
Capita GDP 0.031* 0.035*
(0.018) (0.018)
Durable -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
# 0 Denotes no episode, 1 Non-Sustained Episode, 2 Sustained Episode
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Figure 1.1: Capital stock growth in the (a) Solow framework and the (b)
AK framework
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Figure 1.2: Episodes in South Korea
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Figure 1.3: Agricultural Share of Value Added During Episodes
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Year
Mean Upper 95%
Lower 95%
94
Figure 1.4: Agricultural Share of Employment During Episodes
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Figure 1.5: Manufacturing Share of Value Added During Episodes
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Figure 1.6: Manufacturing Share of Employment During Episodes
.
12
.
14
.
16
.
18
.
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Year
Mean Upper 95%
Lower 95%
97
Figure 1.7: Tradable Share of Value Added During Episodes
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Figure 1.8: Tradable Share of Employment During Episodes
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Figure 1.9: Trade Balance Share of GDP During Episodes
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Figure 1.10: Export Share of GDP During Episodes
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Figure 1.11: Import Share of GDP During Episodes
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECTS OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ON REAL
EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENTS
2.1 Introduction
After a period of macroeconomic stability and no currency crises at sight (2001-2009),
the prolonged stagnation of the peripheral countries in the Euro-zone questions (again) the
viability of extremely rigid exchange rate arrangements. As the number of countries that
use Inflation Targeting has been growing steadily, from a few cases mainly in the developed
world at the early 1990s, to almost 30 cases in the mid 2010s including several non-developed
economies, increasing degrees of exchange rate flexibility look like an appealing option. Not
so long ago it was predicted that intermediate regimes will disappear (Fischer, 2001), but in
non developed countries the Central Bank intervenes heavily in the foreign exchange market,
to deal with hot money flows or booming terms of trade; in practical terms intermediate
options are alive and kicking. In a nutshell, the interest in discussing exchange rate regimes
(henceforth ERRs) does not seems to fade away.
Policy-makers know that the different ERRs affect the mean, the variance, and the dy-
namics of the real exchange rate (henceforth RER) for relevant periods of time. Policy-makers
agree that the RER is a key price that has a strong effects on output, inflation, income dis-
tribution, and on the balance of payments. But unlike policy-markers, theorists often like
to assume that the evolution of RER is entirely shaped by “deep parameters”, and that
the choice of the ERR is, in principle, an irrelevant problem. Put it differently, the ERR
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only affects the nominal exchange rate and the price level: real variables like the RER only
depend on preferences, endowments, and technology.
Consider for example a model of two identical countries, but one faces a given rate of
devaluation per year, while the other implements a perfectly credible fixed ERR (so the rate of
devaluation is zero). Furthermore, assume that due to price flexibility there is continuous full-
employment and that both economies are small in world markets (so they takes international
prices as given), and only tradables and non-tradable goods are produced. If inflation is
correctly anticipated, those countries should only differ on their nominal variables: with
zero output and employment growth, the first country will face a rate of inflation equal to
the rate of devaluation, while the second country will face a zero rate of inflation (and a zero
rate of devaluation).1 The level of the RER should be the same in both cases, so the ERR
is deemed to be neutral.2
Despite the attractiveness of the assumption that the ERR is neutral, important evidence
shows that the ERR can have important effects on the evolution of the RER. In a classic
study, Mussa (1986) shows that the RER tracks closely the behavior of the nominal exchange
rate for long periods of time, in a group of developed countries before and after the collapse
of Bretton Woods. Using a larger span of data for the United States and United Kingdom,
Taylor and Taylor (2004) show that the RER tracks the nominal exchange rate in the short
1In this paper I will use the Latin-American convention. The RER is always defined as the relative price
of tradable to non-tradable goods, unless otherwise stated. A devaluation of the exchange rate means an
increase in the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, while a revaluation means a decrease in
the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. The literature refers to “‘pegs”, “fixed” regimes,
to denote arrangements with little exchange rate flexibility, and “flexible” or “floats” to denote arrangements
with lots of flexibility. I use any of these terms. I call all the other cases “intermediate” regimes.
2This result only holds if the government returns the proceeds from the inflation tax to the private sector
via lump-sum transfers. Otherwise ERR with higher rate of inflation will feature a different income distri-
bution between the government and the private sector, that could produce different levels of expenditures.
In turn, that can have an effect on the RER.
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and medium run if inflation is moderate. Finally, the RER is more volatile under floats than
under pegs (Krugman 1989, ch. 1; Cermeo and Sanin, 2015).3
Some theories try to explain why the ERR is not neutral. A popular story is that in
a “sticky prices” world, if the exchange rate is fixed, the RER is also fixed for substantial
periods of time.4 With flexible prices, the choice of the ERR can lead to changes in the rate of
inflation and on the stock of real balances. This also affects demand patters and the level of
the RER, at least in the medium run. In the model proposed by Calvo and Rodriguez (1977),
if inflation is correctly anticipated, different rates of inflation affect portfolio choices, the
desired rate of accumulation of domestic assets, the balance of payments, and the evolution
of the RER. If higher inflation rates induces the dollarization of portfolios, the adoption of
ERR that features higher inflation rate will imply a temporarily more depreciated RER,
as the private sector increases its saving rate to accumulate foreign exchange. Likewise,
ERR with lower inflation rate (like hard pegs or currency boards) will experience a more
appreciated RER (also temporarily).
In a similar vein, Reinhart et. al. (1994) show that a policy based on RER targeting can
work for substantial periods of time, provided that a credibly policy commits to a specific
path for future inflation or interest rates (depending on whether there are capital controls or
full capital mobility). The underlying intuition is that the first order condition of a model
that a features a cash in advance constraint makes consumption of tradables a negative
function of the (nominal) interest rate, so if interest rates are high (low) today, tradable
3Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Stockman (1983) argue that causality runs from real shocks to the
level of the RER. The problem with this explanation is that one would have to argue that the fundamentals
that determine the RER are extremely volatile, which seems unlikely. See Krugman (1989, ch. 1) for a
critique of that position.
4Most models in that tradition follow the structure of the old Mundell-Fleming model. But some newer
microfounded models that combine elements from Real Business Cycle theory and the New Keynesian ap-
proach (for instance Monacelli, 2004), can also explain the findings of Mussa.
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consumption is low (high), and the real exchange rate is high (low). It follows that some
ERRs that imply a non-constant path for the interest rate, like a “passive crawling-peg”, can
sustain a higher RER than other arrangements (at least for a significant period of time).5
The theories discussed so far are short-run in nature, although the effects of ERR on the
RER may last for prolonged period of time. Other theoretical models rely on the idea that
the ERR affects the long-run behavior of relative prices. For example Broda (2006) develops
a formal model that shows that pegs are associated with more output and employment
volatility. Following the insights from implicit contract theory, the real wage and the price
level should be higher under pegs if: a) firms are risk neutral and workers are risk averse;
b) pegs increase output volatility. If a) and b) hold, then pegs are associated by RER
appreciation.
Other mechanisms that can produce similar effect include wealth effects derived from
a reduction in the inflation tax, or changes in the supply of non-tradable goods.6 Finally,
if non-tradable prices are rigid in the downward direction, it follows that exchange rate
pegs can display persistent overvaluation: after some shock that requires an increase in the
relative price of tradable to non-tradable goods, neither the price of tradables can increase
(for instance if the international price is given) nor the non-tradable price can fall.
On a different theoretical ground, in models with hidden unemployment the non-tradable
price is controllable by monetary policy (see Razmi et. al. 2012), so there is a close connection
between the ERR and the RER. For instance, if the international price of the tradable good
is given and monetary policy pins-down the price of non-tradable goods, then the RER is
5A crawling peg is system based on a rule for the rate of devaluation. The rule is often explicit, but it
could implicit as well. While “passive crawling-pegs” set the rate of devaluation equal to past inflation or the
difference between domestic and foreign inflation, “active crawling-pegs” set a particular rate of devaluation.
Often “passive” regimes were used to target a particular level for the RER, while “active” regimes were
implemented as disinflationary tools.
6See Rebelo and Vegh (1995) for further discussion.
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determined directly by the policy determined exchange rate or by market forces when the
exchange rate is allowed to float.
The empirical literature on the ERRs has also tested the effects of the ERR on prices
and output. While the findings are not conclusive, the results usually show that the ERR
is not neutral.7 The main finding of the literature is that pegs are associated with lower
inflation, but slower growth and more output volatility, while floats are associated with more
inflation, but faster growth and less output volatility. The mechanism are not clear, but a
recent literature has shown that a high RER is related to faster growth and to sustained
capital accumulation (Rodrik, 2008), and that overvaluation leads to output stagnation and
it is a good predictor of currency crises (Godlfjan and Valdes, 1998, 1999). Thus, it is
possible that the ERR can affect growth through changes in the level of the RER.
This paper will analyze the effects of the ERRs on misalignments using Rubin’s (1974)
Propensity Score Matching (PSM henceforth) and another matching estimator (the Maha-
lanobis distance). To cut a long story short, I will proceed in three steps. In the first step,
a RER misalignment index will be estimated following Rodrik (2008). In the second step,
using different de facto and de jure ERR classifications, a propensity to adopt a peg will
be estimated. In the third step, countries that have similar “propensities to peg” but dif-
ferent ERR in place will be compared using different matching algorithms, to analyze the
impact of adopting a peg on RER misalignment.8 Several robustness checks are implemented
afterwards.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following way. To the best of
my knowledge, few papers have analyzed the effect of the ERR on misalignment, and I
7An exception is perhaps, Rose (2011).
8Section 2.2.1 explains the meaning of de facto and de jure classifications.
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am the first to analyze the effect of the ERR on misalignment using matching models. A
comprehensive literature review is also provided.
This paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, section 2.2 present a com-
prehensive review of the relevant literature. Section 2.3 presents the econometric strategy,
the main results, and several robustness checks. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The literature on the ERRs discusses three main issues. How to classify the existing
ERRs, why some ERRs are preferred, and what are the impacts of the different ERRs on
several aspects of macroeconomic performance (prices, output, trade flows, etc.). This section
discuses each of these points. A short summary of the recent literature that relates RER
misalignment with long-run performance (economic growth) is also provided. The reason is
that the role of RER misalignment on growth is one important motivation for looking at the
effects of ERRs on the RER.
2.2.1 Measuring the ERRs
For many years, the IMF provided the only ERR classification available. The IMF
reviewed and reported what countries declared to do. The IMF classification evolved over
time, and it basically classified (and still classifies) the regimes into pegs, intermediates
and floats. Most schemes will fit into this tripartite classification, perhaps including sub-
categories. For example, a work by Corden (2002) classified regimes into Monetary Unions,
Dollarization, Currency Boards, Soft Pegs, Managed Floating, and Free Floating. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2004) consider countries with a rate of inflation above 40% as a special category
called “freely falling” or “hyper-floats”.
There are some problems with the original IMF classification. The presence of “black
markets” for currency, or the existence of systems of multiple exchange rates, represent a
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serious challenge to standard classification methods. How should we classify a country that
pegs the exchange rate for commercial transactions, but uses a floating exchange rate for
financial transactions?9 Moreover, what policy-markers declare to do is not always what
they really do in practice. To continue with the same example, a country may declare to use
a fixed exchange rate, but the relevant nominal exchange rate could be a black market rate
which is determined by market forces. Conversely, a country may declare to use a floating
exchange rate regime, but most of the time the Central Banks intervenes in the foreign
exchange market.10
To address this issue, several alternative de facto classifications were developed. Instead
of relying on what policy markers claim they do (as in a de jure classification), a de facto
classification aims to identify ERRs based on what policy markers really do. To accomplish
that task, observed variables like the volatility of the nominal exchange rate or the changes
in foreign exchange reserves, are combined to produce an alternative classification. Some
approaches are a mixture of de jure and de facto elements, so I classify the different de facto
classification into “Mixed” and “Pure”.11
9For example during Bretton Woods, many Latin-American countries adopted a system of multiple ex-
change rates. An official or commercial exchange rate was used to channel conventional imports and exports,
and a financial exchange rate (often “unofficial” but other times perfectly legal) was used to deal with capital
flows and special tradable goods (such as non traditional exports or luxury imports.). The commercial rate
was usually set below the financial rate.
10In fact there is a whole literature on this phenomena, known as “Fear of Floating”. This problem seems
to be severe. In the words of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, page 32): “Whether the official regime is a float or
peg, it is virtually a coin toss whether the Natural algorithm will yield the same result”. Thus, using IMF
classification is like flipping coins (if tails the classification is correct, if heads the classification is wrong),
while an alternative index (for example their “Natural algorithm”) is more suitable.
11The description of the different classifications on the next pages is based mainly on the work by Tavlas
et. al. (2008).
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2.2.1.1 Mixed De Facto Classifications
Gosh et. al. (1997) classified regimes into “frequent” and “infrequent peggers”, and the
rest (floats and intermediate regimes) into a separate category (using the de jure classifi-
cation by the IMF). The sample covered the period 1960-1999 and included 136 countries.
Frieden et. al. (2001) classified 26 Latin-American countries in 4 categories according to
their capacity to provide credibility and achieve competitiveness. The IMF (1999; 2003) and
Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003), analyzed 190 self-described regimes (by the national author-
ities), covering the (monthly) period 1990-2001. These three papers assessed the movements
of the exchange rate based both on the official and black markets. Some regimes were reclas-
sified according to their realignment frequency, and some declared pegs were reclassified as
managed floaters. From 1999 onward, this de facto coding replaced the IMF de jure coding
in IMF publications. Bailiu et. al. (2003) and Gosh et. al. (2002) modified and reclassified
the de jure classification based on observed ER volatility, for 60 countries during the period
1973-1988.
In a leading paper of the field, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) rewrote the history of exchange
rate regimes considering a methodology that captures the evolution of a market determined
exchange rate, and that includes a careful review of the historical evidence. To produce their
taxonomy, Reinhart and Rogoff designed an algorithm that combines de jure classifications
of the exchange rate regime with an analysis of the actual behavior of the market deter-
mined exchange rate (which may be the black market rate if that market existed) in 153
countries for the period 1946-2001 using monthly data. Their data and their classification
was subsequently extended to 2011.
Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), and Dubas et. al. (2005) estimated a Probit model
with the de jure classification as the dependent variable and a set of economic and political
determinants of ERR, to generate a list of deviations of the observed ERR from the official
de jure classification. The paper by Eichengreen and Leblang analyzed 21 middle income
110
countries using 5 years averages for 1870 to 1997, while Dubas et. al. covered 172 countries
for the period 1971-2002, and it estimated a Multinomial Probit. Finally, a pioneering paper
by Heller (1978) used Discriminant Analysis to identify floaters and fixers using different
country characteristics.12 The findings suggested that economic size, financial integration,
the inflation differential, and the trade patterns seems to explain the choice of the ERR.
2.2.1.2 Pure De Facto Classifications
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) constructed a de facto classification of exchange
rate arrangements considering the volatility of nominal exchange rate and of the level of
foreign exchange reserves, for 183 countries during 1974-2000. If a country displays a high
level of exchange rate volatility and a low level of reserves volatility (compared to the means
of the sample), then the country is de facto adopting a floating exchange rate, while if it
displays a low level of exchange rate volatility and a high level of reserves volatility, is consider
to be de facto using a peg. For intermediate cases, the ERR is classified as an “intermediate
regime”.
Poirson (2001) used the ratio of exchange rate volatility to foreign exchange reserves
volatility to produce a “rigidity index” for 93 countries during 1990-1998. Shambaugh (2004)
divided countries according to their exchange rate movements between pre-defined bands.
De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) used Z-scores to tabulate ERR for 18 countries during 1994-
2004. Be´nassy-Que´re´ and Coeure´ (2006) used regression analysis to estimate implicit basket
pegs as a linear combination of the movements of the US dollar, the Yen, and the Euro
including 165 countries for the period 1994-2001. A similar approach was developed by
Frankel and Wei (2008).
12In a nutshell, Discriminant Analysis is a statistical procedure that involves finding the determinants of
a particular outcome.
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Should I use de facto or de jure classifications? A de facto classification is usually more
informative regarding policy intentions. However, a de jure classification tends to be broader
in terms of coverage by countries and years, but this is not always the case (for instance,
the extended Reinhart and Rogoff classification is as large as the IMF classification). The
de facto classifications seems to have the upper hand, but they have a big drawback: the
different de facto classifications very often disagree with each other, and they suggest that
the same country adopts different ERR during the same period (Tavlas et. al., 2008).
Thus, in conducting empirical work it seems a good idea to draw from the different types of
classifications to test the robustness of the results.
2.2.2 Choosing the ERR
In the literature, countries have different reasons to choose a particular ERR. Based
on theory, I classify the reasons into the following categories: 1) Optimal Currency Area
(henceforth OCA) and country size; 2) Sources of Shocks; 3) The Trilemma; 4) Pegs as a
Source of Credibility; and 5) Liability Dollarization.13
According to the theory on OCAs, geographical areas that represent an OCA should
adopt a common currency. An area is an OCA if their factors and goods markets are highly
integrated. Thus, if labor and capital are highly mobile in a given area, they can move from
part A to part B, for example if part A suffers from a negative real shock that lowers output.
It follows that highly integrated countries are more prone to adopt a less flexible ERR, if
not a common currency.14 Factors related to country size also determine the ERR. Large
countries are usually more closed and can potentially benefit from changes in the exchange
rate, because those are typically translated into relative price chances when the bulk of the
13Levy-Yeyati et. al. (2010) for further discussion.
14Other factors that determine whether a given territory is an OCA includes how similar are the shocks
faced by different countries.
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goods is non-tradable. Exchange rate changes in a small open economies (like islands) have
little effect on relative prices because most of the goods are tables (and their relative price
structure is determined by the world market), so this kind of countries are more prone to
adopt a peg.
The Sources of Shocks approach follows from the standard IS-LM-BP model. Using
a “fix price” IS-LM model, Poole (1970) shows that the optimal monetary policy regime
depends on the origin of the shocks. When real shocks predominate, pegging the money
supply minimizes output volatility, while when nominal shocks are more important, pegging
the interest rate minimizes output volatility. The IS-LM-BP model predicts that a fixed
exchange rate will minimize output volatility when nominal shocks are prevalent, while a
floating exchange rate will minimize output volatility when real shocks prevail.
There is no particular reasons to believe that Poole’s analysis, or the results from IS-LM-
BP, are accurate. For instance, they ignore inflation and, as Lahiri et. al. (2008) shows,
if prices are flexible and financial markets are imperfect, the results should be reversed (a
fixed exchange rate minimizes real volatility if real shocks are predominant, while a floating
exchange rate work better under nominal shocks). Nevertheless, the key point is that different
shocks may affect the choice of the ERR.
The Trilemma suggests that an open economy can chose any two of the following three
desirable targets: a fully open capital account, an independent monetary policy, and a
predetermined exchange rate (Obstfeld, Shaumbaugh, and Taylor, 2010). If the exchange
rate is fixed and the capital account is fully open, monetary independence is lost. If there
is a target for monetary policy and the authorities want to fix the exchange rate, capital
controls should be imposed. Finally, if the the authorities want an autonomous monetary
policy and a fully open capital account, then they cannot target the exchange rate.
A recent literature have tested the Trilemma explicitly. The main findings are that the
Trilemma usually holds (Aizemann et. al., 2013), and that inconsistent policy choices are
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associated with lower growth and more inflation (Mandilaras, 2015). It does not follows
that intermediate options are not possible; in fact reserve accumulation seems to make the
Trilemma less binding. For our purposes, the main intuition is that the choice of the ERR is
related to the degree of monetary policy independence and to the degree of capital account
openness.
According to the Credibility Approach, in the words of Levy-Yeyati et. al. (2010),
exchange rate pegs can act as “policy crutches for weak governments”. For a country with
a history of high inflation (or hyperinflation), the adoption of a hard peg is way to anchor
expected inflation to regain macroeconomic stability and to enhance credibility. Perhaps the
best known approach to justify such proposition was developed by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Calvo (1978), to analyze the problem of dynamic inconsistency. In the classical
closed economy problem, rules for monetary policy (rather than discretion) increase welfare if
expectations are formed rationally. In the open economy set-up, a credible exchange rate peg
(or an explicit path for the rate of depreciation) is equivalent to a rule, while a system such as
managed floating or a fixed but potentially adjustable exchange rate is similar to discretion.
Although the rules vs. discretion model is debatable, there is substantial historical evidence
that suggests that hard pegs were used to stop hyperinflations and to regain credibility, for
example in Latin American countries (see Frenkel and Rapetti, 2012).
Lastly, Liability Dollarization represents a serious treat to stability in non developed
countries with poorly developed financial systems. For example if the banking system has a
big share of foreign currency denominated deposits, or a large fractions of it stock of loans
to non-tradable firms is dollarized, exchange rate volatility may affect the balance sheet of
financial institutions, and governments may display “Fear of Floating” (Calvo and Reinhart,
2002). Thus, when the exposure to foreign currency risk is important, devaluations and
revaluations have large balance sheets effects, so the central bank is willing to intervene in
the foreign exchange market to avoid large swings in the exchange rate. When Liability
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Dollarization is present, adopting a floating exchange rate becomes a very costly policy
choice, and the adoption of a peg a very tempting option.
Our main goal is not to discuss the strengths and weakness of the five different ap-
proaches. Since the implementation of our econometric strategy requires the estimation of
the importance of the different determinants, I will let the data speak for itself in section 2.3,
when I estimate the propensity to adopt each ERR given a full set of explanatory variables
derived from the five theories.
2.2.3 The Impact of the ERR on performance
The literature is also concerned about the impacts of different ERRs on macroeconomic
outcomes. The existing studies can be classified according to the outcome variables an-
alyzed (growth, inflation, price volatility, output volatility, and RER volatility), and the
dimension of the data (time series vs. panel approaches). Part of the literature compared
different international regimes over time. A paper by Bordo (2009) discussed the macroeco-
nomic performance of ERR, focusing on the differences between the Gold Standard, Bretton
Woods, and the recent period. The previous literature surveyed by Bordo finds that the
Gold Standard was associated with more price stability, at the cost of increasing output
instability (Bordo, 1981, Cooper, 1982, Klein, 1975, and Schwartz, 1986). Bordo also finds
that the Gold Standard was the more resilient regime, followed by the current international
“Non-system”. Bretton Woods was ranked in the last place.15
Of particular interest is the relation between ERRs and growth. For the literature this is
still a matter of debate, and different theoretical models suggest that the relation may work in
15Should we attribute the differences in performances to the ERR or to the time periods? For the largest
part of this literature, based on a large sample of countries, but on a smaller time frame, is the ERR that
matters, and not the time period. An exception is Grilli and Kamisky (1991). Based on monthly data
between 1880 and 1986 for the United Kingdom and the United States, they show that with the exception
of the post-World War II period, there is no necessary connection between the ERR and RER volatility.
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opposite directions. Aghion et. al. (2005) developed a model where exchange rate volatility
combined with poorly developed financial system may exacerbate the credit constrains faced
by firms, reducing investment and growth. In the same vein, Gylfason (2000) argued that
the macro-stability imposed by pegs (i.e., low inflation and less exchange rate risk) promotes
openness, improving the efficiency of the economy. According to these papers, peg have the
upper hand in terms of growth promotion.
On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence that show that pegs are crisis prone, in
particular in a context of very open capital accounts. The main mechanism is that pegs
promote the appreciation of the RER, which was found to be one important predictor of
currency crises (Goldfajn and Valdes, 1998). Moreover, most of the overvaluation episodes
feature an exchange rate peg, and the RER reverts back to a higher level not via domestic
price deflation, but via a nominal depreciation (Goldfajn and Valdes, 1999). Consequently,
pegs should be associated with more output volatility and less output growth.
In the same vein, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) suggested that more flexible
exchange rate regimes promote more growth in developing countries. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2004) argued that crawling pegs feature the fastest growth rate among all the regimes. But
Gosh et. al. (1997) presented mixed evidence. Thus, the impact on growth is still an open
question.
2.2.4 The literature on exchange rate “misalignment” and growth
There is a growing literature that recognizes a role for the level of the RER in the
process of capital accumulation. For a long time, the literature on exchange rates and growth
identified RER misalignment as an explanation only for slow growth. Indeed, it is easy to
see how overvaluation can be associated with shortages of foreign exchange reserves, poor
incentives to invest in tradable activities (which are usually the locus of technical progress
and capital accumulation), and economic stagnation. For that literature, undervaluation
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was also seen as a bad policy. The reason is that undervaluation was associated with high
inflation and debt overhangs, for example as in Latin America during the so called “Lost
Decade” in the 1980s.
Nowadays, thanks to the growth miracle of the South East Asian countries, China and
India, but also to some respectable macroeconomic performance of countries like Chile and
Colombia during the 1980s, some authors consider that undervaluation may favor growth.
But as Eichengreen (2008) put it, the literature have spent more time doing empirical work
than explaining the link between RER misalignment and growth.16 An exception is Montiel
and Serven (2009), who identified two competing views: the “capital accumulation channel”
and the “tradable-led channel”. According to the “capital accumulation channel”, a higher
RER increases (tradable) firms profits, so saving and investment (and growth) increase.
According to the “tradable led channel”, a higher RER re-allocates resources from the non-
tradable to the tradable sector of the economy. If the tradable sector displays a special
feature, for instance, if it has increasing returns to scale, or it provides foreign exchange
reserves to relax the external constraint, then a higher RER promotes growth.
Gluzmann et. al. (2012) presented evidence favorable to the “capital accumulation
channel”. However, Montiel and Serven (2009) find no support for that channel, and not
solid theoretical reasons to associate undervaluation with higher rates of saving (and hence
according to them, with higher investment rates). The “tradable led channel” has received
more theoretical support. If the tradable sector features increasing returns to scale or any
externalities, market forces do not deliver a correct set of relative prices from the standpoint
of economic development, so undervaluation can mitigate this problem and accelerate growth
(Rodrik, 2008).
16See Libman (2014) for a comprehensive review (in Spanish) of the empirical literature that finds a positive
association between undervaluation and growth. See Rapetti (2013b) and Frenkel and Rapetti (2014) for
English reviews.
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Other papers also formalized the “tradable led channel”. Razmi et. al. (2012) devel-
oped a dynamic dependent economy model with hidden unemployment. The model features
imported capital goods that enter in the production of tradable goods (in fixed proportions
with labor). A higher level of the RER relaxes the external constraint, not by raising ex-
ports (at least in the short-run), but by creating more space for importing capital goods by
reducing the domestic absorption of tradable goods. The higher the RER, the higher the
room for faster capital accumulation and growth.
In a similar vein, Frenkel and Ros (2006) showed that undervaluation mobilizes resources
from the backward non-tradable sector to the modern tradable sector of the economy. Ko-
rinek and Serven (2010) developed a dependent economy model that features learning ex-
ternal effects in the production of a tradable input. The aggregate production function uses
both tradables and non-tradable inputs, but it behaves like an “AK” function with constant
returns to capital. Since the authors assumed that the tradable input sector is more capital
intensive, when the RER depreciates (by an amount that depends on the size of the learning
externality), capital accumulation and growth accelerate.
2.2.5 Taking Stock
To summarize, there is vast literature that analyses the determinants, the measurement,
and the impacts of ERRs. The determinants of ERR are many, and their importance seems
to depend on the context, but the different reasons to adopt each ERR seems to be captured
by the existing literature. However, it is not possible to overcome the difficulties related
to the measurement issues. Each problem may require different classification schemes and
strategies. Also, there is no consensus on impacts of different ERRs on macroeconomic
performance, but there seems to be some ground to view pegs as crisis-prone, and to recognize
the differential impacts on price and output volatility of pegs vs. flexible regimes.
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Surprisingly, the new literature on the relation between RER and growth, is hardly ever
related to the literature on ERRs and economic performance. The next sections attempt to
fill this gap and present the empirical strategy and our main results.
2.3 Econometric Approach
This section estimates the effects of ERRs on RER misalignments using PSM and another
matching estimator. The application of matching to macroeconomic theory is still scant, but
there is a growing interest on the approach. For example, Lin and Ye (2012) applied PSM to
compare the effectiveness of inflation targeting vs. hard pegs as dis-inflationary tools, Forbes
and Klein (2013) discuss the responses to capital outflows and crises during 1997-1998, and
Bussiere et. al. (2015) analyze the impact of RER appreciations on growth.
Matching has some advantages vis-a-vis an OLS regression.17 Matching avoids the prob-
lem of choosing a functional form, the lag structure, or other details related to model spec-
ification. The reasons is that matching focuses the attention on treatment-status or policy
changes. Furthermore, no assumption regarding the distribution of the variables is need,
and matching puts most of the weight on comparable units, increasing the chances that we
end up comparing similar individuals, so the size of the effects are more reliable.18
A particular form of matching is PSM. The idea behind PSM is to estimate the propensity
of the individuals in the sample to adopt certain treatment or policy. After the propensity
17The results from matching can be contrasted with OLS, and in fact OLS is a particular form of matching.
While OLS compares the means of each treated vs. un-treated individuals, matching compares the means
of treated individiuals vs. similar non-treated individuals. More precisely, matching chooses a different set
of weights than OLS: while matching puts most of the weight on those individuals who are most likely to
be treated, an OLS regression puts most of the weight where the conditional variance of treatment status
is largest; roughly speaking, where the probability of being treated is equal to the probability of not being
treated (or just one-half).
18OLS does not requires any assumption regarding the distribution of the variables, but normality is
imposed for inference.
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is estimated, observations that have similar propensities to adopt the treatment or policy
(according to some metric to be defined) are matched, and the effect of the treatment or
policy on a determined outcome is analyzed comparing the means of the treated group and
a control group (with a similar propensity, but with a different treatment or policy).19
In order to understand the intuition behind PSM and how it works, consider the following
problem.20 Let us assume that I want to analyze the effect of hospitalization on people’s
health. I collect a set of control variables that includes age, sex, income, medical history,
and so on. I estimate the effect of hospitalization by including a dummy variable that takes
value of one if a person is hospitalized, and zero otherwise. Comparing the means across
hospitalized and non-hospitalized persons will not yield the correct answer to our inquiry,
and the reason is straightforward: less healthy people are more likely to be hospitalized, so
it is very likely that I will find a negative effect of hospitalization on health.
Although there are very good reasons to believe that being hospitalized is detrimental
to health (i.e., an inter-hospitalization virus may affect hospitalized persons), I should be
worried that our coefficients do not report the true effect of hospitalization on health, unless
I find a good way to control for the source of bias, or if the health distribution is random
across hospitalized and non-hospitalized units. A plausible approach to solve the problem
is precisely matching, and more precisely PSM, as suggested by Rubin (1974). The idea of
PSM is to estimate the propensity to being hospitalized for the individuals in my sample,
given a set of control variables, and compare the mean health status of similar individuals
(according to their propensity score); the key is some individuals are hospitalized and some
19In the ERR literature, the propensity to adopt a particular ERR is often estimated, and the effects of the
ERR on the economy are usually analyzed. But the estimation of the propensity and the impacts are part of
different papers. PSM allows to combine both approaches. Given that the choice of the ERR is not random,
but depends on country characteristics and the environment, selection bias seems to be a potential concern.
Fortunately, PSM can solve this problem in a straightforward way, by comparing similar individuals.
20I follow Angrist and Pischke (2009, ch. 3) here.
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are not, but they have similar characteristics. The difference in their health status is precisely
the true effect of hospitalization on health, provided that the probability of receiving the
treatment does not depend on the treatment itself. This is PSM in a nutshell.
In practice, PSM proceeds in two steps. In a first step, the propensity score (also known
as, the probability of receiving a treatment) is estimated. In a second step, the effect of
the treatment on the variable of interest is computed by comparing individuals with similar
propensity scores, but different treatment status.21 More formally, let Yi denote the outcome
andD a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a given unit receives treatment, and 0 otherwise.
I can observe individuals that receive treatment Y1 | D = 1 and individuals that do not
Y2 | D = 0 (and with different health status, Y1 and Y2), but clearly I cannot observe
the same individuals with different treatment status at the same time, or Y1 | D = 0 and
Y1 | D = 1.
Moreover, I cannot observe how the effects of hospitalization on sick people differs from
the effects of non-hospitalization, also on the very same sick people. This is the parameter
of interest, the so called “Average Treatment Effect of the Treated” or “Average Treatment
of the Treated” (ATET or ATT), defined as follows:
ATT = E[Y1 | D = 1]− E[Y0 | D = 1] (2.1)
In words, the ATT is the difference between the health of hospitalized E[Y1 | D = 1] minus
the health of those hospitalized, had they decided to stay home E[Y0 | D = 1]. To create an
21To provide an example related to ERR literature, let us say that small islands are more likely to adopt a
hard peg, and that I am interested in the growth effects of different ERRs. Then PSM will first estimate the
probability of adopting a peg given that a country is, or is not, an island, and then it will compare countries
with similar probabilities but different characteristics. So if Hong-Kong is as likely to peg as Iceland, but
Iceland is floating while Hong Kong is on a hard peg, PSM will show the effect of adopting a peg on growth
by comparing Iceland’s growth rate with Hong Kong’s growth rate. This is clearly a more satisfactory than
just comparing the mean growth rate of pegs vs. the mean growth rate of flexible arrangements, which is
precisely what OLS does.
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environment in which the ATT can be estimated requires that sick people go to hospitals and
similar people stay home, and that is why I can read E[Y0 | D = 1] as the effect on health
of staying home. In practice I can only observe or estimate directly the Average Treatment
Effect (ATE), defined as:
ATE = E[Yi | D = 1]− E[Yi | D = 0] (2.2)
ATE is the difference between hospitalized people and not hospitalized people in general, an
interesting but presumably inaccurate measure of the effect of the treatment or policy. To
see this, notice that I can also write the ATE as:
ATE = E[Y1i − Y0i | Di = 1] + E[Y0i | Di = 1]− E[Y0i | Di = 0] (2.3)
In words, the observed difference across treated and non-treated individuals is equal to the
average treatment of the treated ATT, plus a second and third term that together represents
the selection bias. If and only if the selection bias is equal to 0, so E[Y0i | Di = 1] = E[Y0i |
Di = 0], then the estimation of the ATE gives us the true ATT. But notice that only happens
if treatment is assigned randomly.22
A way to remove the selection bias is to condition on a given set of explanatory variables
X. If I can find such a set of variables, the selection bias disappears after I condition on X,
so if I call ρ the ATT:
ρ = E[Y1i − Y0i | Di = 1] (2.4)
ρ = {E[Y1i | Xi, Di = 1]− E[Y0i | Xi, Di = 1] | Di = 1} (2.5)
22Because then we can write the ATE = E[Yi | D = 1]− E[Yi | D = 0], as in the previous expression, or
as ATE = E[Y1i − Y0i | Di = 1]. The reason being that E[Yi | D = 0] = E[Yi | D = 1].
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By virtue of the Conditional Independence Assumption E[Y0i | Xi, Di = 0] = E[Y0i |
Xi, Di = 1], then:
ρ = {E[Y1i | Xi, Di = 1]− E[Y0i | Xi, Di = 0] | Di = 1} (2.6)
So:
ρ = E[ρx | Di = 1] (2.7)
Where I defined ρx = E[Yi | Xi, Di = 1]− E[Yi | Xi, Di = 0]. Thus, after controlling for the
set of covariates X, assignment is in fact random.
The implementation of PSM requires the following assumptions. Assumption 1.a (Un-
confoundedness): [(Y0, Y1)D | X]. In words, this condition says that given a set of variables
that are not affected by the treatment, potential outcomes are independent of the treatment.
This condition states that the selection bias will be removed if I can correctly identify a con-
trol group after controlling for a set of covariates X. This condition is general and it applies
to all matching models. The next condition is similar, but a little bit more precise for the
purpose of using PSM models.
Assumption 1.b (Unconfoundedness given the PS): [(Y0, Y1)D | P (X)]. This condition is
similar to 1.a, but it states that I can correctly identify a control group given the Propensity
Score (which depends on our set of control variables X). Estimate the effects of treatments
given the propensity score is is what PSM does.
A very important implication of “Unconfoundedness” is the “Ignorability assumption”.
In fact Assumption 1.a, or more precisely 1.b, is saying that no unobserved factor that can
potentially explain the choice of the treatment status is left out once I control for whatever
variables I choose to estimate the propensity score.
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An extra implicit assumption is that there are no spill-overs: the treatment status of a
given observation does not affect the treatment status of the rest; in economic theory this
will amount to assuming perfect competition, or small country in our case.
Finally, I need another assumption. Assumption 2 (Overlap or Common Support): [0 <
P (D = 1|X) < 1]. This condition states that our individuals have some positive probability
of being treated and a positive probability of being non-treated. In other words, I do not
have individuals that are always treated or always untreated. This condition makes sure
that comparable units exist.
Most of the time the propensity score is not available, so it should be estimated. That
can be done using the appropriate model from the limited dependent variable family. After
the propensity score is estimated, the next step is to decide which of the different available
criteria for defining “similar individuals” should be used. This amount to choosing among
the different matching estimators. I will quickly comment on the most popular ones that
will be employed in the next section.23
Defining similarity is a two sided problem. First I should choose the metric to define
distance, and then the matching estimator. PSM is a very specific kind of distance which
relies on a single index, which is precisely the propensity score. Other popular option is
the Mahalanobis distance. Mahalanobis distance is a multi-dimensional generalization of
the idea of measuring how many standard deviations away is a point from the mean of the
distribution. Mahalanobis distance is unit-less and scale-invariant. While models based on
the propensity score are very good at minimizing the distance along the propensity score, the
Mahalanobis distances is very good at reducing the distance along particular covariates.24
23See Kaliendo and Kopeining (2008) for a superb discussion of the most popular Matching estimators
24In this paper, I find that the estimator that uses the Mahalanobis distance is the best at reducing the
difference across the determinants of the ERR while the rest do a very poor job.
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Unlike PSM, Mahalanobis distance does not rely on a single index of “similiarity” (which is
precisely the propensity score).
Now let us discuss the different matching models that use propensity scores. The Nearest
Neighbor Matching chooses the partner for each observation based on the propensity score
that are closer. Different kinds of Nearest Neighbor estimators exist. For example I can
compare a given unit with the closest N individuals (where N is an integer). Or I can
implement the Nearest Neighbor with replacement, so a given individual may act as a control
for several units, or without replacement so a given unit is discarded once it is chosen as a
match for a give unit.25 More formally, the Nearest Neighbor chooses the N matches by
minimizing the distance between the observations, or:
min ‖ pi − pj ‖ (2.8)
Where p is the propensity score. The Radius Matching is a better option if the individuals
are far apart. When this is the case, the Nearest Neighbor may pick up bad matches. To
solve this, the Radius matching picks-up all individuals within a given radius. The main
problem is how to determine the correct radius. More formally, the Radius Matching chooses:
‖ pi − pj ‖< r (2.9)
Where r is the pre-specified radius. Finally, the Kernel and the Local Linear Matching are
non-parametric methods that include all the observation in the sample, with lower weights for
individuals that are far away. These estimators have lower variance, but they can they pick
bad matches. In big samples the matching technique should not matter (they should provide
25A problem with this Matching Method with no replacement is that the order of the matching process
matters, so the variables should be order randomly before the matching process starts.
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the same answer as the sample size grows large), but in small samples some differences can
arise (as we will verify soon). The weights are defined as:
w(i, j) =
K(
pi−pj
h
)∑
K(
pi−pj
h
)
(2.10)
Where h is the bandwidth parameter.
Standard errors reported by most statistical packages do not reflect the fact that the
propensity scores are estimated on the first stage, so bootstrapping is needed. However, as
Abadie and Imbens (2008) point out, this procedure fails for the Nearest Neighbor Matching,
as it can lead both to a underestimation or an overestimation of the standard errors. In that
case, a correction of standard errors suggested by Abadie and Imbens should be implemented.
I will report bootstrapped standard errors for all our matching models, except for the Nearest
Neighbor. For the latter, the Abadie and Imbens corrected standard errors will be reported.
For the estimation of the propensity scores, I use a Multinomial Probit model to calculate
the probability of adopting a particular ERR, given a set of covariates chosen from the
economic theory summarized on section (2.2.2).26 More formally, I estimate the following
model (for i = 1, ..., n):
Pri[ERRi = h|x1,i, x2,i, ..., xk,i] = pi,h (2.11)
In words, I estimate the probability that a given individual indexed by time and country
adopts a particular ERR, indexed by h, given a full set of determinants x, discussed in
section 2.2.2. As in any Multinomial Probit, the model has a latent variable representation
with the following structure:
26Estimating a Multinomial Probit model for three options (fix, intermediate, float) seems to be a better
option than a standard Probit model (fix vs. float), because I can exploit the richer structure of the ERR
classifications. The estimations of the propensity scores will differ a lot, but the matching should provide
similar control groups so the final estimation of the ATT should not be affected significantly.
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ERRi,h=1 = β1X + 1
ERRi,h=2 = β2X + 2
ERRi,h=3 = β3X + 3
(2.12)
A country is more likely to peg if both Pb[ERRi,h=1] > Pb[ERRi,h=2] and Pb[ERRi,h=1] >
pb[ERRi,h=3] hold, provided that h = 1 means that the country is on a peg, h = 2 means
that the country adopts an intermediate regime, and h = 3 that the country adopts a flexible
regime.
Once the model is estimated, I evaluate the covariates at the sample means to impute the
propensity scores to the different observations of our sample to adopt each of the regimes.
On the second step, I use the propensity scores to match observations using the different
popular matching estimators to estimate the ATT comparing similar individuals that adopt
a different ERR. The next subsection describes the data and presents the main results.
2.3.1 Data Description
Our empirical estimations require three main ingredients: an index of RER misalignment,
a classification of ERRs, and a set of control variables. Given the presence of different esti-
mations procedures, I will employ several alternatives definitions both for the misalignment
index and the ERRs classification. More precisely, for the ERRs classifications, I will use 3
different ones: IMF de jure classification (IMF), Reinhart and Rogoff (RR) mixed de facto
classification, and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS) pure de facto classification. I stick
with RR as the baseline because of its popularity on empirical work and its broad coverage in
terms of years and countries. For the misalignment index, I will follow Rodrik (Rodrik, 2008,
and also Mc-Donald and Viera, 2010), but I will present alternative specifications soon. I
first presents the main results using RR and Rodrik’s index, and then some robustness check
using the alternative variables.
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To construct Rodrik’s misalignment index, I create a RER index for the i− th economy
at time t as the ratio of the nominal exchange rate, xrat, and relative prices from PWT
(8.1), ppp. All the variables are expressed in natural logs:
ln(RERit) = ln(xratit/pppit) (2.13)
On the second step, I correct the RER index to account for the Balassa-Samuelson-Harrod
effect.27 This is done by including the RER index on the left-hand side of a regression,
with a set of time fixed effects ft and the natural log of per capita GDP (CGDP) of the
i − th country over the US per capita GDP (as a proxy of the ratio of tradable to non-
tradable productivity of the domestic economy vis-a-vis the ratio of the rest of world) on the
right-hand side. Hence, I estimate:
ln(RERit) = ln(CGDPit/CGDP(us)t) + ft + uit (2.14)
Where the term uit represents the error term with the usual mean, variance and covariance
structure. Finally, the misalignment index is the residual from the estimation of (2.14), or
the difference between the “fitted values” from our previous regression ̂ln(RERit) and the
“observed values” of ln(RERit). Thus, I subtract the second equation from the first to
obtain:
undervalit = ̂ln(RERit)− ln(RERit) (2.15)
The variable underval is comparable across countries and time periods. When underval
is positive, the domestic currency is “undervalued”, while when underval is negative, the
domestic currency is “overvalued”. The regression of relative per capita GDP on RER yields
27Best known as the Balassa-Samuelson effect, it says that due to faster productivity growth in the tradable
sector, higher income countries usually have a lower relative price for the tradable good (a lower RER).
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a coefficient of around −0.64, which means that an increase of 1% in per capita GDP leads
to an appreciation of the RER of around 0.64%. Underval has a zero mean and a standard
deviation of 0.41. These figures are line with Rodrik’s (2008) original results using Penn
World Tables 6.
Unfortunately, there are too many reasonable different ways to estimate the misalignment
index. For example, I can add a different set of covariates to our second step, I can use
different RER indexes, and so on. However, as some authors have pointed out (see Berg and
Miao, 2010, for a discussion), some of the most popular indexes used in panel data studies are
strikingly similar regardless of the control variables utilized, and specification with different
combinations will not lead to substantially different results.28 I will produce alternative
misalignment indexes using additional covariates (terms of trade, government spending, net
foreign assets), different RER indexes, and estimation techniques, in the section 2.3.2.
As I said, I use RR classification to the present the main results. Later on, I will
use LYS and IMF classifications for robustness purposes. In order to obtain comparable
results, I collapse the 5-way classification from the different classifications into three broad
categories: pegs, intermediate, and floating. Pegs include monetary unions, currency boards
and other hard pegs; intermediate include soft pegs and managed floaters; floating include
clean floaters. To minimize the impacts of regime changes that are not long lasting, I
include only observations for the ERR that last at least five years or more, including the first
four years. Since the RR classification specifically considers countries that experience high
inflation (above 40%, known as “freely falling regimes”) but such a thing does not exists for
the other classifications, I exclude all the individuals that are classified as “freely falling” by
the RR criteria (even if use LYS or IMF classification). This also helps to compare the degree
28Perhaps the index will differ in absolute size, but changes in undervaluation will be similar, probably
because most of the variation comes from movements of the ln(RERit) itself.
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of misalignment between “stable regimes”, because the “freely falling” category includes
prolonged periods of high inflation and hyperinflation. The “freely falling” episodes also
display the higher degree of undervaluation of the entire sample, so their exclusion is biasing
the results against finding any negative effect of peg on undervaluation. In other words, the
inclusion of “freely falling” will increase the absolute size of the coefficients reported in this
section and in section 2.3.2; they should be considered a conservative estimation.
The decision to include only observations from those regimes that last at least five years
avoids picking up the effect of regime changes, and helps to mitigate endogeneity concerns.29
This reduces the number of observation that implement very flexible ERRs, but it seems a fair
price to pay. However, it also makes impossible to partition the sample between developed
and non-developed countries (as it is often done in the literature) because the number of
developing countries that float for five years or more is scant. Fortunately, matching will
presumably pair together countries that have similar policies and structural characteristics,
so this is not an important concern if developed and non-developed countries differences can
be captured by our controls.
The distribution (see the figures 2.1 and 2.2) shows that pegs are among the most com-
mon regimes, with roughly 50%− 70% of the observations, depending on the classification.
Comparing de jure vs. de facto classifications it seems that pegs are not fully reported.
Notice that restricting the sample to long-lasting regimes makes a small difference, despite
reducing the sample size from the original figure of around 6900 to less than 5000. The main
difference is the significant increase in the fraction of pegs in the LYS classification, from
60% to 80%.30
29When a peg is abandoned, the nominal exchange rate usually jumps up, so the degree of undervaluation
increases.
30The fractions of pegs may look abnormally high, but we should keep in mind that we exclude the “freely
falling” cases, which eliminates a substantial number of floaters from the sample.
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For the covariates, I pick variables that fit the five different theories underlying the
choice of the ERR (as discussed in section 2.2.2), and also the average value of the different
ERR indexes from the 5-way classifications to control for the neighbor’s ERR (called region
regime).31 All our variables have yearly frequency, or are averages over the twelve months, so
I use yearly data. For the OCA theory, I include population (pop), area in squared kilometers
(areakm2 ), a dummy variable for islands (island), a de facto trade openness indicator (trade)
measured as exports plus imports over GDP, and the Theil index of export concentration
that combines extensive and intensive margins (diversity).32 I omit per capita GDP because
that variable is used to calculate the variable underval, and this could lead to a violation
of the assumptions of PSM. A dummy variable (Development) that takes value of 1 if a
country is developed according to the IMF and World Bank classifications, and 0 otherwise,
is included instead.
For the Sources of Shocks I include four measures of different nominal and real shocks: the
5 years variance of the ratio of broad money to GDP (MRES shock), the 5 years variance
of natural log of the terms of trade times the de facto trade openness (TOT shock), the
5 years variance of the ratio of government consumption to GDP (GOV shock), and the 5
years variance of the Federal Funds rate times the Chin-Ito Capital Account Openness Index
(RATE shock). Those four variables try to control for shocks, both real and nominal, and
internal and external. Because the shocks associated with external factors, TOT shock and
RATE shock are related to the degree of trade and financial integration with the rest of the
world. I choose to weight them by the variables that capture how open are the external
accounts.
31This is possible because the ERR are represented by a positive variable restricted between 1 and 5, in
increasing order of flexibility.
32I use five years average to diminish the concern with endogeneity issues, both for the trade concentration
index and trade openness. Notice that a higher level for the Theil index means lower diversification.
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For the Trilemma, the Aizenman (2013) Monetary Independence Index (MI ), and the
Chin-Ito Capital Account Openness Index (kaopen) are included. For the Credibility View,
I include the 5 years average ratio of domestic inflation over the median world inflation
(hinfla) and a variable that captures the durability of the political regime (durable); for
Liability Dollarization, the ratio of non-FDI foreign liabilities to GDP (in current dollars)
is included (LGDP). The variable (Dollar) captures the degree of deposit dollarization (as
estimated by Levy-Yeyati, 2006) as it is used in most studies, but I do not include it in our
main calculation because it removes more than half of our 1,892 observations and I cannot
estimate the models using the alternative ERR classifications.33 Instead, I stick with the less
appealing but easier to handle variable LGDP. Notice that the inclusion of (Development)
may help to capture dollarization problems, since non-developed countries usually suffer from
poor financial development and more exposure to liability dollarization.
After the introduction of the covariates, some observations are dropped from a large list
of 167 countries spanning the period 1950-2011, included in the Penn World Tables 8.1, the
latest version available when this paper was written.34 The table 2.1 summarizes the main
features of our control variables. The full description of the variables and the sources can be
found in the table 2.2.
33The main results using RR classification holds if I include it
34The final sample spans the period 1979-2010. The final list of countries included is: Albania, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Bu-
rundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Es-
tonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Keyna, Republic of Korea,
Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mon-
golia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovak Re-
public, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
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This section presents our main results.35 The baseline specifications are estimated using
RR ERR classification and Rodrik’s undervaluation index. First, I present table 2.3 which
displays the expected signs of the coefficients (the probability of adopting a peg), as well
as the observed results. The table 2.4 display the full results from the Multinomial Probit
equation to analyze the impact of the different covariates on the probability of adopting each
ERR (peg, intermediate and floating).36
As we can see in table 2.4, most variables have the expected sign and are statistically
significant at 1% in at least one of the columns. For example, more trade openness, high
inflation in the past, and a world interest rate shock, increase the likelihood of the adoption of
a peg. On the other hand, more monetary independence increases the likelihood of floating,
and more foreign financial liabilities over GDP makes a country more prone to adopting an
intermediate regime. Regarding the shocks, the nominal internal shock MRES shock make
adopting a peg more likely, the interest rate shock RATE shock makes floating less likely,
while terms of trade and fiscal shocks make the adoption of an intermediate regime or floating
more likely. Perhaps unexpected, the variables associated with size show that small countries
are more likely to float, which goes against our priors.
The results should be interpreted as follows. Consider for instance the coefficient as-
sociated with Capital Account Openness for the first column −0.099. If a country has a
completely open capital account (thus Kaopen = 1), then it is 9.9% less likely to adopt a
peg. Regarding other coefficients, like the effect of a terms of trade shock on the probability
of adopting a floating regime, considering that one standard deviation equals 0.470 (see table
2.1), an increase in one standard deviation means that a country is 0.064∗0.4697 ≈ 3% more
likely to adopt that regime. In other words, terms of trade shock have the wrong sign and
35The results are obtained using the Stata command PSMATCH2 developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
36The coefficients are estimated by evaluating the covariates at their sample means.
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the effects are very small. Notice that the results add-up, so the effect on regime 1 + effect
on regime 2 + effect on regime 3 = 0, as it should be.
The results suggest that there are elements from the Trilemma, the Credibility approach,
the Sources of Shock, and the Liability Dollarization hypothesis, that can account for ERR
choices. I find some evidence against the OCA and the Sources of Shock approach (see
Levy-Yeyati et. al., 2010, for an additional discussion of the empirical determinants of the
ERR choice, and some empirical results). For example, I expect small countries to peg, but
according to our results, it seems that big countries are actually more prone to adopting a
peg than small countries. The same thing applies to the island dummy; islands seems to be
more prone to float. We should keep in mind that our sample includes islands that are good
examples of floaters, such as Australia, United Kingdom, Japan, and so on. However, I also
have a control variable that captures the degree of development, so this is still a puzzling
result.
Once the probability of adopting a peg is estimated, I can asses the effect of the ERR on
undervaluation. The main results are reported in table 2.5. The ATT is estimated using the
different matching models, and I also report an OLS estimation (a regression with underval
as the dependent variable, and the the covariates from the Multinominal Probit model as
controls). I implement five typical matching estimators: Kernel, Local Linear, Nearest
Neighbor (with 5 neighbors and replacement and with 1 neighbor without replacement),
and Radius (with a caliper parameter of 25%). Finally, I also estimate the model with
the Mahalanobis distance. As we will discover soon, this makes sense given that the other
matching algorithms are not very good at reducing covariate imbalances.
The main finding is that pegs are associated with more overvaluation of the domestic cur-
rency. The results holds both for the different Matching estimators and the OLS regressions
including covariates. All the times the difference in means is statistically significant at 1%.
OLS seem to be as good as the other matching models for detecting the sign of the effect
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of the ERRs, but we can see that OLS overestimates (in absolute terms) the true effect of
pegs, although the differences are small. For example, using the Mahalanobis distance, the
effect of adopting a peg is a reduction of 11.5% in the undervaluation index, vs. a reduction
of 17% using an OLS specification.
To understand how bad is the selection bias, I use the same sample as in the matching
models reported in Table 3, and I compare the mean of countries on a peg vs. the rest
(excluding “free falling” and regimes that last less than 5 years). The results point out that
the mean undervaluation for pegs is about −3.2%, vs. a mean for non-pegs of about 1.3%,
and the difference is not statistically significant even at 10 %. Thus, a direct comparison
of the mean shows that pegs are not different than non-pegs. But after I control for the
propensity score (or the covariates that determine the choice of the ERR), the picture is
completely the opposite.
To asses the quality of the Matching models, I report the pseudo R-squared from the
propensity score estimation before and after matching, the numbers of treated variables off-
support, and the mean and median bias before and after matching. This information is
also reported in table 2.5. I have no off-support variables, but contrary to what I expect,
the R-squared almost vanish only for the Mahalanobis distance.37 More quality checks are
discussed below.
Figure 2.3 displays the distribution of propensity scores before matching and after match-
ing. The visual inspection suggest that there are important differences in the distribution
before matching, and that the Nearest Neighbor (with 5 neighbors and replacement) does
a perfect job. The distribution look so similar than it is impossible to see the dashed line.
Figure 2.4 displays the histogram (by propensity scores) of the treated and non-treated vari-
37Once I match individuals with similar propensities to adopt each ERR, the pseudo R-squared should
vanish because the covariates no longer explain the regime choice.
135
ables. The main goal is to verify whether for each treated variable I have similar non-treated
individuals available. We can see that for most of the treated units, a unit with a similar
propensity score but with a untreated status exist. Notice that most of the time I have
very few treated variables “off-support”, but there is either no treated variable on that bin,
or there a plenty of other untreated “on-support”. To ensure the quality of the results, I
explicitly restricted our estimation to the region of common-support. Thus, if treatment and
non-treatment do not overlap, those treated observation that have propensity scores where
there is no overlap are automatically eliminated from the estimation.
I also addressed the issue of the quality of the matching estimators by looking at the
differences of the covariates before and after matching. It is desirable that the differences
by covariates between the control and the treatment group vanish after matching. Some
authors report t-tests for the means before and after matching for each covariate. The point
being to analyze if individuals were really different before matching, and if the process of
matching was able to group together comparable units, so the differences in the mean of
the treated and the control group is no longer significant. But as Austin (2007), Imai, King
and Stuart (2008) argue, the t-test may be inappropriate for two main reasons. First, how
similar are our observations is inherently an in-sample property, without reference to any
broader population (and the samples compared may differ). Second, hypothesis testing can
be misleading as measures of balance, because they often conflate changes in balance with
changes in statistical power.
A better indicator of matching quality is the mean standardized bias, as it is reported on
the graphs contained in figures 2.5 and 2.6.38 Our results suggest that the covariates differ
substantially before matching. After the application of the Local Linear, Kernel and Radius
38The mean standardized bias is defined as MSB = 100(XC−XT )
2
√
S2C+S
2
T
, where the Xs are the means of the
control (C) and treatment (T) units, and the Ss the variances.
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matching, substantial differences seem to remain. The Nearest Neighbor (both with one and
five neighbors) does not seem to do a better job. As a rule of thumb, some studies consider
that an average of 3% to 5% bias as an acceptable threshold for each covariate, and we can
verify that this rule is violated most of the time.
If we take a look at the graphs for the Malahanobis matching (see figures 2.5 and 2.6), it
yields the best match in terms of bias reduction. The pictures suggest that after matching
most of the difference across variables is wiped out, so the control group designed by our
matching estimators looks good, except for a couple of covariates (monetary independence,
trade openness, and the internal nominal shock). This good performance is not surprising
because the Mahalanobis models attempts to minimize the standardized bias by covariate,
instead of relying on a single index (the propensity score). However, some problematic covari-
ates remain. This issue is further examined on section 2.3.2, for different ERR classification.
2.3.2 Robustness Checks
In the previous section I presented results using Rodrik’s undervaluation index and the
RR classification. For robustness, I replace the undervaluation index and the ERR classi-
fication with alternative misalignment indexes and classifications. For the alternative un-
dervaluation indexes, I estimate a “fundamental” index that includes alternative covariates:
net foreign assets, government spending over GDP and the terms of trade. The expectation
is that an increase in any of those additional covariates will appreciate the RER.
I also estimate a “cointegration” index that add leads and lags to estimate a dynamic
OLS specification for the baseline estimation (with per capita GDP as the only covariate);
this is in fact the estimation of a cointegration equation corrected to account for small bias,
and provides results that are consistent in the presence of unit roots in the RER and on per
capita GDP.
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Additionally, I estimate the undervaluation index using a multilateral index (instead of a
bilateral index), the Real Effective Exchange Rate from IMF, which I call “REER”. Finally,
I added the deviation from the mean of the Real Effective Exchange Rate index provided by
the International Financial Statistics from IMF to compute an alternative index, that I call
“PPP”.39 These estimations are reported in table 2.6.
The results using different undervaluation indexes are reported in table 2.7. I only report
the results from the Mahalanobis matching, since it provides the best match (in terms of bias
reduction) among the different matching models. The main plot holds, but we can verify that
the size of the effect does seem to change significantly, depending on which index I use. The
results suggest that adopting a peg reduces undervaluation by roughly 13.1% and 21.4%.
When the multilateral misalignment indexes are used, the ATT is between −18.4% and
−21.4%, and when bilateral indexes are introduced, the size of the effect is between −13.1%
and −13.7%. The Mahalanobis distance model seems to do an decent job at reducing the bias
(both mean and median), except for the models based on multilateral RER. Interestingly,
I still find OLS overestimate the absolute size of the effect for the bilateral indexes, but it
underestimates the effects for the multilateral indexes.
It is known that different ERR classify the same observations differently, so I also repli-
cate the results using LYS and IMF classifications. The results from the Multinomial Probit
models (see tables 2.8 and 2.9) suggest some agreement between the RR and the LYS clas-
sifications, and somehow different results for the IMF model. The table 2.10 displays the
main results using LYS classification. We can verify that under LYS, pegs display more
overvaluation than RR, and that the ATT is bigger (in absolute terms) than the OLS esti-
mation. The results are statistically significant at 1% for all the models. But notice that
39This last index is an index that is often constructed as a naive attempt to track deviations from Pur-
chasing Power Parity. That is why I choose the name “PPP”. Unfortunately, it features a smaller coverage,
so it is hard to compare it with the original index “underval”.
138
OLS under-represents the true effect of adopting a peg: while the model with Mahalanobis
distance yields a large effect of −22%, the OLS estimation is only −14.8%. The other esti-
mators report a lower effect using OLS. The results using the IMF classification (table 2.11)
are the same as before: pegs and floats are overvaluation prone. Moreover, the results are
also not too different from OLS. The model with Mahalanobis distance yields a coefficient
of −12%, while the result for the OLS estimation is −13.6%.
The figures 2.7 and 2.8 report the distribution of propensity scores before and after
matching for the LYS and the IMF classification. As before, except for the model with
1 neighbor, the distribution look pretty similar after matching. The figures 2.9 and 2.10
show the histograms of Propensity Scores by bins, and while some treated variables are off-
support, in general the common support assumption holds (there is almost always a good
match for each treated observation). Finally, the figures 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14, show the
standardized biases before and after matching. For the LYS classification I find again that
the Mahalanobis model provides a reasonable reduction in the bias for most covariates, but
the caliper model also does a decent job. For the IMF classification, it is nice to see that
almost all the estimators are able to eliminate the imbalances after matching.
To summarize, I find that the choice of the undervaluation index does not matter (our
results still hold), and while the LYS and IMF classification may affect the size of the
effect, the results are statistically significant and the signs are the same. Interestingly, some
of the new models have better properties than their counterparts when the RR is used. In
particular, the large covariate imbalances that exist before matching are removed successfully
by most estimators, provided that the LYS and IMF classifications are used.
Now I turn to explore additional robustness checks. Given that our treatment variable
can be constructed in different ways, it is worth to ask whether it represent a true treatment.
To do this, I create a simple placebo test. First, to each country that is using a peg using
the RR classification I add 13 % undervaluation, to remove the observed treatment effect.
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Likewise, when I use the LYS and IMF classifications I will add 22 % and 12 %, in line with
the previous estimations. Next, I assign treatment status to observations on our sample using
a dummy that randomly is equal to one or zero. Then I run the Mahalanobis model using
the three classifications and the dummy as the variable that represents the ERR adopted. I
repeat this procedure 5.000 times and I store the coefficients to create a distribution. The
results are displayed in the figures 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17.
To pass the placebo test, our estimations should lay outside the 95 % bounds of these
distributions of the “placebo coefficients”. Otherwise they are not better than our fake
treatment dummy variable, and that would be very bad news. Notice that all the three
distribution have a mean of zero, and the distribution of the coefficient ranges from -0.04 to
0.04/0.06, depending on the classification. Contrast this with our estimations, with average
effects that are always below -0.04, well outside the range displayed on the histograms.
The lesson is that our treatment variables are clearly better than just assigning treatment
status at random, even for the IMF classification (which supposedly does a bad job assigning
treatment status).
As a further robustness check, I analyze the possible impact of “hidden-sources” of regime
choice. Imagine that countries also chose ERRs based on unobservable and/or unmeasurable
reasons (i.e., “love for pegs”). More formally, suppose that the probability of adopting a
treatment (using a peg in our example) is given by:
Pi = P (Di = 1|xi, ui) = F (ρxi + θui) (2.16)
Where xi are the observed characteristics for the individual i, and ui are the unobserved
characteristics (also for i), and ρ and θ are groups of parameters that capture each of these
types of effects. If there is no “hidden-bias”, then θ = 0. Most likely, this condition will not
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hold, and as a consequence, two identical individuals with the same xi will have different
probabilities of adopting the treatment.
Now assume that we have two paired individuals, i and j, and that F is the logistic
distribution. The odds that individuals receive treatment are thus Pi
1−Pi and
Pj
1−Pj , and the
odds ratios are:
Pi
1−Pi
Pj
1−Pj
=
e(ρxi+θui)
e(ρxj+θuj)
(2.17)
If both individuals have identical characteristics (as suggested by the matching procedure),
then the part associated with x will cancel out:
e(ρxi+θui)
e(ρxj+θuj)
= eθ(ui−uj) (2.18)
So if there are no differences between unobservables ui = uj, or the unobservables do not
matter θ = 0, the odd ratio will be equal to one.
The procedure developed by Rosenbaum (2002) exploits these facts. The idea of the test
is to ask how changing the values of θ and of ui−uj affects the inference about the adoption
of the treatment. Rosenbaum shows that the following bounds on the odds ratio that either
of the two matched individuals will receive treatment exist:
1
eθ
≤ Pi(1− Pj)
Pj(1− Pi) ≤ e
θ (2.19)
There are some limitations with the Rosembaum bounds approach. It can only be applied by
one to one matching, and it assumes that the treatment effects are additive.40 Nevertheless,
it can be used to construct bounds on the estimations of the ATT and their statistical
significance, to asses the potential presence of unobserved sources of treatment status choice.
40Thus, the models that use Kernels, Radius, or more than one neighbor do not work. In our case, I can
only use the Nearest Neighbor and the Mahalanobis distance.
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Based on our original estimation, and using the Mahalanobis distance and the RR clas-
sification, the test suggest that the results are robust to up to 60% hidden heterogeneity.41
In words, if 60% of the choice of ERR were explained by a variable not included in my list
of covariates, I will still find that pegs are associated with more overvaluation.
The results are shown in table 2.12, and they should be read as follow: the first column
shows how large is the hidden source of heterogeneity (i.e., 1.2 means 20 %). The columns
“sig+” and “sig-” create a range for statistical significance, while the columns “CI+” and
“CI-” create a range for the size of the ATT.42 We can see that below 1.7, the results are
statistically significant between 0 and 5.76 % (the numbers on the columns “sig+” and “sig-”
are included in the interval 0-5.76 for Gamma ≤ 1.7), and the ATT is negative. Thus, if
treated and non-treated groups differ to up to 60% in an unobservable variable, I will still
find a negative and significant treatment effect.
Interestingly, the LYS and IMF classification are much more robust than RR. Tables 2.13
and 2.14 suggest that the results tolerate up to 170 % and 120% hidden heterogeneity, two
very large numbers. To see this, notice that the effect of pegs are statistically significant up
to Gamma = 270 and Gamma = 220 (see the columns “sig+” and “sig-”), and the coefficient
is always in a negative interval (see columns “CI+” and “CI-”). This suggest that our result
are not sensitive to unobservable variables (or observable but not included), that can explain
ERR choice.
41According to figure 2.5, variables such as trade openness, monetary independence, as well as the two
monetary shocks, display a very large standardized bias after matching. I removed them and re-estimation
the robustness of our results to “hidden-sources” of regime choice. I find that the results survive even if
regime treated and non-treated groups display up to 55% differences in these covariates. I also excluded
the variables that have a mean that is statistically different between the treated and untreated group (trade
openness, area, monetary independence, and regime durability), and the results tolerate up to 90% of
“hidden-heterogeneity”.
42The columns “t-hat+” and “t-hat-” show a range for the t-statistic.
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2.4 Conclusions
This paper have explored the relation between ERRs and RER misalignments. After
reviewing the vast literature on the choice, classification, and the effects of the ERRs on
macroeconomic performance, I used several matching estimators to analyze the effects of
ERRs on the degree of RER misalignment. The estimation yields some interesting results,
which I can summarize as follow.
The different theories on ERR choice seem to provide interesting insights; many popular
determinants of ERR choice have the expected sign and are statistically significant. More
precisely, using RR classification, I find supporting evidence for the Trilemma, the Sources of
Shock approach, the Credibility View, and Liability Dollarization hypothesis. Our findings
seem to contradict the OCA theory, and against my own priors, the result suggests that
small countries are more likely to float. Perhaps the inclusion of rich islands such as Japan
or Australia is driving the results, but in any case this suggest that poor islands are not very
likely to peg, or that rich islands are very likely to float.
Perhaps the main result of this paper is that pegs seems to be associated with more RER
overvaluation. Moreover, this result does not seems to depend on the ERR classifications, or
on the RER misalignment indexes that is used. I find that this result holds for multilateral
indexes and ERR classification of different kinds.
The presence of significant covariate imbalance after matching suggest that some het-
erogeneity is either inherent to each ERR, or that the information available is not enough
to remove the observed differences based on the set of matching models implemented. The
main results were estimated using the RR classification, but even the best model in terms
of bias reduction (the Mahalanobis distance) was far from perfect. Interestingly, the models
that use the IMF classification seems to do a very good job in terms of bias reduction, which
suggest that we should trust these results more. However, the size of the effects is similar
to the original models (between −13.1% and −14.9% for the RR classification, and between
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−10.4% and −15.7% for the IMF classification). The punch-line is that there is a set of
estimations that we should trust, and the size of the effects do not differ much from the
main specifications.
Finally, the placebo test and the Rosembaum Bounds estimations, show that our treat-
ment variable represent a “true treatment” (i.e., it is better than random), and that the
results are not sensitive to unobservable variables that can explain ERR choices.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean SD Min/Max
Optimal Currency Areas Variables
Island 8274 0.2162 0.4117 0 / 1
Pop 8316 30.9971 111.7169 0.0407 / 1324.353
Trade 5997 0.7598 0.48613 0 .0721 / 4.2545
Diversity 7279 0.6566 0.6974 -0.0467 / 3.9339
Area 6626 849.9338 1968.85 2.6964 / 16572.62
Trilemma Variables
MI 5596 0.4364 0.1770 0 / 0.9679
KA open 5553 0.4290 0.3522 0 / 1
Sources of Shocks Variables
MRES shock 4505 0.2471 0.4700 0.0034 / 9.6182
Rate shock 5553 2.1681 2.4856 0 / 15.5772
TOT shock 4673 0.0295 0.0496 0 / 0.7497
GOV shock 4949 0.0006 0.0019 0 / .0340
Liability Dollarization Variables
Foreign Liab 5652 6.0966 14.0971 0 / 318.0404
Dollar 2361 0.2542 0.2295 0 / 0.98
Credibility Variables
Durable 7499 22.1756 28.9124 0 / 202
High Infla 4249 0.3659 2.5683 -0.0425 / 65.1711
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Table 2.2: Variable Descriptions and Sources
Description Source
Optimal Currency Areas
Island Island Dummy Wikipedia
Pop Population PWT 8.1
Trade De Facto Trade Openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP PWT 8.1
Diversity Theil Index of Export Diversification (Higher means less Diversification) IMF WEO
Area Total Area in KM2 [*]
Trilemma
MI Monetary Independence Index (see source) [**]
KA open Capital Account Openness Index (see source) [**]
Sources of Shocks
MRES shock Internal Nominal Shock (5 year variance of Broad Money/Reserves) WDI
RATE shock External Nominal Shock (5 year variance of US FF rate * KA open) [**]
TOT shock External Real Shock (5 year variance of terms of trade * Trade) [***]
GOV shock Internal Real Shock (5 year variance of government consumption) WDI
Liability Dollarization
Foreign Liab Non-FDI Foreign Liabilities to GDP [****]
Dollar Deposit Dollarization [*****]
Credibility
Durable Political Regime Durability (years) Polity IV Dataset
High Infla High Inflation (5 years average of domestic inflation/world median inflation) WDI
[*] Gallup et. al. (1999).
[**] Aizenman et. al. (2013).
[***] Spatafor and Tytell (2009).
[****] Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001)
[*****] Levy-Yeyati (2006).
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Table 2.3: Estimated Marginal Effects on ERR choices, RR
VARIABLES Predicted Observed Statistical Significance
Region Regime RR (-) (-) ***
Developed (-) (-) **
Island (+) (-) ***
Population (-) (+) ***
Trade Openness (+) (+) ***
Diversity (+) (+) ***
Area (-) (+) ***
Monetary Independence (-) (-) ***
Capital Account Openness (-) (+) ***
Int. Nominal Shock (+) (+) **
Nominal Shock (+) (+) ***
TOT Shock (+) (+)
GOV Shock (-) (+)
L2GDP (+) (-) ***
High Inflation (+) (+) ***
Regime Durability (-) (-) ***
The +/- signs denote increase/decrease in the likelihood of adopting a peg
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Estimated Marginal Effects on ERR choices, RR
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Peg Intermediate Float
Region regimeRR -0.458*** 0.520*** -0.063***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.023)
Developed -0.069** 0.079** -0.009
(0.033) (0.031) (0.011)
Island -0.062** -0.041 0.103***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.008)
Population 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade 0.416*** -0.201*** -0.215***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.018)
Trade diverse 0.051** 0.084*** -0.135***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.023)
Area 0.000** -0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Monetary Indep -0.169*** 0.094 0.076***
(0.061) (0.059) (0.024)
KA open -0.099** 0.152*** -0.053***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.015)
TOT shock 0.064 1.226*** -1.290**
(0.542) (0.416) (0.647)
GOV shock 4.165 -21.216* 17.050***
(10.846) (11.218) (1.895)
Rate shock 0.061*** -0.063*** 0.003**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.001)
MRES shock 0.019 0.004 -0.023**
(0.019) (0.017) (0.011)
Foreign liab 0.005* 0.003 -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Infla history 0.017*** -0.006 -0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Durable -0.002*** 0.002*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,679 1,679 1,679
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: OLS and ATE of RR ERR on Underval
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator Mahalanobis Nearest (5) Nearest (1) Kernel Local Linear Radius
OLS -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.178***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
ATT -0.131*** -0.149*** -0.135*** -0.143*** -0.142*** -0.127***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.028) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020)
Mean Bias Unmatched 33.26 33.26 33.26 33.26 33.26 33.26
Mean Bias Matched 8.016 26.01 26.79 24.51 26.79 23.74
Median Bias Unmatched 31.29 31.29 31.29 31.29 31.29 31.29
Median Bias Matched 7.66 24.67 27.39 24.79 27.39 21.35
Pseudo-R2 Unmatched 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Pseudo-R2 Matched 0.06 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.15
Treated Observations (Off Support) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Observations 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679
Boot-Strapped standard errors (100 replications) in parentheses for (1), (4), (5) and (6)
Abadie and Imbens (2008) standard errors for Nearest Neighbor
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Estimation of Different Undervaluation Indexes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RER PWT RER PWT RER PWT REER IMF
Relative CGDP -0.639*** -0.646*** -0.766*** -0.027
(0.038) (0.048) (0.042) (0.024)
Terms of Trade 0.086***
(0.014)
Government Spending -2.150***
(0.105)
Net Foreign Assets -0.026***
(0.006)
4Relative CGDPt−1 6.171**
(2.917)
4Relative CGDPt+1 13.433***
(3.271)
Constant 0.376*** 0.408*** 0.347*** 0.045***
(0.050) (0.085) (0.049) (0.000)
Observations 8,274 5,115 7,773 2,822
R-squared 0.078 0.217 0.093 0.158
Country FE No No No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: OLS and ATT effects using different undervaluation indexes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Index Baseline Fundamental Cointegration REER PPP
OLS -0.178*** -0.182*** -0.182*** -0.160*** -0.152***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
ATT -0.131*** -0.131** -0.137*** -0.184*** -0.214***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.064) (0.040)
Mean Bias Unmatched 33.26 33.26 33.26 42.20 42.20
Mean Bias Matched 8.02 8.02 8.02 12.75 12.75
Median Bias Unmatched 31.29 31.29 31.29 40.91 40.91
Median Bias Matched 7.66 7.66 7.66 11.09 11.09
Pseudo-R2 Unmatched 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.37 0.37
Pseudo-R2 Matched 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.17
Treated Observations (Off Support) 0 0 0 0 0
Observations 1679 1679 1679 973 973
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Estimated Marginal Effects on ERR choices, LYS
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Peg Intermediate Float
Region Regime (LY) -0.461*** 0.173*** 0.288***
(0.054) (0.031) (0.050)
Developed 0.191*** -0.193*** 0.002
(0.048) (0.033) (0.049)
Island -0.170*** -0.083*** 0.254***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.030)
Population 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade Openness 0.405*** -0.071** -0.335***
(0.045) (0.028) (0.051)
Diversity 0.254*** -0.088*** -0.166***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.037)
Area 0.000** -0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Monetary Independence -0.330*** -0.028 0.358***
(0.078) (0.043) (0.082)
Capital Account Openness 0.147*** -0.119*** -0.029
(0.054) (0.038) (0.055)
Int. Nominal Shock 0.031*** 0.002 -0.033***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Nominal Shock 0.215** -0.181** -0.034
(0.085) (0.089) (0.082)
TOT Shock 5.775*** -4.205*** -1.570*
(0.823) (0.867) (0.813)
GOV Shock 217.606*** -432.371*** 214.765***
(49.919) (86.757) (40.569)
L2GDP 0.010 0.010 -0.019
(0.024) (0.016) (0.025)
High Inflation -0.006 -0.001 0.007
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Regime Durability -0.000 0.002*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 780 780 780
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.9: Estimated Marginal Effects on ERR choices, IMF
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Peg Intermediate Float
Region Regime (IMF) -0.210*** 0.135*** 0.075**
(0.041) (0.040) (0.032)
Developed -0.019 0.123*** -0.104***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.028)
Island -0.109*** 0.043 0.066***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.023)
Population -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade Openness 0.149*** 0.161*** -0.310***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.037)
Diversity 0.105*** -0.086*** -0.019
(0.020) (0.023) (0.020)
Area 0.000 -0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Monetary Independence -0.077 0.050 0.027
(0.062) (0.064) (0.053)
Capital Account Openness -0.346*** 0.119*** 0.227***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.033)
Int. Nominal Shock 0.041*** -0.026*** -0.016***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Nominal Shock 0.014 -0.011 -0.003
(0.021) (0.027) (0.019)
TOT Shock 0.048 1.531*** -1.579***
(0.412) (0.441) (0.513)
GOV Shock -17.985* -22.650* 40.635***
(10.576) (12.854) (6.322)
L2GDP 0.060*** -0.036* -0.025
(0.022) (0.019) (0.016)
High Inflation -0.011** 0.007** 0.004***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Regime Durability -0.000 -0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,723 1,723 1,723
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: OLS and ATE of LYS ERR on Underval
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator Mahalanobis Nearest (5) Nearest (1) Kernel Local Linear Radius
OLS -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.148***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
ATT -0.220*** -0.104** -0.121** -0.111** -0.111*** -0.146***
(0.024) (0.046) (0.059) (0.056) (0.045) (0.053)
Mean Bias Unmatched 47.57 47.57 47.57 47.57 47.57 47.57
Mean Bias Matched 26.04 18.71 18.36 18.35 18.36 11.92
Median Bias Unmatched 43.45 42.62 42.62 42.62 42.62 42.62
Median Bias Matched 19.97 12.26 14.61 12.10 14.61 9.37
Pseudo-R2 Unmatched 0.42 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.11
Pseudo-R2 Matched 0.053 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.019 0.022
Treated Observations (Off Support) 0 127 127 127 127 127
Observations 726 744 744 744 744 744
Boot-Strapped standard errors (100 replications) in parentheses for (1), (4), (5) and (6)
Abadie and Imbens (2008) standard errors for Nearest Neighbor
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
154
Table 2.11: OLS and ATT of IMF ERR on Underval
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator Mahalanobis Nearest (5) Nearest (1) Kernel Local Linear Radius
OLS -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
ATT -0.120*** -0.128*** -0.157*** -0.125 *** -0.126*** -0.104***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023)
Median Bias Unmatched 31.38 31.36 31.36 31.36 31.36 31.36
Median Bias Matched 8.27 6.06 7.04 5.13 7.04 7.92
Mean Bias Unmatched 31.71 31.69 31.69 31.69 31.69 31.69
Mean Bias Matched 6.81 5.18 5.67 4.08 5.67 6.95
Pseudo-R2 Unmatched 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Pseudo-R2 Matched 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02
Treated Observations (Off Support) 0 112 112 112 112 112
Observations 1618 1627 1627 1627 1627 1627
Boot-Strapped standard errors (100 replications) in parentheses for (1), (4), (5) and (6)
Abadie and Imbens (2008) standard errors for Nearest Neighbor
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.12: Rosembaum Bounds (RR)
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-
1 1.7e-12 1.7e-12 -.08316 -.08316 -.106396 -.059778
1.1 7.8e-16 1.2e-09 -.094935 -.071142 -.118452 -.048178
1.2 0 1.9e-07 -.105755 -.060378 -.129637 -.037669
1.3 0 .00001 -.115832 -.050779 -.139956 -.027978
1.4 0 .00022 -.12508 -.041931 -.149854 -.018644
1.5 0 .002382 -.133875 -.033766 -.159182 -.010354
1.6 0 .014688 -.142257 -.025984 -.16797 -.002574
1.7 0 .057578 -.149995 -.018513 -.17611 .004687
1.8 0 .156661 -.15743 -.011821 -.18402 .011479
1.9 0 .318264 -.164739 -.005422 -.19125 .017984
2 0 .514099 -.171419 .000461 -.198642 .024323
2.1 0 .697941 -.177614 .006151 -.205296 .030294
2.2 0 .836316 -.183956 .011423 -.211807 .036012
2.3 0 .92225 -.189667 .016587 -.217898 .041599
2.4 0 .96735 -.195386 .021516 -.223929 .046929
2.5 0 .987761 -.200708 .02631 -.229743 .051832
2.6 0 .995865 -.206079 .030997 -.235459 .056817
2.7 0 .998729 -.211151 .035406 -.24095 .061497
2.8 0 .999642 -.215754 .03965 -.246363 .066042
2.9 0 .999907 -.220491 .043957 -.251491 .070236
3 0 .999977 -.225036 .047786 -.256497 .074157
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Table 2.13: Rosembaum Bounds (LYS)
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-
1 0 0 -.163676 -.163676 -.191031 -.136879
1.1 0 0 -.176236 -.150877 -.204099 -.124361
1.2 0 0 -.18842 -.13957 -.215721 -.112413
1.3 0 0 -.199097 -.129178 -.226819 -.101515
1.4 0 4.8e-15 -.209055 -.11929 -.236704 -.091365
1.5 0 4.9e-13 -.218258 -.110022 -.24626 -.081841
1.6 0 2.5e-11 -.226877 -.101471 -.25489 -.073138
1.7 0 7.5e-10 -.234682 -.093566 -.263342 -.065053
1.8 0 1.4e-08 -.242252 -.085621 -.27184 -.057425
1.9 0 1.7e-07 -.249565 -.078712 -.279374 -.050335
2 0 1.5e-06 -.256192 -.071986 -.286778 -.043488
2.1 0 .00001 -.262742 -.065598 -.29369 -.037219
2.2 0 .000054 -.269462 -.059695 -.300293 -.031257
2.3 0 .000226 -.275447 -.054146 -.306578 -.025317
2.4 0 .000795 -.281104 -.048475 -.312589 -.01949
2.5 0 .002373 -.286805 -.04348 -.318219 -.013989
2.6 0 .006138 -.292086 -.038739 -.323633 -.008835
2.7 0 .013996 -.297295 -.033848 -.329081 -.003856
2.8 0 .02855 -.302091 -.02956 -.334369 .000934
2.9 0 .05276 -.306736 -.025181 -.339507 .005715
3 0 .089334 -.311271 -.020676 -.344426 .010175
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Table 2.14: Rosembaum Bounds (IMF)
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-
1 7.8e-16 7.8e-16 -.129485 -.129485 -.159409 -.100384
1.1 0 2.6e-13 -.140967 -.118187 -.171258 -.088564
1.2 0 3.0e-11 -.151411 -.107882 -.181969 -.077895
1.3 0 1.4e-09 -.16127 -.098533 -.192137 -.068004
1.4 0 3.6e-08 -.170385 -.08956 -.200867 -.058924
1.5 0 5.4e-07 -.178642 -.081189 -.208999 -.0503
1.6 0 5.3e-06 -.18653 -.07311 -.21672 -.041991
1.7 0 .000036 -.193791 -.066284 -.22427 -.034619
1.8 0 .000186 -.20028 -.059436 -.230777 -.028138
1.9 0 .000752 -.206267 -.052785 -.237653 -.021559
2 0 .002468 -.21231 -.046556 -.243834 -.014853
2.1 0 .006798 -.218189 -.04083 -.250088 -.009085
2.2 0 .016106 -.223414 -.035383 -.256168 -.003434
2.3 0 .033524 -.228414 -.030507 -.261584 .002131
2.4 0 .062392 -.2333 -.025592 -.266881 .007313
2.5 0 .105395 -.238101 -.021078 -.271667 .012579
2.6 0 .163689 -.242226 -.01635 -.276671 .017443
2.7 0 .236365 -.24721 -.012118 -.28168 .022277
2.8 0 .320454 -.251388 -.007824 -.286414 .027095
2.9 0 .411459 -.255661 -.003911 -.290827 .031759
3 0 .504209 -.259739 .000161 -.295296 .036274
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of ERRs, full sample
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of ERRs, regimes that last more than 5 years
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Propensity Scores, before and after matching
(RR)
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of Propensity Scores, On and Off Support Observa-
tions (RR)
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Figure 2.5: Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (I), RR
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Figure 2.6: Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (II), RR
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of Propensity Scores, before and after matching
(LYS)
0
1
2
3
4
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Treated Untreated
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Treated Untreated
Nearest 1
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Treated Untreated
Nearest 5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Treated Untreated
Kernel
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Treated Untreated
Local Linear
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Treated Untreated
Radius Caliper
165
Figure 2.8: Distribution of Propensity Scores, before and after matching
(IMF)
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Figure 2.9: Histogram of Propensity Scores, On and Off Support Observa-
tions (LYS)
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Figure 2.10: Histogram of Propensity Scores, On and Off Support Obser-
vations (IMF)
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Figure 2.11: Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (I), LYS
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Figure 2.12: Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (II), LYS
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Figure 2.13: Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (I), IMF
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Figure 2.14: Covariates Imbalances, before and after matching (II), IMF
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Figure 2.15: Placebo Testing (RR)
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Figure 2.16: Placebo Testing (LYS)
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Figure 2.17: Placebo Testing (IMF)
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CHAPTER 3
ASYMMETRIC MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE
POLICIES IN LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES USING
INFLATION TARGETING
3.1 Introduction
During the last decades several developed and non-developed countries adopted more
flexible exchange rate arrangements. More precisely, Inflation Targeting has become the
poster child of exchange rate regimes. That regime works as follows. The Central Bank
commits to deliver a low and stable rate of inflation, using as the main policy instrument
a short-term interest rate. In an open economy set-up, countries on Inflation Targeting
keep a relatively open capital account. The usual prescription is that they should refrain
from intervening in the foreign exchange market and let the exchange rate float as freely as
possible.
In practice this is hardly the case. As monetary policy is used to target inflation (and
possibly the output-gap), changes in the interest rate may create large swings in exchange
rates, well beyond what most Central Banks are willing to tolerate. In fact the theory does
not necessary precludes sales and purchases of foreign assets by authorities (as well as other
types of interventions), as long as they reflect attempts to cushion temporary shocks or other
exchange rate movements not justified by economic fundamentals.
The largest Latin-American countries have adopted the framework, including Brazil
(1999), Chile (1991), Colombia (1999), Mexico (2002), and Peru (2003). These countries
are the perfect specimens to analyze how Inflation Targeting works on a set-up subject to
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a myriad of external nominal and real shocks. Although their exchange rate regimes are
de facto much more flexible than in the past, their Central Banks intervened heavily in the
foreign exchange market to cushion large movements in exchange rates (Chang, 2008).
There are good reasons to believe that this type of intervention was not implemented
during episodes of appreciation and depreciation with the same intensity. Authors such as
Barbosa-Filho (2015) and Ros (2015) have argued that the Central Banks of Brazil and
Mexico have conducted an “asymmetric policy”, tightening the stance of monetary policy
too much when inflation accelerates, and softening it too little when inflation falls. Because
the capital account of the balance of payments was extremely open, the required changes
in the interest rate may have triggered movements in the exchange rate with a bias in the
downward direction.1 On the other hand, intervention in the foreign exchange market via
sales of dollars (when exchange rate depreciates) may have been more pronounced than
purchases of dollars (when the exchange rate appreciates).
This paper analyzes the nature of monetary and exchange rate policy in Latin-American
Inflation Targeting countries. Using non-linear econometric techniques, I test whether the
Central Banks from these countries were more willing to tolerate appreciations than depreci-
ation, for the period 1999-2015. The purpose of my econometric estimation is to test for the
presence of asymmetries in the evolution of the exchange rate. But because exchange rate
may behave asymmetrically for reasons other than policy, I also estimate a set of Central
Bank reaction functions for interest rates and reserve accumulation, to determine the impact
of monetary and exchange rate policy on the observed exchange rate behavior.
A brief summary of my results is as follows: there are some signs that the Central Banks
from Latin-America dislike depreciations more than appreciations, with the exception of
1In this paper I stick to the following convention: the exchange rate is defined as the number of units
of domestic currency per unit of dollars, so a reduction in the exchange rate is an appreciation, while an
increase is a depreciation.
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Chile. Moreover, this behavior seems to be more pronounced for the cases discussed by
Barbosa-Filho and Ros, Brazil and Mexico.
This paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, section 3.2 comments on the
related literature. Section 3.3 describes the econometric techniques and presents the results.
Finally, section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
The recent thinking in macroeconomics have converged on a sort of synthesis, known
as the “New Consensus Macroeconomics”. This consensus agrees on the desirability of an
autonomous monetary policy, and how to conduct it. The interest rate has replaced monetary
aggregates on the monetary policy rules. It has been shown that a fully microfounded model
based on a representative and forward looking agent framework is able to determine the
equilibrium without any reference to the quantity of money, provided that the interest rate
rule is sufficiently sensitive to changes in the rate of inflation.
This is known as the “Taylor-Principle”, and it is embodied in the famous “Taylor-Rule”.2
Intuitively, the principle says that the rate of interest should be increased by more than
inflation when inflation increase above the inflation target, to avoid a feedback from higher
inflation to lower real interest rates, and from lower real interest rates to more aggregate
demand and higher inflation. Conversely, when inflation falls below the target, the interest
rate should be reduced by more than inflation.
When the “Taylor-Principle” is satisfied, the equilibrium is “determined”, so inflationary
expectations are “anchored” by the inflation target.3 It is believed, In the context of Dynamic
2Both are due to John Taylor (see Taylor, 1993).
3Equilibrium Determinancy in models with forward looking behavior means that the number of positive
roots is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables, so the system can be placed into the equilibrium
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Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, that if there are no real frictions, stabilizing
inflation implies the stabilization of the output-gap, and thus Inflation Targeting seems to be
a cost free approach to control inflation. This very convenient feature is called the “Divine
Coincidence”, following the terminology of Blanchard and Gali (2007). Due to the popularity
of the DSGE approach, it is not surprising that Inflation Targeting has emerged as the most
popular macroeconomic regime.4
Although the record of Inflation Targeting in terms of inflation reduction (at no noticeable
output cost) seems to be quite remarkable in some countries, there is some debate on whether
the observed disinflation is due to the adoption of Inflation Targeting per see, or due to other
global factors, for instance the emergence of China as a provider of cheap manufacturing
goods. For example Ball and Sheridan (2003) suggest that “Inflation Targeting does not
matter”: dis-inflation has happened almost everywhere, not only in countries that adopted
Inflation Targeting.
On the other hand, the reduction in the rates of inflation was not translated into fast
output growth and employment opportunities in several non-developed economies (see for
instance the volume edited by Epstein and Yeldan, 2009). It may not be correct to argue
that Inflation Targeting per se is responsible for a disappointing macroeconomic performance.
Rather, this seems to be the result of a set of policies mainly concerned with keeping inflation
in single and lower digits, with little emphasis on the promotion of growth and development.
Perhaps an important but often neglected aspect of the debate on Inflation Targeting is
related on how it is implemented in an open economy. Very often is implicitly assumed that
the open economy set-up should work as if the economy were closed. The core propositions
trajectory. For monetary policy models, when the “Taylor-Principle” is not satisfied, the number of positive
roots is larger than the number of non-predetermined variables.
4See Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) for a more precise description of Inflation Targeting.
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presumably apply in an open economy as well (i.e, interest rate should response to inflation
shocks aggressively, etc.), but there are additional complications associated with additional
monetary and real shocks from the rest of the world. Unsurprisingly, the effects of exchange
rate fluctuations, and the scope of Central Bank interventions in the foreign exchange market
are subject to intense controversies.
It is often claimed that Inflation Targeting requires a fully flexible exchange rate, but
some authors believe that there is a role for Central Bank intervention (see Ball, 1999, for a
discussion). In practice, for a small open economy there is no really such a thing as a fully
flexible exchange rate regime. To let the exchange rate to be determined entirely by market
forces is a luxury around the world, especially in non-developed economies. Central Bank
often intervene to avoid large fluctuations of the exchange rate, and despite being banned
from the policy debate, capital controls have not totally disappeared yet.5
Then, how does Inflation Targeting works in an open economy? Is a less than fully flexi-
ble exchange rate regime incompatible with Inflation Targeting? Although in non-developed
countries the exchange rate regimes are much more flexible than in the past, there is sub-
stantial evidence that the Central Banks intervened heavily to cushion large movements in
the exchange rates.6 There are good reasons to believe that this type of intervention is not
implemented during episodes of appreciations and depreciations with the same intensity. As
discussed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), when the financial system is highly dollarized, the
Central Bank may fear that currency depreciations will trigger bank failures.7 This behavior
is often called “fear of floating”. On the other hand, when competitiveness of the tradable
5See for example the new data set on capital controls by Fernandez et. al. (2015). Also see Chang (2008)
and Ce´spedes et. al. (2014), for an analysis that shows how in Latin-American countries using Inflation
Targeting, the Central Banks intervened heavily to control exchange rate fluctuations.
6See for example Chang (2008) for the Latin-American case.
7It is also possible that Central Banks fear the effects of depreciations on inflation, although the exchange
rate pass-through have recently declined by non-trivial amounts.
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sector is an issue, or when the policy makers want to build a “war chest” of foreign exchange
reserves, the Central Bank may intervene to prevent currency appreciations, a phenomena
known as “fear of floating in reverse”, and illustrated by the recent East-Asian experience
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007).
Some observers of the Latin-American cases argued that Inflation Targeting have intro-
duced a bias in evolution of the exchange rate because the Central Banks react strongly to
control depreciations, but more timid to fight appreciations (Barbosa-Filho, 2015, and Ros,
2015.8 Unlike East-Asian countries that used interventions in the foreign exchange mar-
ket to prevent appreciations (Pontines and Rajan, 2001, and Pontines and Siregar, 2012),
Latin-American countries seem to intervene mainly in the opposite direction.
Also according to the observers of the Latin-American experience (Barbosa-Filho and
Ros), it seems to be the case that Inflation Targeting is responsible for a persistent appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate. Whether this process was permanent or temporary is not
fully spelled out, although these authors seem to suggest that the appreciation was long-
lasting. I personally do not find the argument that the effects of Inflation Targeting on the
real exchange rate are permanent very convincing, and in fact the most recent experience
illustrates how that regime can also accommodate large real depreciations.
8“There is a fundamental asymmetry in the way macroeconomic policy deals with changes in the exchange
rate in developing economies, especially in Latin America. Because appreciations are deflationary and
depreciations are inflationary in the short run, any democratic government tends to tolerate appreciations
but fight depreciations of their currencies. In fact, the adjusting period of the economy after a depreciation
of its domestic currency may be longer than the mandate of elected officials, and this creates an asymmetric
response of democratic governments to changes in the real exchange rate,” (Barbosa-Filho, 2015). “To the
extent that the Central Bank reacts only to changes in the inflation rate it becomes very tempting for
the monetary authority to subordinate the exchange rate to its inflation objectives or to respond in an
asymmetrical way to appreciations and depreciations. There is then as a consequence a ‘fear to depreciate’,
more than a ‘fear of floating’. This tends to make monetary policy pro-cyclical in the fact of external shocks.
For example, in the face of a negative export demand shock, which tends to lower economic activity, the
monetary authority tends to moderate the pressure towards depreciation through an increase in interest
rates which aggravates the recession”, (Ros, 2015).
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However, even if Inflation Targeting does not have an effect on the long-run level of the
real exchange rate, this does not mean that an asymmetric policy do no have important
implications. The rate of devaluation can be bounded, and thus certain shocks may not a
produce a convenient re-allocation of resources. Furthermore, the distribution of the possible
levels for the real exchange rate may become bounded. Consider the following example.
Imagine that the real exchange rate index has a mean of 1. Assume that the real exchange
rate remains constant in the long-run, but it can increase to 1.5, and decrease to 0.5, due
to shocks if the Central Banks refrains from intervening in the foreign exchange market.
Certainly, the real exchange rate may not fall below 0.5, but the Central Bank may also
want avoid increases above 1.2.
Thus, an asymmetric monetary or exchange rate policy may not have an effect on the
level of the long-run real exchange rate, but it may affect it short-run behavior or other
moments of its distribution, like the variance of the skewness, and it can constraint the limit
the adaptation of sectorial production and consumption to different shocks. Moreover, even
if the long-run real exchange rate does not change (it remains 1 as in our example), an
asymmetric policy may imply that the real exchange is more appreciated on average during
a given span of time. If the tradable sector holds debt, then the unfavorable shocks increase
its financial fragility, while the favorable shocks are not enough to compensate for the bad
times. Thus, the tradable sector is hurt, in the sense that a different monetary and exchange
rate policy will provide a higher relative price of tradable goods “on average”.
The presence of asymmetries on monetary policy rules have been tested. Authors such
as Barros-Campello et. al. (2016) have estimated asymmetric monetary policy rules using
GMM for the European case. They find that the European Central Bank monetary policy
is more sensible to changes in the output-gap when output is below the trend than when
output is above. The authors also argue that their findings are not consistent with other
explanations, such as non-linearities in the Phillips curve. Surico (2003, 2007) obtains similar
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results, and Dolado et. al. (2005) also find that the European Central Bank conducts an
asymmetric policy, but with respect to changes in inflation and not with respect to changes
in output.
The leitmotiv of this paper is the potentially existence of this type bias, but in the Latin-
American context, and with more emphasis on exchange rate behavior. The next sections
will analyze the behavior of the exchange rate in the main Latin-American countries using
Inflation Targeting during the last 15 years.9 The main questions are the following: are
authors such as Barbosa-Filho (2015) and Ros (2015) correct? Are monetary and exchange
rate policies in Brazil and Mexico (or in general in Latin-American countries using Inflation
Targeting) asymmetric?
To tackle the questions, I follow Pontines and Sireger (2012) approach and I estimate
a Panel Smooth Transition Autoregressive Model with three regimes (and two transition
thresholds), and a Markov Switching model. These two models will estimate the upper
and the lower bound of an exchange rate band, and the transition probabilities for differ-
ent “regimes” (appreciations and depreciations), respectively, for the rate of change of the
exchange rate. This is a simple way to test whether monetary and exchange rate policy
in Latin-American countries using Inflation Targeting was in fact asymmetric, and whether
there is “fear of floating” or “fear of depreciation” (or neither of both). As far as I know,
this paper is the first to apply the models used by Pontines and Sireger (2012) to analyze
East Asian cases, to the Latin-American countries.
In my view, Pontines and Sireger (2012) do not correctly identify the origin of the observed
exchange rate behavior, and because it is possible that the exchange rate moves more in one
direction due to factors other than monetary and exchange rate policy. Hence, I extend
9The largest countries from the region have adopted Inflation Targeting, including Brazil (1999), Chile
(1991), Colombia (1999), Mexico (2002) and Peru (2003).
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their approach by also estimating a set of reaction function for the reference interest rate
and reserve accumulation, to analyze the role of Central Bank policies in shaping the observed
exchange rate dynamics.
3.3 Exchange rate trends and empirical approach
Before presenting the empirical strategy, it is interesting to take a look at the evolution of
one variable of interest: the nominal exchange rate. In the recent Latin-American experience,
the Central Bank intervention in the foreign exchange market was widespread, as shown for
example by Chang (2008). Precisely because the Central Bank can intervene to moderate
exchange rate fluctuations, it is interesting to capture the overall pressures on the exchange
rate excluding the effect of the sales and purchases of foreign assets due to policy reasons.
This requires to remove the effect of the intervention somehow.
A popular method is to also look at the evolution of foreign exchange reserves and the
interest rate to create an index of exchange rate pressure. One example is the Exchange
Market Pressure Index (EMP), as proposed by Kaminsky et. al. (1998) and Reinhart and
Kaminsky (1999). The EMP is calculated as follows:
EMPi,t =
∆xri,t
xri,t
− σe
σr
∆reservesi,t
reservesi,t
+
σe
σInt
∆ratei,t (3.1)
Where EMPi,t is the Exchange Market Pressure Index,
10 xri,t is the exchange rate (units of
domestic currency per dollar), reservesi,t are gross foreign reserves, ratei,t is the domestic
short-term reference rate. The variables σxr, σr, and σInt are the standard deviations of the
rate of devaluation
∆ei,t
ei,t
, the rate of growth of foreign reserves
∆reservesi,t
reservesi,t
, and the change in
the domestic rate ∆ratei,t.
10The subscripts represent country i in period t. I use 24 month rolling averages for the standard deviations.
The data frequency is monthly.
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Because the Central Bank can deal with them in different ways (i.e., for instance buying
or selling reserves, or changing the interest rate), just looking at the evolution of the nominal
exchange rate is not enough. For example, it is perfectly possible to observe no change in
the exchange rate, despite the fact that the Central Bank is increasing the interest rate very
aggressively (or selling reserves) to combat pressures towards devaluation. The idea of the
EMP index is to capture all the pressures on the exchange rate.
The graphs included in figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 show the EMP index for Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru during the 15 years spanning the period 2000-2015. They
also display the natural log of the exchange rate (“ln of xr”), so the slope of the line captures
the rate of devaluation. The figures clearly show that Latin-American Inflation Targeteres
experienced significant pressures towards appreciation, but also important pressures towards
depreciation. There general trend was appreciation, and that was only reverted recently by
abrupt depreciations, but it is also evident that other factors, such as reserve accumulation,
played a role by reverting exchange rate pressures, both upwards and downwards. For
example, consider the figure 3.3 during 2012-2015. Most of the time Colombia experienced
pressures towards appreciation, but it is evident from the picture that the exchange rate did
not appreciate a lot, at it never cross the lower bound of 7.5 (remember the variable is the
natural log of exchange rate).
As shown by Ponties and Sireger (2012), in East Asian countries using, “fear of appre-
ciation” was the rule. Under pressures towards nominal appreciation, the Central Banks
intervened more heavily when the exchange rate appreciated than when the exchange rate
depreciated. Does this result holds for Latin-American countries as well? Or did the Central
Banks intervened mainly in the opposite direction, as argued by Barbosa-Filho and Ros?
In the next subsections I follow the approach of Pontines and Sireger, and I estimate a
set of logistic smooth transition auto-regressive models (also known as LSTAR models) and
a set of Markov-Switching models, to find out whether exchange rate behavior displayed
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any sings of asymmetry. Then I expand the results by asking whether Central Bank was
responsible for the observed developments, using a set of GMM type reaction functions for
monetary policy and reserve accumulation.
The sample (for the non-linear models) spans the period 1999-2015, for Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, the larger Inflation-Targeting countries in Latin-America. But
unlike Pontines and Siregar (2012), who use monthly and weekly data for nominal exchange
rates, I use daily data instead.11
3.3.1 LSTAR-2 and Markov-Switching Models
A natural approach to test if Latin-American central banks intervention was biased in one
particular direction is to follow the methodology proposed by Pontines and Siregar (2012).
They implement a set of LSTAR and Markov-Switching model for the nominal exchange
rate in East Asian Inflation Targeteres. As far as I know, mine is the first attempt to use the
same non-linear econometric models for the Latin-American case. I am certainly not aware
of any similar attempt.
The advantage of the procedure suggested by Pontines and Siregar (2012) is that it
provides as an output a precise size for both the lower and upper bound for the rate of
change of the nominal exchange rate. In other words, a de facto exchange rate band is
estimated.
11The data comes from the national Central Banks. Lower frequency data is often the result of the
estimation of an average (monthly or yearly), so the lower frequency presumably the better, as the figures
are subject to less manipulation, and additional information (i.e., more observations) increase the precision
of the estimation.
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More precisely, Pontines and Siregar (2012) implemented a LSTAR model to test for the
presence of asymmetric bands for intervention in East Asian countries.12 The basic model
has the following form:
∆ln(xrt) = α0 +
p∑
i=1
αi[∆ln(xrt−i)] + {β0 +
p∑
i=1
βi[∆ln(xrt−i)]}F [(∆ln(xrt−d)] + t (3.2)
The variable of the interest is the log of the nominal exchange rate ln(xrt). In the equation
(3.2), α0 is the intercept, αi (with i = 1, ..., p), stands for the autoregressive parameters, β0
is the nonlinear intercept term, βi (with i = 1, ..., p) represents the nonlinear auto-regressive
parameters, and F is the transition function which characterizes the smooth transition dy-
namics between two regimes. The function F depends on the lagged term of the first dif-
ference of the log of the nominal exchange rate, ∆ln(xrt−i), where d is the delay lag length.
Finally t is a white noise with zero mean and constant variance.
The F function may adopt different forms. A natural starting point is the two-regime
LSTAR-1 model with the following general logistic transition function, which takes values
in the interval between zero and one:
F =
1
1 + e−{γ[ln(xrt−d)−c)]}
(3.3)
Where γ > 0 is the slope parameter (which measures the speed of transition between
regimes), c is the threshold parameter (which indicates the location of the transition) and
ln(xrt−d) is the transition variable with the associated delay parameter d. As in Pontines and
Siregar’s paper, ln(xrt−d) represents the lagged change in the natural of log of the exchange
rate. Notice that if γ approaches zero the model is linear, while if γ approaches infinity the
12See Terasvirta and Anderson (1992) and van Dijk et. al. (2002), for a discussion of the more general
family of smooth transition autoregressive models.
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model becomes a two regime model. In the intermediate case, the transition between the
two regimes is “smooth” (hence the name of the model). The farther away the system is
outside the band, the strong the effect of the non-linear part of the model. And the larger
is γ, the larger the difference between regimes.
It turns out that a variant of the LSTAR-1 model is well-suited to test whether the
Central Banks exhibits aversion to appreciations or depreciations. In particular, one can
resort to the LSTAR-2 model suggested in Terasvirta (1998):
F =
1
1 + e−{γ[ln(xrt−d)−cL][ln(xrt−d)−cH ]}
(3.4)
The main difference is that LSTAR-2 includes two transition parameters cL, and cH , for
the lower and upper threshold. These threshold parameters capture the switching points
between regimes, and hence their absolute size measure the relative tolerance of monetary
authorities to exchange rate variations, as they capture they rates of change of the exchange
rate at witch there is a change in the exchange rate behavior. Using equation 3.4 I can
estimate a de facto exchange rate band.
Pontines and Siregar (2012) find that |cL| < |cH | so East Asian central banks have an
aversion to appreciations. This means that for East Asian countries, the authorities tolerated
larger depreciations than appreciations. For example, if the upper bound is 6% and the lower
bound is −2%, this means that there is a regime switch when the exchange rate moves up
by 6% or down by 2%, triggering a reaction by the central bank which tends to move the
exchange rate in the opposite direction (or at least to keep it constant).
Notice that the way the model is specified does not constraint the level of the nominal
exchange rate. The exchange rate may appreciate by more in countries where |cL| < |cH |
than in countries where |cL| > |cH |. For example the nominal exchange rate may appreciate
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by 1% on a more or less permanent basis on a country with cL = −2% and cL = 2%, and it
may depreciate by 0.5% on a more or less daily basis if cL = −3% and cL = 1%.13
Pontines and Siregar supplement their finding using a Markov-Switching model, to test
whether the exchange rates were more likely to remain in the “upper” regime (given that
they were already there) than to remain in the “lower” regime (also given that they were
already there). These regimes can represent depreciations and appreciations, respectively.14
The Markov-Switching model has the following form:
∆ln(xrt) = α0(s) +
p∑
i=1
αi(s)[∆ln(xrt−i)] + t(s) (3.5)
It is assumed that the regime variable s follows an irreducible ergodic two-regime Markov
process with the following transition matrix P:
P =
p11 p12
p21 p22
(3.6)
Where the terms p denote the transitions probabilities. Thus, p11 is the probability that the
rate of change of the exchange rate remains in the regime 1, given that the exchange rate was
in regime 1 in the previous period, while p12 is the that the rate of change of the exchange
rate will move to the regime 2, given that it was in regime 1 in the previous period, and so
on.
Although Pontines and Siregar argue that their models capture mainly the motivations
of the Central Banks in East Asia, it is possible that the observed behavior of the exchange
13Keep in mind that the data shows persistent trends in the nominal (and also the real) exchange rates.
See the evolution of the (natural log of) the nominal exchange rates in figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
14But that may not be the case. It is possible that the upper regime represents “depreciation” and the
lower regime “less depreciation”. However, most of the time in the five Latin-American cases the results
from the Markov-Switching model suggest a mean rate of change that does not fit this problematic scheme.
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rate is due to something else. Nevertheless, the estimations of the de facto bands and the
average duration of each regime provide important information regarding the nature of the
pressures that each Central Bank face. On the section 3.3.3 I deal with the problem.
3.3.2 Empirical Results
Now I am ready to implement the LSTAR-2 and the Markov Switching models discussed
previously. The first step is to select the lag length for the models. I inspect the Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), although I choose
the model with the lowest AIC value. As argued by Teravista (1998), using the BIC (which
penalizes large models) often results in residuals with poor properties (i.e., serial correlation
may remain in the residuals) and on the incorrect acceptance of the non-linear model (if
a non-linearity test is implemented), among other problems. The AIC suggest that large
auto-regressive models, between 7 and 19 lags, are preferred. More precisely, the criteria
suggest to adopt an AR(16) for Brazil, an AR(7) for Chile, an AR(15) for Colombia, an
AR(17) for Mexico, and an AR(19) for Peru. They may seem too large, but a large model
is better than a bad model.
To determine the correct model from the STAR family, a non-linearity test could be
implemented.15 Alternatively, and following the literature, a particular model is implemented
and later validated by the data (see Teravista 1998). I follow this approach here, and I adopt
15Testing non-linearity requires taking a second order approximation around γ = 0 (that is, assuming a
linear model) to estimate the following equation:
∆ln(xrt) = α
∗
0 +
p∑
i=1
α∗i [∆ln(xrt−i)] +
X∑
i=1
p∑
i=1
β∗i [∆ln(xrt−i)∆ln(xrt−d)
X ] + t (3.7)
Where X = 2, 3, 4. In a nutshell, I should estimate an auto-regressive model of order p, with interaction
terms that multiply each lag by the lag d (the lag decay length), by d2, d3, and d4. Linearity requires to
accept the null that all the interaction terms are statistically not different from zero. An LSTAR model is
chosen if we can reject the null that the terms multiplied by d3, and d4 are not statistically significant, and
that d and d2 are statistically significant. Finally, if I jointly reject the null that all the interaction terms
are significantly different from zero, I should specify an LSTAR-2.
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a three regime logistic model (an LSTAR-2) because it fits my needs better, by allowing me
to estimate a system of de facto exchange rate bands.16 To chose the lag-decay length, I
pick the one that fits the data better. Thus, I choose different values for d, from 1 to 12, I
estimate the full set of models, and I pick the model with the largest F value.
Table 3.2 shows a summary of the result of the estimation of the LSTAR-2 models. I
skip most of the autoregressive coefficients, but they are available on the tables 3.4 and 3.5.
All the residuals pass the Portmanteau test for white noise (using 4, 8, and 12 lags) except
for Mexico. For that country the residuals do not pass the heteroscedasticity test, but the
estimations use robust standard errors to correct this. Table 3.2 also presents the ratio of
variance of the residuals of the LSTAR-2 models to the variance of the residuals of the linear
models. In all cases the residual variances are lower for the non-linear model, suggesting
that using the non-linear model is a good idea.
We can verify that for most countries, the upper threshold is larger in absolute value
than the lower threshold, except for the case of Peru. However, for Chile and Colombia the
difference is very small, while for Brazil and Mexico the difference is large. While for the case
of Brazil the upper threshold is 1.75%, for the lower threshold the number is -3.81% (see the
column “Brazil”), and for the Mexican case the figures are 1.84% and -2.27%, respectively
(see the column “Mexico”). Notice that these are daily rates of changes, so even the smaller
numbers are very important figures.17
As a general rule, all the thresholds are statistically significant, except for the upper
threshold in the estimation for Mexico. In the worst case scenario, this suggest that Mexican
rate of change of the exchange rate is not clearly bounded from below. It is interesting to
16Results from the non-linearity test suggest that the LSTAR-2 model should be preferred for Brazil, Chile
and Colombia, but not necessarily for Mexico and Peru (see table 3.1).
17For example, a 1% daily rate of devaluation, considering 250 trading days a year (just to pick a reasonable
number) implies an annual rate of increase of the exchange rate of about 1, 200%!
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notice that the speed of adjustment are very large for Chile and Colombia, suggesting an
abrupt transition from the regimes outside the bands to the regime inside them. In the case
of Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, the transition is much more smooth (see the rows “Speed of
Adjustment”). Thus, the exchange rate seems to revert to the central part of the band faster
in Chile and Colombia than in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru.
Table 3.3 shows a summary of result from the estimation of the Markov-Switching models.
The full list of coefficient is reported on tables 3.6 and 3.7. Once again, except for the case
Mexico, all the residuals pass the Portmanteau test for white noise (using 4, 8, and 12 lags),
although they are heteroscedastic. But once again, the inclusion of robust standard errors
come to the rescue.
Our main interest lies in the transition probabilities. The rows “Transition PB” on the
table 3.3 displays the probabilities that there is a change in the regime. Both the lower and
the upper regime are very persistent, but as a general rule, the lower regime is much more
persistent, perhaps with the sole exception of Peru.
It is easier to understand what is going on if we take a look at the number of periods
(in our case, days) that are associated with each transition probability. These figures are
displayed in the rows “Expected Duration” (also from table 3.3). Notice that Brazil, Chile
and Mexico display appreciations that last for very long periods of time (37, 33, and 64 days).
Comparing this number with the duration of depreciations, we can verify that appreciation
last more than three times more than depreciations (for Brazil and Chile), and more than
six times for Mexico. For Colombia, while appreciation last longer than depreciations, the
number is lower (22 days vs. 10 days). For Peru, appreciations last only 8-9 days, versus
6 days for depreciations. It is also worth to notice that for all the countries, for the upper
regime, the variance of the rate of change of the exchange rate is about 3-4 times larger than
for the lower regime, suggesting that appreciations represent a less turbulent scenario than
depreciations.
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To summarize, combining the results from the LSTAR-2 and the Markov Switching mod-
els, I find evidence that that exchange rate behaves asymmetrically mainly in Brazil and Mex-
ico. For these cases, the lower threshold is larger in absolute value than the upper threshold.
Moreover, the transition between regimes seems to be smoother than in Chile and Colombia
(but not than in Peru). Notice this suggest that Brazil and Mexico are different than the
other three countries, as suggested by the literature. As a general rule, appreciations seem to
last longer than depreciation, and they are also less volatile. For Brazil, Chile, and Mexico,
appreciations last at least three times as much as depreciation (but keep in mind that in
Chile the exchange rate band looks symmetric and that transition between regimes seems to
be less smooth).
3.3.3 GMM Reaction Functions
The previous sub-section shows that there is some evidence of asymmetric behavior of
the exchange rate, at least for Brazil and Mexico, and that appreciations last longer than
depreciations, perhaps with the exception of Peru where they last more or less the same.
Are monetary or exchange rate policies to be blamed? Or to put the question differently:
did the Central Banks deliberately behave in way such that the observed behavior of the
exchange rate should be attributed to interest rate targeting or foreign exchange reserves
accumulation? Although an answer that accounts for all the observed changes in exchange
rates is beyond the scope of the present study, I can analyze if interest rate targeting and
reserve accumulation show some sensitivity with respect to exchange rate changes. This is a
simply way to test whether market forces or policies account for the findings of section 3.3.2.
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This section estimates a set of reaction functions for Latin-American countries using
Inflation Targeting, considering changes in the target interest rate and on the stock of gross
foreign exchange reserves.18
I estimate a set of reaction functions using GMM because of the potential correlation
between the error term and the independent variables. Instrument variables for GMM are
selected from the observable information sets for the Central Bank. The instruments are the
lags, from 2 to 12, of all the dependent variables, plus the natural log of the Federal Funds
interest rate. The Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
covariance matrix is used to eliminate the serial correlation in the error term. More precisely,
I estimate the following two equations:
∆ln(ratet) = β0 + β1∆pit−1 + β2(Yt−1 − Y¯t−1) + β3∆ln(xrt−1) + ut (3.8)
∆ln(reservest) = β0 + β1∆pit−1 + β2(Yt−1 − Y¯t−1) + β3∆ln(xrt−1) + ut (3.9)
Where ∆pit−1 is the increase in the rate of inflation, (Yt−1 − Y¯t−1) is the output gap, and
∆ln(xrt−1) is the rate of devaluation.19 The ut is the error term. All the variables are lagged
one period.20 Equations 3.8 and 3.9 are the kind of Taylor rules (augmented by the inclu-
sion of the exchange rate changes) that the Central Bank supposedly follow under Inflation
Targeting. Because they differ from usual Taylor-Rules, they deserve some comments. The
18Due to data limitations, the samples do not always coincide, and I use monthly data. Our sample
includes, Brazil (April of 2000-July of 2015), Chile (January of 1999-January of 2014), Colombia (January
of 1999-October of 2005), Mexico (February of 2009-July of 2015), and Peru (October of 2004-May of 2014).
19The output gap is defined as the deviation of monthly output from the HP trend, the inflation-gap is
the difference between the annualized rate of CPI inflation and the target, and the reserves are the gross
reserves. The interest rates are the central bank short-term interest rate (that explain why the sample is
usually shorter for Mexico and Peru, which did not target an interest rate until 2002/2003). All the “rates”
are defined as percentage points. Thus, a 5% inflation rate is 5, not 0,05. A 1% interest rate is not 0,01 (nor
1,01), but 1.
20The results hold if I use contemporaneous values and I add the first lag to the set of instruments.
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inclusion of the change of interest rates as the dependent variable seems reasonable because
the lagged interest rate is highly significant and close to one, and the result will not be
affected due to this choice. It is possible to estimate a similar equation with the level of the
(log) of the interest rate and the lagged (log) of the interest rate on the right hand side, but
I also decide not to estimate such equation because doing so makes the comparison between
equations (3.8) and (3.9) less appealing and it hardly affects the results.
Notice that the inclusion of the change in the rate of inflation, rather than deviations
from the target, may seem strange. Because the definition of “deviation from the target”
is not clear, I resort to this simple procedure.21 The Appendix B presents results using the
month-by-month deviation from the target (using the mean of the target). These additional
estimation show that the gist of the results will not change by the inclusion of alternative
definitions of the inflation-gap.
Finally, it may worth to consider that policy makers may react to changes in exchange
rates by imposing capital controls, so our equations (3.8) and (3.9) may not capture the
entire story. Implementing a similar equation with a measure of capital controls (or capital
account openness) as the dependent variable is not plausible due to data limitations (most
data set have yearly frequency), and the account of the most recent experience of Latin-
American Inflation Targeting countries suggest that capital controls were not the main tool
(see Chang, 2008). The five countries analyzed in this paper never departed from the “rules
of the game” (keep the capital account relatively open, intervene occasionally in the for-
eign exchange market, and so on), with exceptions. In particular Brazil during the period
2002-2003 resorted to drastic measures, such as increasing the upper bound for the Infla-
21For example, should I use the deviation of the annualized rate of inflation from the annual target, the
deviation of the accumulated inflation in the year from a target, or the deviation of the monthly inflation
from a monthly target? For the target inflation, and considering that most Central Banks use a band for
the target rather than a single number, should I consider the mean, the upper bound, or the lower bound?
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tion Targeting when facing large exchange rate depreciation that triggered an acceleration
of inflation. Even before and during the Presidency of the “left-wing” Lula da Silva capi-
tal controls were softened.22 Thus, capital account regulation was not the main tool used
to combat exchange rate pressures, and the experience suggest a long-run trend towards
deregulation (at least until 2009-2010), but very little day-to-day adjustments.
The first set of results analyze the data as if monetary and exchange rate policies were
symmetric. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show the results for interest rates and reserves under the
assumption of symmetry. Notice that all the model pass the Hansen’s misspecification test.23
The main interest lies in the coefficient associated with the rate of devaluation, β3. Notice
that they are only significant for the reserve accumulation equations, except for the case of
Chile, where β3 is not significantly different from zero in both cases. Moreover, the signs are
negative, suggesting that when the exchange rate depreciates, reserves fall, while when the
exchange rate appreciates, reserves increase.
To check for the presence of asymmetries more explicitly, I re-estimate the reaction
function introducing a different variable for appreciations and depreciations. Now I estimate:
∆ln(ratet) = β0 + β1∆pit−1 + β2(Yt−1 − Y¯t−1) + β3APPt−1 + β4DEPt−1 + ut (3.10)
∆ln(reservest) = β0 + β1∆pit−1 + β2(Yt−1 − Y¯t−1) + β3APPt−1 + β4DEPt−1 + ut (3.11)
The most interesting variables are APPt−1 and DEPt−1. They represent variables that are
equal to one when the exchange rate appreciates and zero otherwise, and equal to one when
the exchange rate depreciates and zero otherwise, respectively (notice they are not dummy
22The presidential campaign of Lula was precisely the source of uncertainty that triggered capital outflows
during the period 2002-2003.
23That means that I cannot reject the null that the models are correctly specified.
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variables). The rest of the variables are defined as before. If monetary or exchange rate
policy are asymmetric, then I should find that β3 = 0 and β4 < 0, or at least that |β3| < |β4|.
The tables 3.10 and 3.11 contain the results. Once again, all the models pass the Hansen’s
misspecification test. Consider the interest rate reaction function. We can see in table 3.10
that except for Brazil and Mexico, exchange rate movements are not significant. For Mexico,
the coefficients are significant, but the signs are wrong (appreciations trigger an increase in
the interest rate, while depreciations trigger a decrease), and for Brazil only depreciations
affect interest rates. This suggest that interest rates do not usually react to exchange rate
changes. This is not surprising at all: the interest rates used to conduct monetary policy are
hardly changed as a much as the exchange rate, and one should not expect a Central Bank
that targets inflation to worry about all exchange rate changes.
Consider now the behavior of reserves in table 3.11. We can find a very different picture
here. The constant term is highly significant and positive, consistent with the large accumu-
lation of foreign exchange reserves. More important for my purposes, we can also see that
depreciations seems to reduce reserve accumulation, and the results are significant except
for Chile. In other words, when the exchange rate goes up, the Central Bank losses reserves.
This is interesting because it suggest that the symmetric exchange rate band observed in
section 3.3.2 is not necessarily related to Central Bank policies (including both reserve ac-
cumulation and interest rate management) in all the countries. At least Chile seems to be
an exceptional case.24
24Perhaps the large Economic and Stabilization Fund is responsible for the observed exchange rate behav-
ior. But according to the official statement the Fund has no explicit role in the foreign exchange market:
“The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF) was established on March 6th, 2007 with an initial
contribution of US$ 2.58 billion, much of which (US$ 2.56 billion) was derived from the old Copper Stabiliza-
tion Fund, which was replaced by the ESSF. The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund allows financing
of fiscal deficits and amortization of public debt. Thus, the ESSF provides fiscal spending stabilization
since it reduces its dependency on global business cycles and revenue’s volatility derived from fluctuations
of copper price and other sources. For example, budget reductions originated from economic downturns can
be financed in part with resources from the ESSF, reducing the need for issuing debt. According to the
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The Central Bank of Peru (a highly dollarized economy) seems to be the most averse
country, closely followed by Brazil. Only in Mexico appreciations are significant, but the
size of the effect is small. This suggest that reserve accumulation was significantly affected
by currency depreciations, but not by appreciations.
To summarize, the estimation of reaction functions suggest that intervention in the foreign
exchange market, except for a constant trend of reserve accumulation, was focused mainly
on preventing depreciations. This behavior seems to explain the asymmetric behavior of
the exchange rate, in particular for Brazil and Mexico. Interestingly, the Chilean Central
Bank does not seem to care about the nature of the exchange rate fluctuations. This is
consistent with the informal observation that Chile has the most flexible regime in the region.
Although the estimations bounds the change of the exchange rate between -0.3 % and 0.3 %,
suggesting the presence of a symmetric band, I could not find evidence that Central Bank
policies are responsible for the observed evolution of the exchange rate: neither depreciations
nor appreciations seems to trigger a change in the policy interest rate or reserves.
3.4 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the potential presence of asymmetries in the behavior of the exchange
rate, for a group of Latin-American countries that adopted Inflation Targeting. Using daily
data for the period 1999-2015, I implement a set of LSTAR-2 models to estimate the threshold
for the changes in the exchange rate, and I find evidence that the lower threshold is larger in
absolute value than the upper threshold, at least for Brazil and Mexico, and that transition
between regimes is smoother in these countries and in Peru than in Chile and Colombia.
Fiscal Responsibility Law, the ESSF receives each year the positive balance resulting from the difference
between the effective fiscal surplus and the contributions to the Pension Reserve Fund and to the Cen-
tral Bank of Chile, discounting the payment of public debt and advances made the year before.” (source
http://www.hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-funds/economic-and-social-stabilization-fund.html)
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I then proceed to implement a set of Markov-Switching models that highlights that
appreciation usually last longer than depreciation, and they are less volatile. Moreover,
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico show very long lasting appreciations (more than 30 trading days,
about a month and half).
I extended the results to analyze the role of policy. Using a set of GMM equations, I
estimate reaction functions for interest rates and reserve accumulation (using monthly data).
I find that the observed asymmetric behavior of the exchange rate can be attributed (at least
partially) to reserve accumulation, but not to interest rate policies. Interestingly, this result
does not hold for Chile, consistent with the informal observation that this is the only country
in Latin-America that is willing to tolerate larger fluctuations in the exchange rate in any
direction.
The evidence that I was able to gather suggest that there is “fear of floating” in Latin-
American countries using Inflation Targeting, with the exception of Chile, and that this
behavior seems to be more pronounced for Brazil and Mexico. More precisely, in these two
countries appreciations last longer than depreciations, the exchange rate band has a larger
lower threshold, the transition between regimes is very smooth, and the Central Banks
intervene mainly via sales of foreign exchange reserves when the exchange rate depreciates.
This evidence is consistent with Barbosa-Filho (2015) and Ros (2015), and it contrast with
the work of Pontines and Siregar (2012), who find that East Asian countries using Inflation
Targeting display “fear of floating in reverse” or “fear of appreciation”.25
25I am not aware of other author that have claimed a similar thing for the other three countries of my
sample.
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Table 3.1: Lagrange Multiplier “LM” Non-Linearity Tests
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Lag Decay Length 3 11 7 4 1
Linear Model Nested in LSTAR
LM 376.6835*** -1307.7203 93.2464*** 110.0916*** -463.2886
Linear Model Nested in LSTAR-2
LM 578.9817*** -920.5965 144.6916*** 214.9019*** -316.8815
LSTAR model Nested in LSTAR-2
LM 221.0704*** 298.9841*** 52.5499 *** 107.4777*** 132.5625***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.2: LSTAR-2 Model
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Lower Threshold -3.8055*** -0.3110*** -0.3459*** -2.2718*** -1.1031***
(0.0537) (1.8850) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0842)
Upper Threshold 1.7507*** 0.3008*** 0.2055*** 1.8378 1.4677***
(0.0873) (0.0026) (0.0017) (.) (0.0986)
Speed of Adjustment 4.3972 7577.5060 9327.3200 86.6119 12.9158**
(7.0863) (80147.43) (59160.59) (.) (6.0913)
Linear σ2 0.4137 0.1802 0.1727 0.1364 0.0453
Non-Linear σ2 0.3457 0.1780 0.1697 0.1525 0.0421
Ratio 0.8354 0.9878 0.9827 0.8947 0.9299
Observations 4436 4436 4436 4436 4436
R-Squared 0.467 0.2187 0.2839 0.3837 0.1932
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: Markov-Switching Model
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Lower Regime
Transition Pb 0.9733 0.9696 0.9552 0.9846 0.8832
( 0.0048) (0.0065) (0.0073) (0.0047) (0.0146)
Expected Duration 37.4223 32.9040 22.3039 64.9711 8.5613
(6.7705) (7.0379) ( 3.6313) (19.9761 ) (1.0669)
Variance 0.3557 0.2575 0.2091 0.2545 0.0725
Upper Regime
Transition Pb 0.8983 0.9057 0.8964 0.9148 0.8431
(0.0222) (0.0264) (0.0167) (0.0219) (0.0235)
Expected Duration 9.8320 10.6001 9.6509 11.7398 6.3725
(2.1457) (2.9759) (1.5544) (3.0161) (0.9558)
Variance 1.2112 0.7201 0.6836 0.7099 0.3128
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: LSTAR-2 Model Linear Part (Full List of Coefficients)
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant 0.0138 0.0102 -0.0035 0.0081 0.0010
(0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0072) (0.0051) (0.0031)
L1 0.6507*** 0.4782*** 0.6060*** 0.7162*** 0.4320***
(0.0221) (0.0211) (0.0487) (0.0333) (0.0269)
L2 -0.3646*** -0.1516*** -0.2983*** -0.4088*** -0.2435***
(0.0406) (0.0230) (0.0543) (0.0578) (0.0226)
L3 0.2304*** 0.1232*** 0.1302** 0.2344*** 0.1416***
(0.0356) (0.0234) (0.0517) (0.0369) (0.0206)
L4 -0.1512*** -0.0001 -0.0573 0.2310*** -0.0448**
(0.0346) (0.0239) (0.046) (0.0442) (0.0193)
L5 0.0739** 0.0080 -0.0023 -0.0345 0.0745***
(0.0340) (0.0243) (0.0391) (0.0441) (0.0198)
L6 -0.0357 -0.0211 0.0098 0.0466 -0.0401**
( 0.0339) (0.0233) (0.0294) (0.0443) (0.0196)
L7 0.0082 0.0414** -0.0230 -0.0112 0.0266
(0.0312) (0.0211) (0.0577) (0.0273) (0.0233)
L8 0.0244 0.0572* 0.0568* -0.0247
(0.0300) (0.0327) (0.0323) (0.0298)
L9 -0.0095 -0.0088 -0.0711** 0.0071
(0.0289) (0.0336) (0.0307) (0.0222)
L10 0.0630* 0.0258 0.0609** -0.0285
(0.0353) (0.0317) (0.0281) (0.0231)
L11 -0.0605* -0.0170 -0.070 0.0283
(0.0295) (0.0265) (0.064) (0.0216)
L12 0.0722 0.0081 0.237** 0.0111
(0.0281) (0.0313) (0.109) (0.0181)
L13 0.0026 0.0083 -0.0205 -0.0113
(0.0239) (0.0267) ( 0.0191) (0.0180)
L14 0.0073 -0.0021 -0.3260 -0.0050
(0.0247) (0.0244) (.) (0.0187)
L15 -0.0110 -0.0098 -0.0341* 0.0278
(0.0292) (0.0218) (0.0199) (0.0185)
L16 0.0489* 0.0406* -0.0282
(0.0227) (0.0204) (0.0197)
L17 -0.0516*** 0.0155
(0.0190) (0.0188)
L18 0.0210
(0.0168)
L19 0.0457***
(0.0167)
Observations 4436 4436 4436 4436 4436
R-Squared 0.3364 0.2187 0.2839 0.3837 0.1932
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: LSTAR-2 Model Non-Linear Part (Full List of Coefficients)
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant -0.4875 -0.0104 0.0289** -7.6688*** -1.5227
(0.3767) (0.0130) ( 0.0134) (0.0051) (4.5099)
L1 0.0315 0.0593* -0.0105 1.3603*** -24.1173***
(0.1204) (0.0300) (0.0667) (0.0333) (7.2930)
L2 0.0735 -0.1954*** 0.0614 0.3593*** -24.6934**
(0.1521) (0.0338) (0.0782) (0.0578) (11.6151)
L3 -0.1411 0.0390 0.0175 1.4989*** 34.6984**
(0.1798) (0.0345) (0.0708) (0.0369) (17.7269)
L4 0.4407** -0.1176*** -0.0065 35.2727 64.3030***
(0.1837) (0.0346) (0.0582) (.) (12.8336)
L5 -0.4209** 0.0647* 0.0643 -0.1131*** -118.7485
(0.1640) (0.0344) (0.0513) (0.0441) (114.5918)
L6 0.3677** -0.0464 -0.0668 1.8344*** 230.3089***
(0.1759) (0.0337) (0.0442) (0.0443) (72.6696)
L7 0.2302 -0.0221 0.0577 -2.7652*** 292.2510**
(0.2400) (0.0299) (0.0640) (0.0273) (132.5638)
L8 -0.3729* -0.1102** 4.3374*** -213.6767**
(0.2138) (0.0442) (0.0323) (101.1127)
L9 0.2776 0.0275 1.4860*** 82.4195***
( 0.2710) (0.0442) (0.0307) (30.0557)
L10 -0.1285 -0.0354 1.9861*** 327.6850***
(0.2183) (0.0440) (0.0281) (23.8769)
L11 -0.1410 0.1161*** -0.8618*** -342.5000
(0.2094) (0.0441) (0.0238) (.)
L12 0.0047 0.0775* -0.8647*** -94.8187***
(0.2770) ( 0.0449) (0.0225) (33.5089)
L13 -0.1530 0.0229 -0.1036*** -22.3516
(0.1488) (0.0431) (0.0191) (15.7596)
L14 -0.3481* 0.0289 -38.3190*** -175.8334***
(0.2018) (0.0422) (0.0527) (19.3134)
L15 0.3320 0.0554 2.9429*** 57.7587***
(0.2402) (0.0384) (0.0199) (19.8360)
L16 0.1184 -0.1400*** 295.1587***
(0.2223) (0.0204) (97.2449)
L17 -2.6107*** 226.1584***
(0.0190) (38.7235)
L18 314.4840***
(39.2204)
L19 -327.6949***
(57.8781)
Observations 4436 4436 4436 4436 4436
R-Squared 0.3364 0.2187 0.2839 0.3837 0.1932
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Markov-Switching Model Lower Regime (Full List of Coefficients)
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant -0.0082 -0.0024 0.0005 -0.0089* -0.0028
(0.0072) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0021)
L1 0.7090*** 0.6747*** 0.6328*** 0.6733*** 0.4438***
(0.0228) (0.0222) (0.0238) (0.0227) (0.0339)
L2 -0.4306*** -0.3755*** -0.3356*** -0.4201*** -0.3173***
(0.0268) (0.0241) (0.0264) (0.0231) (0.0168)
L3 0.2351*** 0.2302*** 0.2174** 0.2404 0.1584***
(0.0254) (0.0236) (0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0191)
L4 -0.1555*** -0.1351** -0.0903 -0.1640*** -0.1033***
(0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0249) (0.0267) (0.0136)
L5 0.0896** 0.0755*** 0.0786*** 0.0993 0.0590***
(0.0233) (0.0220) (0.0232) (0.0261) (0.0168)
L6 -0.0248 -0.0359 -0.0352* -0.0877 -0.0416**
(0.0262) (0.0232) (0.0206) (0.0228) (0.0168)
L7 0.1023 0.0062 0.0378 0.0452 0.0495***
(0.052) (0.0216) (0.0208) (0.0224) (0.0158)
L8 0.0146 -0.0306 -0.0208 -0.0158
(0.0264) (0.0198) (0.0217) (0.0153)
L9 -0.0108 0.0342* -0.0089 0.0232
(0.0225) (0.0195) (0.0226) (0.0149)
L10 0.0371* 0.0283 0.0057 -0.0420*
(0.0218) (0.0177) (0.0233) (0.0192)
L11 -0.0475* 0.0261 -0.064 0.0260
(0.0228) (0.0188) (0.050) (0.0197)
L12 -0.0529* 0.0111 0.017 -0.0124
(0.0252) (0.0201) (0.024) (0.0155)
L13 -0.0235 0.0217 -0.076* 0.0311*
(0.0242) (0.0169) (0.046) (0.0160)
L14 0.0547** 0.0116 0.074 0.0166
(0.0216) (0.0196) (0.048) (0.0157)
L15 -0.0406* 0.0138 -0.068 -0.0294
(0.0240) (0.0174) (0.050) (0.0202)
L16 0.0310 0.091 0.0235
(0.0208) (0.0223) (0.0187)
L17 -0.0070 -0.0057
(0.0189) (0.0141)
L18 0.0127
0.0152
L19 0.0077
(0.0136)
Variance 0.3557 0.2575 0.2091 0.2545 0.0725
Observations 4436 4436 4436 4436 4436
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: Markov-Switching Model Upper Regime (Full List of Coefficients)
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant 0.1053** 0.0336 0.0316 0.1124*** 0.0060
(0.0464) (0.0245) (0.0199) (0.0407) (0.0075)
L1 0.604*** 0.4230*** 0.5862*** 0.6503 *** 0.3427***
(0.0388) (0.0471) (0.0446) (0.1028) (0.0539)
L2 -0.3051*** -0.1814*** -0.2396*** -0.4112*** -0.1854***
(0.0645) (0.0427) (0.0562) (0.1246) (0.0388)
L3 0.1511* 0.1099** 0.1026* 0.2200* 0.1203***
(0.0727) (0.0436) (0.0519) (0.1164) (0.0325)
L4 -0.0034** 0.0178 -0.0484 -0.0898 -0.0010
(0.0699) (0.0484) (0.0417) (0.1033) (0.0326)
L5 -0.1013 0.0320 0.0093 -0.1465 0.0800**
(0.0935) (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.1012) (0.0319)
L6 0.0511 -0.0692 -0.0181 0.1820* -0.0437
(0.0784) (0.0446) (0.0366) (0.0983) (0.0322)
L7 0.0031 0.0562 -0.0137 -0.1418* 0.0099
(0.0886) (0.0631) (0.0357) (0.0751) (0.0370)
L8 -0.0253 0.0050 0.1269 -0.0547
(0.0700) (0.0378) (0.0883) (0.0467)
L9 0.0325 -0.0097 -0.0424 0.0248
(0.0823) (0.0389) (0.0956) (0.0406)
L10 0.0320 -0.0147 -0.0302 -0.0365
(0.0858) (0.0407) (0.0960) (0.0383)
L11 -0.0453 0.0685 -0.005 0.0330
(0.0714) (0.0447) (0.249) (0.0374)
L12 0.0402 -0.0699 -0.098 0.0167
(0.0931) (0.0449) (0.151) (0.0320)
L13 0.0261 0.0188 0.227 -0.0303
(0.0638) (0.0435) (0.166) (0.0310)
L14 -0.1086 0.0176 -0.167 -0.0194
(0.0892) (0.0415) (0.124) (0.0311)
L15 0.0503 0.0263 -0.111 0.0744**
(0.0720) (0.0383) (0.230) (0.0295)
L16 0.0602 0.1354*** -0.0492
(0.0428) (0.0516) (0.0320)
L17 -0.1575*** 0.0211
(0.0485) (0.0332)
L18 0.0220
(0.0302)
L19 0.0575*
(0.0308)
Variance 1.2112 0.7201 0.6836 0.7099 0.3128
Observations 4436 4436 4436 4436 4436
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: GMM Estimation of Interest Rate Reaction Functions
∆ ln(Rate) Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant -0.0002 -0.0065** -0.0083*** -0.0033* 0.0086***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0023)
∆ Inflation (t-1) 0.2950*** 0.1344*** 0.1779*** -0.0017 0.0833***
(0.0057) (0.0400) (0.0359) (0.0055) (0.0230)
Outputgap (t-1) -0.0003 0.0008 0.0008** 0.0011* 0.0022**
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0007)
∆ln(XR) (t-1) 0.2199** 0.3888** 0.0166 0.0221 -0.0521
(0.0897) (0.1502) (0.0580) (0.0156) (0.2546)
Observations 183 147 82 78 103
Hansen’s J χ p-value 0.5273 0.2812 0.6157 0.9986 0.8821
Instruments: Lags 2/12 of Output-gap, ∆Inflation,
Domestic and Federal Funds Rates (in logs)
Standard error in parentheses (Newey-West “HAC” Covariance Matrix)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9: GMM Estimation of Reserve Accumulation Reaction Functions
∆ ln(Reserves) Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant 0.0110*** 0.0031 0.0079*** 0.0110*** 0.0107***
(0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013)
∆ Inflation (t-1) -0.0657* -0.0037 0.0222 -0.0138 -0.0154***
(0.0331) (0.0069) (0.0188) (0.0106) (0.0062)
Outputgap (t-1) 0.0011* 0.0018*** 0.0006*** 0.0014*** 0.0006*
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
∆ln(XR) (t-1) -0.2307*** 0.0222 -0.2303*** -0.0842** -0.2428**
(0.0580) (0.0934) (0.0420) (0.0357) (0.1194)
Observations 179 147 82 74 103
Hansen’s J χ p-value 0.3998 0.5052 0.7820 0.1700 0.6098
Instruments: Lags 2/12 of Output-gap, ∆Inflation,
Domestic and Federal Funds Rates (in logs)
Standard error in parentheses (Newey-West “HAC” Covariance Matrix)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10: GMM Estimation of Interest Rate Reaction Functions
∆ ln(Rate) Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant -0.0013 -0.0065 -0.0116*** -0.0017* 0.0125**
(0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0033) (0.0010) (0.0042)
∆ Inflation (t-1) 0.2949*** 0.1344*** 0.1806*** -0.0109 0.0788***
(0.0403) (0.0422) (0.0391) (0.0092) (0.0227)
Outputgap (t-1) -0.0002 0.0008 0.0008** 0.0019*** 0.0024***
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.003) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Appreciation (t-1) 0.1774 0.3865 -0.2248 0.2531** 0.4560
(0.1484) (0.3256) (0.2249) (0.1050) (0.5695)
Depreciation (t-1) 0.2243* 0.3894 0.1224 -0.1301* -0.3710
(0.1153) (0.2386) (0.0969) (0.0615) (0.3010)
Observations 183 147 82 78 103
Hansen’s J χ p-value 0.4992 0.2695 0.6542 0.8652 0.8202
Instruments: Lags 2/12 of Output-gap, ∆Inflation,
Domestic and Federal Funds Rates (in logs)
Standard error in parentheses (Newey-West “HAC” Covariance Matrix)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.11: GMM Estimation of Reserve Accumulation Reaction Functions
∆ ln(Reserves) Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant 0.0169*** 0.0043 0.0079*** 0. 0139*** 0.0144***
(0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
∆ Inflation (t-1) -0.0631* -0.0040 0.0235 -0.0166* -0.0097*
(0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0194) (0.0090) (0.0054)
Outputgap (t-1) 0.0011 0.0017*** 0.0006*** 0.0013*** 0.0007**
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Appreciation (t-1) 0.0034 0.0705 -0.2189 0.0914* 0.0892
(0.1337) (0.1750) (0.1430) (0.0502) (0.1140)
Depreciation (t-1) -0.3200*** -0.0089 -0.2303*** -0.1707*** -0.5477***
(0.0633) (0.1716) (0.0665) (0.0534) (0.2045)
Observations 179 147 82 74 103
Hansen’s J χ p-value 0.3554 0.5013 0.7376 0.1848 0.5598
Instruments: Lags 2/12 of Output-gap, ∆Inflation,
Domestic and Federal Funds Rates (in logs)
Standard error in parentheses (Newey-West “HAC” Covariance Matrix)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3.1: EMP and Natural Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate
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Figure 3.2: EMP and Natural Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate
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Figure 3.3: EMP and Natural Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate
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Figure 3.4: EMP and Natural Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate
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Figure 3.5: EMP and Natural Log of the Nominal Exchange Rate
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR INVESTMENT
EPISODES DETERMINANTS
This appendix presents additional results for the estimation of the determinants of sus-
tained investment surges episodes, using different models from the limited dependent variable
family. Tables A.1 and A.2 present alternative models. The first column shows the standard
results from a Logit model, without estimating the average marginal effects for comparison
purposes.1 As in all Logit models, the coefficients represent the log of the odds ratios. The
odds ratios represent the ratio of the likelihood of the “positive” outcome over the “neg-
ative” outcome. In our case, the likelihood that episode dummy is equal to one, over the
likelihood that the episode dummy is equal to zero. For example a coefficient of 1.2 means
that the positive outcome is 20 per cent more likely than the negative outcome (when the
independent variable is increased by one unit), while a coefficient of 0.8 means that the
negative outcome is 20 per cent less likely. Tables A.1 and A.2 present the log of the odds
ratio, so the negative coefficients indicate an odd ratio lower than 1, and thus an increase
in the independent variable lowers the likelihood of an episode, while ratios bigger than 1
associated with positive coefficients, increase it.2
The second and third column implements the Conditional Logit model. Conditional
Logit models are useful to analyze how the characteristics of the different choices affect
1Unfortunately, there is no easy way to estimate the average marginal effect for a set of models that I
will present soon, so I choose to stick with the “raw” estimations.
2In other words, the coefficients should be raised to the power of e to be interpreted as odd-ratios.
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the likelihood of the individuals to pick among them. I group countries according to some
common characteristic: countries that experienced an episode in the past (column 2) and
anywhere in the sample (column 3). This accounts for the fact that countries that experience
episodes may have some features that make them more likely to experience another episode
in the future.
The fourth and fifth columns introduce the Re-Logit and the Firth Logit models. These
two models account for the presence of rare events by penalizing the standard estimations. In
our sample the number of observations associated with an episode taking place is relatively
small compared to the number of observations where no episode takes place, and the ratio
got worse and worse as we include additional covariates with limited coverage. I present
results for a first specification that includes the covariates with a broad coverage, and the
last specification, which cut the number of observations by about one sixth of the original
sample of around 6,200.
The purpose of tables A.1 and A.2 is to search for unexpected changes in the coefficient.
It is good to see that the results do not depend on the type of model adopted. Notice
that the signs, the statistically significance and the size of the effects is more less similar in
different models. We can verify that most of the variables that were consistently important
in our baseline specification remain important using alternative models, except perhaps for
inflation (but it was close to being not significant in the last specification of the baseline
results).
While very useful, the previous results do not properly account for the fact that countries
that had an episode may differ from countries that do not have them. As I first check, I
implement a set of Multinomial Probit models, with a dependent variable that is exactly the
same as the original episode dummy, except that it takes the value of 2 instead of 1 when
the country had an episode in the past. Unlike the standard Probit models, where a country
can have an episode or not, here a country can have an episode, can have an episode given
217
that it had one in the past, or it simply can have no episode. The purpose of this exercise
is once again to detect drastic changes in the coefficients among different models from the
limited dependent variable family.
Tables A.3 and A.4 show the average marginal effects for the occurrence of a first episode
and the occurrence of a non-first episode. Consider the table for first episodes. Most of
the time the coefficients associated with undervaluation and lagged per capita growth are
significant, but the size of the effect of growth is reduced substantially. Human capital is
still significant but the effect is smaller. The main difference is that now the capital flow
variables change sign. But notice that this is effect seems to be driven by FDI flows. The
external factors are no longer significant, and trade openness is statistically significant and
has a negative coefficient suggesting that more open countries are less likely to experience
an episode.3 To summarize, using a Multinomial Probit models does not lead to a drastic
change in our main results.
A Nested Logit model is another popular choice that allows for a richer structure by
modeling choice using a decision tree. In the multinomial model the error terms could be
correlated if similar choices are related. A Nested Logit model can correct this. For my
present purposes, I may want to specify a model with two branches. The first branch of the
tree may include whether a country had an episode in the past or not, and a second branch
whether a country has an episode today or not. But unfortunately, this is approach is not
possible because I do not have choice specific variables by branch. Instead, I rely on models
that does not need observables that determine branch choice. Tables A.5 and A.6 display the
3It is also interesting to take a look at the table that presents the results for non-first episodes. Now
only a couple of variables seems to matter, including trade openness, capital account openness and terms of
trade. Human capital changes it sign, while net capital flows seems to be the only variable that remains.
The lagged capital stock per capital, lagged growth and undervaluation are not always significant and their
sign change, in particular when we added additional covariates. Perhaps the low number of cases where our
episode dummy is equal to 2 is driving these results.
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results when I use models from the family of Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models
(GLLAMM); they impose hierarchy and structure without variables that define choice at
each part of the tree.
Table A.5 show the different specification of a linear model that considers that countries
that had an episode in the past are part of different branch than countries that never had
an episode episode before. Table A.6 put all the countries that had an episode anywhere
in the sample in one branch, and the rest on the other one. Notice this second branch is
“degenerate”, as there is nothing to choose there. But it still make sense to check whether
the results are robust. We can see that all the variables have the same sign and the same
statistical significance. Although the size of effects do change by significant amounts, the
differences are reasonable. For example the size of effect of undervaluation in column one
in table A.6 is about two thirds of the original effect, but the number looks plausible (it is
0.022 vs. 0.29).
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Table A.1: Robustness Logits II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit Relogit Firth Logit
Underval81 0.377*** 0.400*** 0.264** 0.264** 0.375***
(0.116) (0.119) (0.115) (0.115) (0.116)
Lag Growth 7.708*** 7.268*** 6.810*** 6.810*** 7.685***
(0.797) (0.810) (0.825) (0.825) (0.797)
Lag KL -0.272*** -0.342*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.272***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035)
Observations 6,230 6,230 3,860 3,860 6,230
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.2: Robustness Logits III
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit Relogit Firth Logit
Underval81 1.034** 0.866** 0.882** 0.882** 0.874**
(0.415) (0.368) (0.377) (0.377) (0.384)
Lag Growth 8.913** 8.787** 7.809** 7.809** 8.889**
(3.714) (3.727) (3.742) (3.742) (3.572)
Lag KL -2.176*** -2.112*** -1.951*** -1.951*** -2.114***
(0.415) (0.420) (0.416) (0.416) (0.402)
Fiscal 0.335 0.285 0.161 0.161 0.339
(0.288) (0.290) (0.292) (0.292) (0.281)
Inflation -1.442 -1.506 -1.247 -1.247 0.010
(1.101) (1.089) (1.027) (1.027) (0.016)
XR Stability -0.725 -0.839* -0.564 -0.564 -0.598
(0.472) (0.476) (0.475) (0.475) (0.458)
Crisis 5y -0.798*** -0.815*** -0.743** -0.743** -0.867***
(0.286) (0.290) (0.291) (0.291) (0.274)
Rents -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Trade -0.373 -0.742 -0.566 -0.566 -0.205
(0.433) (0.465) (0.454) (0.454) (0.413)
KA open -0.099 -0.077 -0.058 -0.058 -0.083
(0.101) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099)
FDI Inflows -0.055 -0.026 -0.025 -0.025 -0.057
(0.064) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.064)
Port Inflows -0.087*** -0.081*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.081***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Reserves 0.086 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.082
(0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
TOT -0.637 -0.593 -0.656 -0.656 -0.616
(0.831) (0.821) (0.819) (0.819) (0.788)
FFend -0.171*** -0.182*** -0.196*** -0.196*** -0.171***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.048)
Global Uncertainty -0.073** -0.070** -0.076** -0.076** -0.068**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
Human Capital 1.891** 2.191** 1.968** 1.968** 1.937**
(0.898) (0.883) (0.906) (0.906) (0.882)
Capita GDP 1.335*** 1.217*** 1.157*** 1.157*** 1.216***
(0.439) (0.430) (0.433) (0.433) (0.416)
Durable -0.015** -0.018** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 1,029 1,029 787 787 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.3: Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 1#
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit
Underval81 0.010** 0.014** 0.043*** 0.031** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Lag Growth 0.186*** 0.320*** 0.203** 0.187** 0.199**
(0.049) (0.061) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082)
Lag KL -0.010*** -0.011*** 0.003 -0.015* -0.013*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007)
Fiscal 0.015** -0.006 0.007 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Inflation -0.008 -0.001 -0.017 -0.020*
(0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
XR Stability 0.000 -0.007 -0.012 -0.016
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Crisis 5y -0.016* -0.019* -0.022**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Rents 0.000* 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade -0.032** -0.062*** -0.066***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.022)
KA open -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
NET Inflows 0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI Inflows 0.002**
(0.001)
Port Inflows -0.001
(0.001)
Reserves -0.001
(0.001)
TOT 0.017 -0.003 -0.001
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
FFend -0.004** -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Global Uncertainty 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Human Capital 0.037** 0.033**
(0.014) (0.015)
Capita GDP 0.017 0.016
(0.011) (0.010)
Durable -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6,230 3,298 1,084 1,041 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
# 0 Denotes no episode, 1 First Episode, 2 Episode + Episode in the Past
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Table A.4: Multinomial Probit, Average Marginal Effect Case 2#
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit Mprobit
Underval81 -0.017 -0.014 -0.004 0.001 -0.003
(0.015) (0.024) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036)
Lag Growth 0.523*** 0.666*** -0.138 0.296 0.158
(0.116) (0.189) (0.335) (0.334) (0.356)
Lag KL 0.031*** -0.024*** -0.066*** 0.021 0.018
(0.004) (0.007) (0.015) (0.039) (0.039)
Fiscal 0.026 0.072** 0.068** 0.068**
(0.017) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Inflation 0.005 -0.005 0.004 0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
XR Stability -0.066** 0.072 0.038 0.036
(0.028) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Crisis 5y -0.002 0.020 0.027
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Rents 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.302*** 0.366*** 0.359***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.043)
KA open -0.034*** -0.020* -0.021*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
NET Inflows -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
FDI Inflows -0.009
(0.006)
Port Inflows -0.003
(0.002)
Reserves 0.016**
(0.007)
TOT -0.163** -0.157** -0.158**
(0.065) (0.066) (0.067)
FFend 0.009* 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Global Uncertainty -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Human Capital -0.552*** -0.543***
(0.088) (0.090)
Capita GDP -0.024 -0.021
(0.044) (0.044)
Durable -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 6,230 3,298 1,084 1,041 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
# 0 Denotes no episode, 1 First Episode, 2 Episode + Episode in the Past
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Table A.5: GLLAMM Models 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy GLLAMM GLLAMM GLLAMM GLLAMM GLLAMM
Underval81 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.077*** 0.066*** 0.064***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Lag Growth 0.473*** 0.795*** 0.678*** 0.509** 0.500**
(0.052) (0.095) (0.217) (0.217) (0.227)
Lag KL -0.022*** -0.033*** -0.060*** -0.125*** -0.125***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.025) (0.025)
Fiscal 0.021** -0.010 0.013 0.012
(0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Inflation -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
XR Stability 0.010 -0.016 -0.017 -0.019
(0.015) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Crisis 5y -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.063***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Rents 0.002** -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.020 -0.035 -0.038
(0.022) (0.026) (0.027)
KA open 0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
NET Inflows -0.002 -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.004
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.005***
(0.002)
Reserves 0.005
(0.004)
TOT -0.052 0.004 0.002
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
FFend -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.136** 0.140**
(0.064) (0.064)
Capita GDP 0.071** 0.073***
(0.028) (0.028)
Durable -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6,230 3,298 1,084 1,041 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.6: GLLAMM Models 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Episode Dummy GLLAMM GLLAMM GLLAMM GLLAMM GLLAMM
Underval81 0.022*** 0.026** 0.070*** 0.060** 0.058**
(0.008) (0.013) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Lag Growth 0.441*** 0.767*** 0.660*** 0.491** 0.486**
(0.051) (0.094) (0.216) (0.216) (0.227)
Lag KL -0.012*** -0.025*** -0.055*** -0.124*** -0.125***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.025) (0.025)
Fiscal 0.022** -0.012 0.008 0.008
(0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Inflation -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
XR Stability 0.009 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013
(0.015) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Crisis 5y -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.061***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Rents 0.002** -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade -0.020 -0.030 -0.030
(0.022) (0.024) (0.026)
KA open 0.005 -0.000 -0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
NET Inflows -0.001 -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI Inflows -0.004
(0.004)
Port Inflows -0.005***
(0.002)
Reserves 0.005
(0.004)
TOT -0.056 -0.000 -0.004
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
FFend -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Global Uncertainty -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Human Capital 0.136** 0.135**
(0.062) (0.063)
Capita GDP 0.076*** 0.078***
(0.028) (0.028)
Durable -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6,230 3,298 1,084 1,041 1,029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX B
GMM ESTIMATIONS USING THE INFLATION GAP
This Appendix includes the additional GMM estimations for the third paper, section 4.
Here I reproduce the tables 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11. But instead of the change in the rate
of inflation, here I show the results using the difference between observed inflation and the
target inflation. Because the Central Bank use a band for the target inflation, rather than
a single number, I choose to use the mean. Thus, if the Central Bank has a target inflation
between 2% and 4%, I set the target to 3%.
Tables B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 include the results. It is comforting to notice that the main
lesson holds. In all the countries, with the sole exception of Chile, depreciations seems to
trigger a sale of foreign exchange reserves, while appreciation matter very little: either the
sign of the coefficient is wrong, as in Colombia in Peru, or the results are not significant and
the coefficient is smaller in absolute size (see table B.4). Interest rate changes do not seem
to be clearly related to exchange rate changes.
It is worth to notice that the coefficient associated with inflation gap often has the wrong
sign (it is negative but it should be positive), and its size is small, and always much smaller
than the coefficient associated with exchange rate changes (see table B.1). Although the
problem could be the precise definition of the inflation gap, this may also imply that Latin-
American Central Banks pay much more attention to exchange rates than to inflation, at
least in a month by month basis. This is clearly inconsistent with the usual description of
the way Inflation Targeting works.
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Table B.1: GMM Estimation of Interest Rate Reaction Functions
∆ ln(Rate) Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant -0.0061*** 0.0057*** -0.0054* 0.0033* 0.0077***
(0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0020)
Inflationgap (t-1) 0.0019** -0.0003* 0.0006 -0.0077** -0.0057***
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0030) (0.0020)
Outputgap (t-1) 0.0009 0.0029** 0.0002 0.0011*** 0.0028***
(0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0008)
∆ln(XR) (t-1) 0.1532* 0.4318** 0.0399** 0.0342 0.2350
(0.0794) (0.1938) (0.0193) (0.0299) (0.2342)
Observations 183 169 70 78 116
Hansen’s J χ p-value 0.4024 0.6186 0.9867 0.9923 0.3175
Instruments: Lags 2/12 of Output-gap, Inflation-gap,
Domestic and Federal Funds Rates (in logs)
Standard error in parentheses (Newey-West “HAC” Covariance Matrix)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.2: GMM Estimation of Reserve Accumulation Reaction Functions
∆ ln(Reserves) Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant 0.0161*** 0.0056*** 0.0108*** 0.0194*** 0.01667***
(0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0017)
Inflationgap (t-1) -0.0018** 0.0016** -0.0005 -0.0074*** -0.0043***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Outputgap (t-1) 0.0002 0.0022*** 0.0003** 0.0009*** 0.0013***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004)
∆ln(XR) (t-1) -0. 1606** -0.1588*** -0.2322*** -0.0364 -0.5139***
(0.0666) (0.0842) (0.0375) (0.0270) (0.1533)
Observations 179 169 70 74 116
Hansen’s J χ p-value 0.2410 0.6849 0.4230 0.5787 0.7475
Instruments: Lags 2/12 of Output-gap, Inflation-gap,
Domestic and Federal Funds Rates (in logs)
Standard error in parentheses (Newey-West “HAC” Covariance Matrix)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.3: GMM Estimation of Interest Rate Reaction Functions
∆ ln(Rate) Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant -0.0070* 0.0151* -0.0076** 0.0038*** 0.0018
(0.0040) (0.0080) (0.0034) (0.0014) (0.0025)
Inflationgap (t-1) 0.0017* 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0057*** -0.0066***
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Outputgap (t-1) 0.0008 0.0022 0.0003** 0.0007*** 0.0028***
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0007)
Appreciation (t-1) 0.0792 0.7536* -0.1472** 0.1406 -0.6188**
(0.1355) (0.4119) (0.2526) (0.0855) (0.3087)
Depreciation (t-1) 0.1916* -0.0778 0.1403 -0.0252* 0.6756
(0.1039) (0.3001) (0.0660) (0.0134) (0.3843)
Observations 183 149 70 78 116
Hansen’s J χ p-value 0.3675 0.6242 0.9756 0.9947 0.7043
Instruments: Lags 2/12 of Output-gap, Inflation-gap,
Domestic and Federal Funds Rates (in logs)
Standard error in parentheses (Newey-West “HAC” Covariance Matrix)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
229
Table B.4: GMM Estimation of Reserve Accumulation Reaction Functions
∆ ln (Reserves) Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Constant 0.0220*** 0.0019 0.0088*** 0.0208*** 0.0174***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0024)
Inflationgap (t-1) -0.0017** 0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0073*** -0.0042***
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Outputgap (t-1) 0.0002 0.0024*** 0.0004*** 0.0009*** 0.0013***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Appreciation (t-1) 0.1352 0.0311 -0.2610** 0.0405 -0.4568**
(0.1452) (0.1637) (0.1326) (0.0625) (0.2258)
Depreciation (t-1) -0.2219*** 0.3439 -0.1491*** -0.0799*** -0.5811**
(0.0701) (0.2174) (0.0496) (0.0424) (0.2423)
Observations 179 169 70 74 116
Hansen’s J χ p-value 0.2360 0.7017 0.3981 0.5119 0.7287
Instruments: Lags 2/12 of Output-gap, Inflation-gap,
Domestic and Federal Funds Rates (in logs)
Standard error in parentheses (Newey-West “HAC” Covariance Matrix)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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